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Technological developments are increasingly important to
criminal investigation. Every modern law enforcement agency
needs access to scientific laboratories. Scientific methods of identifi-
cation, such as fingerprinting, prove both guilt and innocence. With
the increasing efficiency of data retrieval and collection and the vol-
untary sharing of facilities and expertise, law enforcement benefits
immensely from progress in the applied sciences, often with result-
ing gains to society.' But technological progress has its dark side, as
* Associate Professor of Law, University of Bridgeport School of Law. J.D., North-
western University School of Law; A.B. Brown University. The author wishes to express
his appreciation to Professors Elizabeth Marsh Alexander M. Meiklejohn and Margaret
V. Sachs for their helpful comments on earlier drafts of the Article.
1 There is a substantial body of literature on technology and the criminal process.
See generally E. IMWINKELRIED, SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE AND EXPERT EVIDENCE (2d ed. 1981);
A. MOENSSENS, F. INBAU & J. STARRS, SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE IN CRIMINAL CASES (3d ed.
1986). This parallels an astonishing increase in the variety and sophistication of visual
surveillance devices. See, e.g., Westin, Science, Privacy and Freedom: Issues and Proposals for
the 1970's, 66 COLUM. L. REV. 1003, 1004-17 (1966)(analyzing various forms of technol-
ogy used in physical, data, and psychological surveillance); Note, Electronic Visual Surveil-
lance and the Fourth Amendment: The Arrival of Big Brother?, 3 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 261,
266 (1976)(describing various electronic visual surveillance devices)[hereinafter Elec-
tronic Visual Surveillance]; Note, Police Use of CCTV Surveillance: Constitutional Implications and
Proposed Regulations, 13 U. MIcH. J.L. REF. 571, 573-75 (1980)(discussing use of closed-
circuit cameras for area surveillance). One of the most important recent developments
is in the area of genetic tracking: the use of DNA typing to identify suspects from traces
of body fluids, skin, and hair. See Moss,. DNA-The New Fingerprints, 74 A.B.A. J. 66
(1988); Froelich & Leyden, Genetic Fingerprint Technology May Revolutionize Crime Solving,
Hartford Courant, April 24, 1988, at 1, col. 1; Johnson, DNA 'Fingerprinting' Tests Becom-
ing a Factor in Courts, N.Y. Times, Feb. 7, 1988, at 1, col. 4.
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even universally recognized achievements in science create harmful
byproducts.
The most obvious social cost associated with the use of new
technology in law enforcement is the loss of personal privacy that
results from the increased ability of police agencies to spy on private
conduct. 2 While this problem has existed ever since science first en-
hanced a human sense, legislatures and courts have only recently
begun to address it on a broad scale. While statutes and common
law decisions address isolated aspects of the law enforce-
ment/privacy implications of technology,3 the struggle has focused
2 In 1975, Senator John Tunney noted:
Technological developments are arriving so rapidly and are changing the na-
ture of our society so fundamentally that we are in danger of losing the capacity to
shape our own destiny.
This danger is particularly ominous when the new technology is designed for
surveillance purposes, for in this case the tight relationship between technology and
power is most obvious. Control over the technology of surveillance conveys effec-
tive control over our privacy, our freedom and our dignity-in short, control over
the most meaningful aspects of our lives as free human beings.
Hearings on Surveillance Technology Before the Subcommittee on Constitutional Rights of the Senate
Committee on the Judiciary, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. 1 (1975)(statement of Sen. Tunney). See
also Amsterdam, Perspectives on the Fourth Amendment, 58 MINN. L. REV. 349, 386
(1974)(quoting Silverman v. United States, 365 U.S. 505, 509 (1961))("In recent years
, * rapid technological advances and the consequent recognition of the [resulting]
'frightening paraphernalia' . . . have underlined the possibilty of worse horrors yet to
come."); Fishman, Electronic Tracking Devices and the Fourth Amendment: Knotts, Karo, and
the Questions Still Unanswered, 34 CATH. U.L. REV. 277, 393-94 (1985)(new technology
threatens fourth amendment privacy protections); Tomkovicz, Beyond Secrecy for Secrecy's
Sake: Toward an Expanded Vision of the Fourth Amendment Privacy Province, 36 HASTINGS LJ.
645, 713 (1985) ("Effective and comprehensive visual surveillance and recordation ...
infringe on ... informational privacy essential to travel, physical mobility and associa-
tion."); Note, Electronic Visual Surveillance, supra note 1, at 264 (characterizing the effects
of visual electronic surveillance as "far more serious than those of electronic eavesdrop-
ping"); Note, From Private Places to Personal Privacy: A Post-Katz Study of Fourth Amendment
Protection, 43 N.Y.U. L. REV. 968, 975 (1968) (describing enhanced observations as "[t]he
most odious modem searches," no less intrusive than "the most blatant trespassory in-
vasions") [hereinafter Private Places].
Technological intrusion has become a major part of modern fantasy life. It is hard
to find a television crime show that does not involve some techno-gimmick such as elec-
tronic surveillance, night-scope observation, or beeper monitoring. For instance, David
Letterman once teased his viewers by telling them that he had a radio scanner and would
be listening to all of their cellular telephone conversations, Late Night with David Letter-
man (NBC television broadcast, Dec. 18, 1987), and one popular song of recent years
was "Every Breath You Take," the Police's anthem of an obsessed person watching
every movement of a former lover. The Police, Synchronicity (A&M Records
1983)(words and music by Sting). The real obsession is ours; the tension between pri-
vacy and surveillance is one of the major concerns of the 1980's.
3 See, e.g., Frye v. United States, 293 F. 1013, 1014 (D.C. Cir. 1923)(results of early
form of polygraph examination inadmissible under evidence law); Employee Polygraph
Protection Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-347, 102 Stat. 646, 646-53 (1988)(prohibiting
random polygraph testing by private employers); Omnibus Crime Control & Safe
Streets Act of 1968, Pub. L. No. 90-351, 82 Stat. 197 (1968)(regulating electronic eaves-
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principally on the interpretation of the fourth amendment's protec-
tions against unreasonable searches and seizures. 4 For most of the
nation's history, the courts treated that amendment as regulating
only "physical" searches and "tangible" seizures.5 This approach
implicated technology only indirectly, such as where a court holds
the results of scientific analysis inadmissible under the exclusionary
rule because police obtained tested evidence in an unconstitutional
search or seizure.
6
In 1967 the Supreme Court changed its approach to evaluating
searches and seizures. In Katz v. United States7 the Court brought
electronic surveillance under constitutional control by redefining
"searches and seizures" to include constructive intrusions and in-
tangible appropriations.8 The Court's method was relatively simple
and somewhat ironic. Katz changed the existing understanding of
the fourth amendment as a straightforward proscription of certain
unreasonable and unauthorized actions, primarily arrests, physical
searches, and confiscations, to a less specific protection of personal
privacy. Under the Court's analysis, any governmental action that
invades a protected privacy interest is subject to the fourth amend-
ment regardless of the form of the invasion. 9 Because law enforce-
ment use of technology almost invariably diminishes someone's
privacy, the Court thereby created a model for regulating the use of
technology on a general basis.
The "paradigm" concept explains the significance of Katz. As
explained by Thomas Kuhn, a paradigm is a theory or model that
dropping); W. PROSSER & P. KEETON, THE LAW OF TORTS, ch. 20 (5th ed. 1984)(general
survey of common law and statutory actions and remedies for privacy invasions).
4 The fourth amendment states:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects,
against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants
shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particu-
larly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.
U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
5 See infra text accompanying notes 16-29.
6 See, e.g., Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 448, 449-73 (1971)(plurality
opinion) (suppressing microscopic analysis of vacuum sweepings obtained in an uncon-
stitutional search of defendant's automobile); Davis v. Mississippi, 394 U.S. 721, 723-26
(1969)(suppressing fingerprint evidence obtained as a result of an unlawful arrest);
Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165, 166, 169-74 (1952)(suppressing two morphine cap-
sules obtained by pumping defendant's stomach). Cf. United States v. Jacobsen, 466
U.S. 109, 122-26 (1984) (scientific analysis of substance to determine whether it was con-
traband was neither search nor seizure); Texas v. Brown, 460 U.S. 730, 735-44
(1983)(plurality opinion)(testimony as to chemical analysis of substance seized from de-
fendant was properly admitted because seizure was lawful).
7 389 U.S. 347 (1967).




attempts to explain all known relevant principles, but which is open
to continuing reappraisal and development. 10 Professor Kuhn's
paradigms are breakthrough scientific achievements that attract "an
enduring group of adherents... [and] leave all sorts of problems" " I
for them to resolve. Legal paradigms are well entrenched rules and
principles that provide inspiration and direction for judicial deci-
sionmaking in a variety of related settings. Paradigms may be
superceded, however, when they no longer help to resolve difficult
or important problems.'
2
The expectations paradigm adopted in Katz suffers from several
serious defects and should be replaced. While the decision is prop-
erly recognized as one of the Warren Court's major achievements in
the constitutional law of criminal procedure,' 3 it has not had the
effect of rewriting fourth amendment principles to monitor all law
enforcement activities that implicate privacy. If the main virtue of
Katz is that it attempted to provide a general framework for analysis
in later cases, its main vice lies in the amorphous structure man-
dated by that ambitious purpose. Courts applying the expectations
paradigm to different settings have differed sharply on its impact on
various law enforcement practices. While the Supreme Court has
labored to unify the law concerning individual techniques, close de-
cisions and shifting majorities have resulted in a crazy melange of
rules and principles. Despite the Court's use of impact rather than
means to define "search" and "seizure," courts have often found
themselves lost in a maze of baffling and self-contradictory prece-
dents that defy consistent analysis. Moreover, the Court's under-
standable hesitancy to establish immutable rules has encouraged
lower courts to emphasize fine and artificial distinctions in various
10 T. KUHN, THE STRUCTURE OF SCIENTIFIC REVOLUTIONS 10-22 (2d ed. 1970). Legal
commentators have recognized the application of Professor Kuhn's terminology. See,
e.g., Diver, Policymaking Paradigms in Administrative Law, 95 HARV. L. REV. 393, 394-95 &
n.9 (1981) (using the concept to explain two different models of administrative decision-
making); Eisenberg, The Bargain Principle and its Limits, 95 HARV. L. REV. 741, 751 & n.31
(1982). Professor Kuhn also recognized the role of the paradigm concept in legal rea-
soning, analogizing a scientific paradigm to "an accepted judicial decision in the com-
mon law." T. KUHN, supra, at 23.
11 T. KUHN, supra note 10, at 10. "To be accepted as a paradigm, a theory must seem
better than its competitors, but it need not, and in fact never does, explain all the facts
with which it can be confronted." Id. at 17-18.
12 Professor Kuhn traces the role of paradigms in advancing scientific understanding.
Id. at 10-11, 17-18, 23-30, 52-65, 92-95, 174-91. He defines scientific revolutions as
"those non-cumulative episodes in which an older paradigm is replaced in whole or in
part by an incompatible new one." Id. at 92. This occurs when the existing paradigm is
no longer adequate to explain a problem or concept. Id. This is true of Katz's expecta-
tions paradigm and the problem of visual searches.
13 See infra note 50.
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factual settings. Finally, by manipulating and redefining the thresh-
old privacy interest required for fourth amendment protection,
courts have allowed numerous intrusive governmental actions, such
as invasions of open private property and some electronic surveil-
lance, to escape constitutional scrutiny.
14
As a result, the constitutional law of search and seizure is
largely indeterminate. This is especially true with respect to govern-
mental observations aided by technological surveillance devices.
The judicial assertion of authority in this area has benefited society
by creating a legal monitor of some of the ill effects of scientific ad-
vancement, but it has done so at the expense of clarity, guidance,
and coherence.
This Article addresses legal responses to visual observations by
law enforcement officers, most of them using enhancement devices
such as binoculars or telescopes. The Supreme Court has not spo-
ken directly on the use of such devices, which is ironic because they
have been in common use for many years.' 5 Lower courts have reg-
ularly considered the use of such visual enhancement devices, but
they have moved in a variety of different directions, each supposedly
mandated by Katz. Part II below analyzes the premises of Katz and
the different ways courts have applied its teachings to visual surveil-
lance. Part III explains these inconsistent approaches in terms of
the incompatible beliefs about privacy and different understandings
of Katz held by judges. It then argues that the expectations para-
digm should be replaced by a more inclusive Intrusion Paradigm.
Part IV proposes a model of analysis for visual searches that is pre-
mised on four norms-general principles that follow from widely
shared notions of personal privacy and law enforcement responsibil-
ity. Application of these principles would permit the courts to es-
tablish clear and satisfactory guidelines for law enforcement and
provide additional protection for personal privacy. They are also
sufficiently flexible to permit judicial or legislative refinement in ap-
propriate cases.
14 See infra Part II.B.
15 Individuals have used telescopes regularly since the early 1600's, when Galileo
designed the modem refracting telescope. 18 ENCYCLOPEDIA'BRITANNICA MACROPAEDIA
97 (1978). Binoculars are somewhat more advanced and of more recent origin, but are
more widely used by police officers and the general public.
1989]
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II. SEARCHES, SEIZURES, AND SIGHTINGS
A. FOURTH AMENDMENT THEORY
1. The Expectations Paradigm
It was once simple to determine whether law enforcement ac-
tion presented a fourth amendment issue. For many years, the
Supreme Court took a formalistic view of the amendment's scope, t 6
limiting it to physical searches and seizures of persons, houses, pa-
pers, or effects. The constitutional validity of a search or seizure
depended on its reasonableness, which in most instances turned on
the existence of a warrant issued on probable cause.' 7 Property law
concepts dominated judicial interpretation of the fourth amend-
ment's words. A search occurred only if there was an actual entry
into a "constitutionally protected area,"' 8 which included a variety
16 See Note, Formalism, Legal Realism, and Constitutionally Protected Privacy Under the
Fourth and Fifth Amendments, 90 HARV. L. REV. 945 (1977). The author traces develop-
ments from Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616 (1886), which supported broad protec-
tion of personal property consistent with legal formalism, to Fisher v. United States, 425
U.S. 391 (1976), and Andresen v. Maryland, 427 U.S. 463 (1976), which limited protec-
tion using a relativist approach more consistent with prevailing notions of legal realism.
The author criticizes Katz for abandoning protected enclaves, which the author believes
resulted from the Court's "pragmatic-realist premises." Note, supra, at 970-71. As
shown below, Katz has not truly ended protected enclaves. See infra notes 132-42 and
accompanying text.
17 The standard doctrine was stated in Katz: "[S]earches conducted outside the judi-
cial process, without prior approval by judge or magistrate, are per se unreasonable
under the Fourth Amendment-subject only to a few specifically established and well-
delineated exceptions." Katz, 389 U.S. at 357 (footnotes omitted). Seizures, such as
arrests, are also subject to the warrant clause. See, e.g., Payton v. New York, 445 U.S.
573, 585-86 (1980)(seizures of persons and property are presumptively unreasonable
without a warrant, at least if conducted in the home). Although the exceptions may be
limited and probable cause is usually required, the bulk of searches and seizures are
made without warrants. W. LAFAVE &J. ISRAEL, MODERN CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 297 (6th
ed. 1986). See also Amsterdam, supra note 2, at 414 (more searches occur under excep-
tions than with warrants).
This is the so-called "monolithic model" of the fourth amendment, in which the
reasonableness required by the fourth amendment's first clause depends on a warrant
valid under the second clause. See I W. LAFAVE, SEARCH & SEIZURE 315 (2d ed. 1987); C.
WHrrEBREAD & C. SLOBOGIN, CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 136-37 (2d ed. 1986). This ap-
proach dominated fourth amendment analysis prior to 1973, when, in Professor Amster-
dam's words, the Supreme Court created "the kind of very small hole in the fabric of the
fourth amendment which customarily begins the process by which entire tapestries un-
ravel." Amsterdam, supra note 2, at 374. The case, Cupp v. Murphy, 412 U.S. 291
(1973), excused the absence of a warrant for a "very limited search." Cupp, 412 U.S. at
296. Since then, many cases have authorized limited searches or seizures without war-
rants, relying solely on their "reasonableness." See, e.g., United States v. Ross, 456 U.S.
798 (1982)(automobile search); United States v. Ramsey, 431 U.S. 606 (1977)(opening
of international mail); United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. 873 (1975)(seizure for
questioning).
18 Lanza v. New York, 370 U.S. 139, 142 (1962). One commentator described this
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of locations in which a person had a legally cognizable interest.1 9
The Court was unwilling to extend "houses" beyond the curtilage
20
of a home or other protected dwelling, however, and therefore de-
nied fourth amendment protection to invasions of privately owned
but open areas, or, as they are usually characterized by the courts,
"open fields." 21 The "actual physical entry" requirement further
limited the application of the fourth amendment. Observations and
other remote invasions were not subject to the fourth amendment's
requirements even if their effect was to allow agents to perceive
something they could not otherwise perceive without entering a
protected area.22 The case that best represents this entry or tres-
terminology as both "hasty" and "misleading," however, because it is not the area, as
such, that is protected, but rather the "relationship between the area and the person
incriminated by the search that is critical." Kitch, Katz v. United States: The Limits of the
Fourth Amendment, 1968 Sup. CT. REv. 133, 136. This is consistent with the treatment of
"specially protected objects" under the intrusion paradigm proposed in this Article. See
infra Part IV.B. 1.
19 See, e.g., Stoner v. California, 376 U.S. 483 (1964)(hotel room); Rios v. United
States, 364 U.S. 253 (1960)(occupied taxi); Jones v. United States, 362 U.S. 257
(1960)(apartment); Taylor v. United States, 286 U.S. I (1932)(garage); Carroll v. United
States, 267 U.S. 132 (1925)(automobile); Amos v. United States, 255 U.S. 313
(1921)(store); Silverthorne Lumber Co. v. United States, 251 U.S. 385 (1920)(business
office).
20 The curtilage is "the area attached to and containing a dwelling-house and its out-
buildings." 2 OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY 1278 (1933). Legal definitions are even less
precise, but courts generally limit the definition to the yard and buildings close to the
house that are unquestionably part of the home unit. See, e.g., Care v. United States, 231
F.2d 22, 25 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 351 U.S. 932 (1956)(application turns on facts, pri-
marily distance from house, location of enclosures, and building's "use and enjoyment
as an adjunct to the domestic economy of the family"); State v. Kender, 60 Haw. 301,
304, 588 P.2d 447, 449 (1979)("Curtilage is usually defined as a small piece of land, not
necessarily enclosed, around a dwelling house and generally includes buildings used for
domestic purposes in the conduct of family affairs."). In United States v. Dunn, 480 U.S.
294 (1987), the Supreme Court stated:
[W]e believe that curtilage questions should be resolved with particular reference to
four factors: the proximity of the area claimed to be curtilage to the home, whether
the area is included within an enclosure surrounding the home, the nature of the
uses to which the area is put, and the steps taken by the resident to protect the area
from observation by people passing by.
Id. at 301. See also California v. Ciraolo, 476 U.S. 207, 213 (1986)(curtilage is "where
privacy expectations are most heightened"); Oliver v. United States, 466 U.S. 170, 180
(1984)(linking the curtilage to "intimate activity" and privacy and suggesting that judi-
cial determinations are guided by "expect[ations] that an area immediately adjacent to
the home will remain private").
21 Hester v. United States, 265 U.S. 57, 59 (1924). Justice Holmes' opinion for a
unanimous Court stated that the distinction between the areas protected by the fourth
amendment and open fields is as "old as the common law." Id. This enigmatic com-
ment constitutes the entire analysis.
22 See, e.g., United States v. Lee, 274 U.S. 559, 563 (1927). The Court held that use
of a search light was not prohibited by the fourth amendment and suggested in dicta that
this was analogous to use of a "field glass," in modern terms a telescope or binoculars.
1989]
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pass paradigm is Olmstead v. United States,23 in which the Supreme
Court held the fourth amendment inapplicable to wiretapping con-
ducted without trespassing on the defendant's property. 24 Basing
its analysis on the intent of the framers, the Court held that the
fourth amendment could not be construed to prohibit wiretap-
ping.25 There was no search because there was no physical intru-
sion into a protected area and there was no seizure because the
evidence was obtained by listening rather than by taking personal
property. 26 Despite a strong dissent by Justice Brandeis 27 and later
indications that other Justices believed Olmstead to present an un-
duly limited vision of the amendment's scope, 28 the case established
Id. Courts continue to cite Lee as authority that law enforcement use of enhancement
devices raises no fourth amendment issue. See infra note 82.
23 277 U.S. 438 (1928).
24 Id. at 464.
25 Id. at 465.
26 Id. at 466. The Court's analysis repeatedly stressed these points:
The Amendment itself shows that the search is to be of material things-the
person, the house, his papers, or his effects....
... There was no searching. There was no seizure. The evidence was secured
by the use of the sense of hearing and that only. There was no entry of the houses
or offices of the defendants.
Id. at 464. Note, Electronic Visual Surveillance, supra note 1, at 270-72, contains a good
analysis of the entry paradigm. See generally N. LAsSON, THE HISTORY AND DEVELOPMENT
OF THE FOURTH AMENDMENT TO THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION (1937); O'Brien, Rea-
sonable Expectations of Privacy: Principles and Policies of Fourth Amendment-Protected Privacy, 13
NEw ENG. L. REV. 662, 673-75 (1978); Note, The Concept of Privacy and the Fourth Amend-
ment, 6 U. MICH. J.L. REF. 154, 158-59 (1972)[hereinafter Concept of Privacy ].(all analyz-
ing the intent of the fourth amendment's framers).
27 Justice Brandeis focused on privacy rather than property, Olmstead, 277 U.S. at
473-79 (Brandeis, J., dissenting), and equated wiretapping with opening sealed letters,
id. at 475-76 (Brandeis, J., dissenting), a practice the majority recognized as prohibited
under the fourth amendment. Id. at 464 (finding this "plainly within the words of the
amendment"). A compelling statement in support of personal privacy, his dissent em-
phasized the deleterious effects of changing technology on the values of the Fourth
Amendment. See id. at 473-76.
28 See, e.g., Berger v. New York, 388 U.S. 41, 51 (1967)(specifically holding that elec-
tronic "capture" of conversations constituted a fourth amendment "search"); Silverman
v. United States, 365 U.S. 505, 508-09, 511-12 (1961)(prohibiting use of spike mike into
heating duct in home under the entry paradigm but stressing that the real injury was the
indiscriminate secret eavesdropping); Goldman v. United States, 316 U.S. 129, 133-35
(1942)(approving eavesdropping of conversations by means of detectaphone outside
business office but suggesting that hearing would constitute seizure if it involved the
interception of wire communication or resulted from trespass). The Silverman Court
seemed quite conscious of the implications of modern investigative technology,
Silverman, 365 U.S. at 508-09, and refused to be bound by the "niceties" of property law.
Id. at 511. Berger also evidenced the Court's concerns about particularly intrusive as-
pects of modern surveillance technology, Berger, 388 U.S. at 46-47, as might be expected
since the Court would decide Katz only six months later. See also Lanza v. New York, 370
U.S. 139, 143 (1962)(emphasizing privacy attributes of constitutionally protected
locations).
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the parameters of fourth amendment jurisprudence until the final
years of the Warren Court.
29
Katz v. United States3 0 changed this landscape. Government
agents attached an electronic device to the outside of a public tele-
phone booth and eavesdropped on Katz as he made incriminating
calls.a l The Supreme Court overturned the resulting gambling con-
viction and held that the eavesdropping constituted both a search
and a seizure and was unreasonable because it had not been author-
ized by a warrant.3 2 This necessitated overruling Olmstead with re-
spect to the requirement of an actual physical intrusion.3 3 More
significantly, however, the Court used Katz as a vehicle to reformu-
late the scope of the fourth amendment. The majority opinion be-
gan by belittling the importance of constitutionally protected areas,
noting that "the Fourth Amendment protects people, not places."
3 4
Then, after noting that matters "knowingly expose[d] to the public"
remain unprotected,3 5 the Court suggested a very broad residual
area of protection: "[W]hat [a person] seeks to preserve as private,
even in an area accessible to the public, may be constitutionally pro-
29 See generally O'Brien, supra note 26, at 693 ("until the mid-sixties the Supreme
Court legitimated few privacy claims because of its adherence to Olmstead's rigid prop-
erty analysis"); Comment, Police Helicopter Surveillance, 15 ARIz. L. REV. 145, 160-61
(1973)(discussing Olmstead and the trespass doctrine); Note, supra note 16, at 961 (sug-
gesting that formalism failed as a satisfactory vehicle for resolving fourth amendment
issues because "old categories" of property law were not responsive to technological
change represented by wiretapping); Note, Private Places, supra note 2, at 973 (noting that
use of modem electronic surveillance techniques ultimately defeated the viability of the
trespass doctrine).
30 389 U.S. 347 (1967).
31 Id. at 348.
32 Id. at 353-57.
33 Id. at 353. The Court recognized that it had discarded Olmstead's limitation of
"seizures" to the confiscation of tangible items in Silverman v. United States, 365 U.S.
505, 511 (1961). Katz, 389 U.S. at 353. All in all, Olmstead was "probably overripe for
extinction." Kitch, supra note 18, at 133.
34 Katz, 389 U.S. at 351. The Court addressed its prior emphasis on "constitutionally
protected areas" by admitting that it used the terminology but asserting that it "ha[d]
never suggested that this concept can serve as a talismanic solution to every Fourth
Amendment problem." Id. at 351 n.9.
The "people not places" language underscores the major shift in analysis repre-
sented by Katz. It is both misleading and unclear, however, as a guide to resolving
fourth amendment problems, as Justice Harlan recognized in his concurring opinion.
Id. at 361 (Harlan, J., concurring). See also Note, Private Places, supra note 2, at 976
(describing the notion as "appealing but ambiguous"). The phrase is reminiscent of
"Guns don't kill people, people kill people." It is true on one level, but erroneously
suggests that a very critical factor is of little or no consequence. Cf. United States v.
Fisch, 474 F.2d 1071, 1076 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 412 U.S. 921 (1973)(phrase "does not
tell us what people are protected, when they are protected, or why they are protected").
35 Katz, 389 U.S. at 351.
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tected." 36 Applying this principle to electronic eavesdropping, the
Court reasoned that a person using a public telephone booth "is
surely entitled to assume that the words he utters into the mouth-
piece will not be broadcast to the world." 37 Because Katz "justifia-
bly relied" on privacy in making his telephone calls, the warrantless
eavesdropping violated the fourth amendment. 38
Justice Harlan's concurring opinion requires special attention
because its restatement of the governing principles has largely re-
placed the majority opinion's analysis in the Court's later deci-
sions. 39 Justice Harlan first postulated that courts must continue to
examine "places" because levels of privacy are generally related to
location.40 He then stated what he believed to be the appropriate
inquiry: "[T]here is a twofold requirement, first that a person have
exhibited an actual (subjective) expectation of privacy and, second,
that the expectation be one that society is prepared to recognize as
'reasonable.' "41 He argued that Katz should prevail and the Court
36 Id. at 351-52.
37 Id. at 352.
38 Id. at 353. The meaning of the phrase "justifiably relied" is central to the failure
of the expectations paradigm. See infra notes 43-46 and accompanying text and Part
II.B.
39 See, e.g., California v. Greenwood, 108 S. Ct. 1625, 1628 (1988)(rummaging
through garbage bags); California v. Ciraolo, 476 U.S. 207, 211 (1986)(aerial surveil-
lance); Oliver v. United States, 466 U.S. 170, 177 (1984)(entry onto open fields); United
States v. Knotts, 460 U.S. 276, 280-81 (1983)(beeper monitoring); Smith v. United
States, 442 U.S. 735, 740 (1979)(use of pen register); Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 39
(1968)(stop and frisk). Cf. United States v. Place, 462 U.S. 696, 706-07 (1983)(conclud-
ing that use of narcotics detection dog to sniff luggage does not intrude into privacy
interest in personal luggage). Most state and lower federal courts are in accord, regard-
less of the method of intrusion. See, e.g., United States v. Cuevas-Sanchez, 821 F.2d 248,
251 (5th Cir. 1987)(video camera); United States v. Whaley, 779 F.2d 585, 590 (11th
Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 1055 (1987)(binoculars); United States v. Taborda, 635
F.2d 131, 137-38 (2d Cir. 1980)(telescope); Lorenzana v. Superior Court, 9 Cal. 3d 626,
638, 108 Cal. Rptr. 585, 587, 511 P.2d 33,40, (1973)(naked-eye observation); Common-
wealth v. Oglialoro, 377 Pa. Super. 317, 587 A.2d 387, 389 (1988)(helicopter); State v.
Manly, 85 Wash. 2d 120, 125, 530 P.2d 306, 307, cert. denied, 423 U.S. 855 (1975)(binoc-
ulars). See also infra note 45.
40 Katz, 389 U.S. at 361 (Harlan, J., concurring).
41 Id. (Harlan, J., concurring). Although this language has survived as the major
statement of the expectations paradigm, it remains controversial. Commentators assert
that the Harlan test is tautological, provides insufficient standards, undercuts privacy,
and is difficult to apply. See, e.g., Kitch, supra note 18, at 152 (finding the test "satisfac-
tory in the context of Katz" but providing little help in resolving how to apply the fourth
amendment to more difficult situations); Note, Police Use of Sense-Enhancing Devices and the
Limits of the Fourth Amendment, 1977 U. ILL. L.F. 1167, 1182 (suggesting that Katz does not
provide sufficient guidance in observation cases)[hereinafter Sense-Enhancing Devices];
Note, Concept of Privacy, supra note 26, at 178 ("Typically, it is applied ipse dixit, without
discussion."); Note, Protecting Privacy Under the Fourth Amendment, 91 YALE LJ. 313, 315
(1981)(calling for a "pure concept" of privacy to protect "secrecy and soli-
tude") [hereinafter Protecting Privacy]; Note, Tracking Katz: Beepers, Privacy, and the Fourth
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should overrule Olmstead because at least this use of electronic sur-
veillance defeated an actual and reasonable expectation of privacy.
42
The entry paradigm was finished as a governing principle.
From 1967 to the present, the Katz formulation has dictated the
scope of the fourth amendment. The Court's ruling provided the
groundwork for the expectations paradigm, but it raised many more
questions than it answered.
The most fundamental problem arising out of Katz concerns the
objective aspect of the required expectation of privacy, termed "jus-
tifiable" by the majority and "reasonable" by Justice Harlan.43 Each
Amendment, 86 YALE LJ. 1461, 1473-74 (1977)("This use of the Harlan test produces
confused and unprincipled judicial decisions.")[hereinafter Tracking Katz].
Characterizing Justice Harlan's opinion as establishing the expectations paradigm
raises additional problems. It was a concurrence by a single justice, andJustice Harlan
insisted that his analysis "emerged from prior decisions" outside of the wiretapping
area. Katz, 389 U.S. at 361 (Harlan, J., concurring). If Katz constituted a major break
with the past, as later decisions and commentators seem to agreeJustice Harlan's analy-
sis should represent a defeated view of a more limited fourth amendment. Some com-
mentators take this view. See, e.g., Amsterdam, supra note 2, at 383 ("I believe that it
destroys the spirit of Katz and most of Katz's substance"); Cunningham, A Linguistic Anal-
ysis of the Meanings of "Search" in the Fourth Amendment: A Search for Common Sense, 73 IowA
L. REV. 541, 567-68 (1988)(suggesting thatJustice Harlan "missed the central holding
of the majority's opinion"); Note, Tracking Katz, supra, at 1471 (stressing that it was an
attempt to limit the holding and was inconsistent with views of the majority). These
arguments are moot in substance because later majorities have repeatedly adopted his
terminology. See supra note 39. They may have misunderstood the majority's holding in
Katz, but if so, they recreated it using Justice Harlan's image in later decisions that are
equally authoritative. More importantly, perhaps, the meaning ofJustice Harlan's ap-
proach is ultimately no less ambiguous than that of the majority; its plastic make-up
allows courts to change its shape to fit their own predilections, no less than to fit the
facts of individual cases.
42 Katz, 389 U.S. at 361 (Harlan, J., concurring).
43 Justice Powell later weighed in with "legitimate." Couch v: United States, 409
U.S. 322, 336 (1973). "Reasonable" is most often associated with a likelihood emphasis,
while "justifiable" and "legitimate" seem to have a normative connotation. See, e.g.,
Comment, Defining a Fourth Amendment Search: A Critique of the Supreme Court's Post-Katz
Jurisprudence, 61 WASH. L. REV. 191, 195-97 (1988)(noting that the meanings of the terms
are different and use of "reasonable" has resulted in an unduly rigid inquiry focused on
physical location). It is a mistake, however, to conclude that the choice of any particular
term is of much importance. See Dow Chemical Co. v. United States, 476 U.S. 227, 248
n.9 (1986)(Powell, J., dissenting)("Our decisions often use the words 'reasonable' and
'legimate' interchangeably to describe a privacy interest entitled to Fourth Amendment
protection."); United States v.Jacobsen, 466 U.S. 109, 122-23 n.22 (1984)(using various
combinations of such terms, all apparently intended to mean the same thing).
The Katz majority stressed the value of protecting the privacy of telephone conver-
sations, thereby suggesting a normative approach, but the brevity of its analysis and its
refusal to protect exposed conduct suggests a likelihood approach. Katz, 389 U.S. at
352. Justice Harlan was equally ambiguous. His reference to the protected expectation
as "one that society is prepared to recognize as 'reasonable,'" id. at 361 (Harlan, J.
concurring), seems to concern what is deserving of privacy, but his examples focus on
what one expects is likely to remain private. Id. at 360-61 (Harlan, J., concurring).
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term is ambiguous and can be characterized as meaning either what
society deems to be deserving of privacy or what most people expect
is likely to remain private. Most commentators unhesitatingly opt
for the normative view,4 4 but the courts have been less consistent.
Courts describing the protected privacy interest tend to use lan-
guage supporting the "deserving of privacy" approach, but their
analysis more often opts for the "likelihood" approach. 45 Perhaps
the problem is that both are relevant, but neither is dispositive, as
recognized by the California Supreme Court: "''[R]easonable ex-
44 See, e.g., 1 W. LAFAVE, supra note 17, at 311-14, 360 (seeing the inquiry as focusing
on value judgments concerning privacy, freedom, and law enforcement needs); Amster-
dam, supra note 2, at 384 (Katz and the fourth amendment do not "ask ... what we
expect of government[,] [t]hey tell us what we should demand of government.");
Tomkovicz, supra note 2, at 687-90, 699-700 (preferring legitimate to reasonable; seeing
Katz as protecting rights to privacy rather than probabilities of privacy); Note, Sense-
Enhancing Devices, supra note 41, at 1171 (the test determines "the level of surveillance
that a free society should tolerate without the safeguard of a warrant"); Note, Concept of
Privacy, supra note 26, at 185 (appropriate inquiry concerns norms and values of society);
Comment, supra note 43, at 210-11 (test should be premised on social norms of privacy).
Other commentators see both aspects as pertinent, e.g., Coombs, Shared Privacy and the
Fourth Amendment, or the Rights of Relationships, 75 CALIF. L. REV. 1593, 1614 (1987)(the
inquiry is "not purely empirical" but "also rests on a normative judgment"), or empha-
size likelihood factors, e.g., Note, Katz and the Fourth Amendment. A Reasonable Expectation of
Privacy or, A Man's Home is His Fort, 23 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 63, 79 (1974)(favoring the
objective likelihood structure)[hereinafter Katz and the Fourth Amendment]; Note, Aerial
Surveillance: Overlooking the Fourth Amendment, 50 FORDHAM L. REV. 271, 280-90
(1981) (proposing a multi-factor analysis that emphasizes the realistic likelihood of cas-
ual observation by members of the public)[hereinafter Aerial Surveillance].
45 See infra note 115. See generally infra Parts II.A.2. and II.B. The Supreme Court's
recent "garbage bag" case, California v. Greenwood, 108 S. Ct. 1625 (1988), provides
an example of the judicial schizophrenia on this issue. The Court upheld two warrant-
less police seizures and searches through opaque garbage bags. Id. at 1627-28. The
majority seemed to describe the appropriate standard in "value" terms, noting that
" 'certain areas deserve the most scrupulous protection from government invasion.' "
Id. at 1630 (quoting Oliver v. United States, 466 U.S. 170, 178 (1984)). Still, the thrust
of the Court's analysis focused on likelihood. Garbage bags are simply too accessible to
human and animal snoops for persons to reasonably expect to retain privacy in their
contents. Id. at 1628-29. The dissent began by asserting that "[s]crutiny of another's
trash is contrary to commonly accepted notions of civilized behavior," id. at 1632 (Bren-
nan, J., dissenting), and emphasized the deeply private nature of many items disposed of
in garbage bags, id. at 1634-35, 1637 (Brennan, J., dissenting). Still, the dissent ana-
lyzed the likelihood that trash would be examined in determining the protected expecta-
tion of privacy. Id. at 1632-33, 1635-37 (Brennan, J., dissenting). See also Florida v.
Riley, 109 S. Ct. 693, 696-97, 698, 701, 705 (1989) (majority, concurring, and dissenting
opinions all evaluating the likelihood of observation from helicopters as central to
resolving the issue).
Approximately three-quarters of the visual observation cases analyzed in this Article
use the term "reasonable expectation of privacy." Fewer than ten percent use the term
"legitimate expectation of privacy;" very few use the term "justifiable expectation of
privacy," and slightly fewer than fifteen percent cover their bets by using two or more
terms. The use of terminology appears to have little relation to the court's choice of a
societal value or likelihood approach to the problem.
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pectation' possesses two meanings, one predictive, the other
prescriptive."
46
Two additional problems involve the extent to which Katz modi-
fied long established fourth amendment doctrines. "Location"
seemed largely irrelevant under the majority's analysis, yet would
often be dispositive underJustice Harlan's analysis. Similarly, com-
mon law property notions would be less important under the expec-
tations paradigm, but even the majority disavowed the existence of a
general constitutional right to privacy divorced from traditional
fourth amendment notions.47 The continued vitality of the open
fields doctrine turned on the resolution of such problems, as that
doctrine denied constitutional protection to a search of an "area ac-
cessible to the public" and a seizure from an open field of an item a
person "seeks to preserve as private."' 48 Finally, Katz jeopardized
the principle that observations by government agents present no
fourth amendment issues. By recognizing that constructive inva-
sions may be searches and by seeming to exclude from protection
only matters "knowingly expose[d] to the public," the Court left
open the firm possibility that unauthorized observations constitute
searches or seizures49 and would now be prohibited in the absence
46 People v. Cook, 41 Cal. 3d 373, 376, 221 Cal. Rptr. 499, 501, 710 P.2d 299, 301
(1985). California courts also restate the Katz inquiry as follows: "[W]hether the person
has exhibited a reasonable expectation of privacy, and, if so, whether that expectation
has been violated by unreasonable governmental intrusion." People v. Edwards, 71 Cal.
2d 1096, 1100, 458 P.2d 713, 715, 80 Cal. Rptr. 633, 635 (1969).
47 Katz, 389 U.S. at 350-51. The Court noted that the creation of such general pri-
vacy rights is more properly a matter of state law. Id. at 351. Still, one commentator has
characterized Katz as the "jurisprudential basis for the modern Court's liberal construc-
tion of an abstract [constitutional] right of privacy." O'Brien, supra note 26, at 712. It is,
perhaps, not coincidental that the Court decided Katz only two years after Griswold v.
Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965), during a period in which the Court was grappling
with the source and nature of constitutional aspects of privacy largely unrelated to
search and seizure.
48 Katz, 389 U.S. at 351. See supra note 21 and accompanying text (recognition of
open fields doctrine). Justice Harlan saw the open fields doctrine as continuing to exist
after Katz because the fourth amendment would rarely, if ever, have application to such
areas: "[Clonversations in the open would not be protected against being overheard,
for the expectation of privacy under the circumstances would be unreasonable." Id. at
361 (Harlan, J., concurring). The Supreme Court has reaffirmed the open fields doc-
trine. See infra notes 57-59 and accompanying text. The doctrine remains a critical as-
pect of visual search cases. See infra Part II.B.2.
49 Conversely, the decision left open the possibility that actual physical invasions
would no longer be protected by the fourth amendment in the absence of a reasonable
expectation of privacy from such entries. See Note, Katz and the Fourth Amendment, supra
note 44, at 67. A continuing debate concerns whether the Katz inquiry replaced the
traditional property approach, which is a possible result, or merely supplemented that
approach, thereby retaining the traditional protection for property interests. Two "ten
year retrospectives" on Katz bemoaned the failure of the courts to resolve this question.
Note, A Reconsideration of the Katz Expectation of Privacy Test, 76 MICH. L. REv. 154, 172-73
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of a warrant.50
2. The Supreme Court and the Expectations Paradigm
The Supreme Court soon began testing the nature and limits of
the new paradigm. Two 1968 decisions suggest that Katz was both
less and more a break from past practice than one might infer from
(1977)[hereinafter A Reconsideration of Katz]; Comment, The Relationship Between Trespass
and Fourth Amendment Protection After Katz v. United States, 38 OHIO ST. LJ. 708, 732-33
(1977)[hereinafter Trespass and Fourth Amendment Protection]. The succeeding years have
provided no more assistance in this regard, unless one views the Court's revitalization of
the open fields doctrine as supporting the notion that Katz only added to prior fourth
amendment coverage. See Note, A Reconsideration of Katz, supra, at 173 (suggesting this
even before the Supreme Court's more specfic rulings on open fields). Resolution of
this issue could be of immense importance in resolving observation cases. If "old" pro-
tected areas are inherently protected even in the absence of a reasonable expectation of
privacy, then arguably defendants need not prove their actual expectations and precau-
tions to ensure privacy in such places. Id. Cf. Note, A Reconsideration of Katz, supra, at 181
(the property approach should be retained as it "defines a set of expectations that, be-
cause people are entitled to hold them, receive protection regardless of governmental
manipulation of actual expectations or judicial assessment of the adequacy of precau-
tion"); Tracking Katz, supra note 41, at 1477-78 (suggesting the use of the privacy ap-
proach only if fourth amendment protection cannot be based on traditional property
concepts). This is, in part, the underlying theory behind the "honored" expectation of
privacy approach and the special protection for the home approach. See infra notes 113-
16 and 132-41 and accompanying text. A fair reading of Katz is that the majority in-
tended to expand fourth amendment coverage, Comment, Trespass and Fourth Amendment
Protection, supra, at 732-33, and that the Court designed its analysis primarily to make
clear that one could have a protected privacy interest even in the absence of a property
interest. The use of Katz as a replacement vehicle for fourth amendment analysis seems
largely the result of later reliance on Justice Harlan's two-part inquiry to solve all ques-
tions of the fourth amendment's scope, which is doubly ironic because he believed it to
be a distillation of prior decisions. See supra note 41.
50 Most responses to Katz were favorable and recognized its importance. Professor
Edmund Kitch wrote that the Court was "moving toward a redefinition of the scope of
the Fourth Amendment" which would "release [it] from the moorings of precedent and
determine its scope by the logic of its central concepts." Kitch, supra note 18, at 133. See
also Tomkovicz, supra note 2, at 467 ("Katz merely began the revolution" of making the
fourth amendment protective of individual rights.). See generally, Note, Katz and the Fourth
Amendment, supra note 44, at 66 nn.32-34, 36 (citing articles noting a strong positive
reaction to the decision). Courts have suggested the importance of Katz in various ways.
The decision is sometimes cited as ending the old era of fourth amendment analysis, e.g.,
State v. Stanton, 7 Or. App. 286, 293, 490 P.2d 1274, 1277 (1971)(the change from
emphasis on property law "culminated in Katz"); for beginning the new era, e.g., United
States v. Christensen, 524 F. Supp. 344, 346 (N.D. Ill. 1981)(Katz is the starting point);
People v. Agee, 200 Cal. Rptr. 827, 829 (Cal. Ct. App. 1984)(Katz is "[t]he seminal au-
thority on privacy and technology."); and for guiding fourth amendment analysis, e.g.,
Oliver v. United States, 466 U.S. 170, 177 (1984)(Katz inquiry "is the touchstone of
Fourth Amendment analysis"); Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 739 (1979)(Katz is "our
lodestar"); United States v. Paulino, 850 F.2d 93, 95 (2d Cir. 1988)("The cornerstone of
current Fourth Amendment analysis is Katz ...."); United States v. Jackson, 588 F.2d
1046, 1050 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 442 U.S. 941 (1979)("The scope of the Fourth Amend-
ment's protection of personal privacy is delineated in Katz ....").
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the majority opinion's language. In Haris v. United States,51 the
Court reaffirmed the "plain view" doctrine by holding that an agent
who is lawfully in a private location may seize items in his or her
view without a warrant.52 By thus excluding plain view observations
from fourth amendment coverage, Harris effectively rebutted argu-
ments based on Katz that all observations are searches subject to the
warrant requirement. In Teny v. Ohio,53 the Court addressed the
constitutionality of a "stop-and-frisk" without probable cause, let
alone a warrant. The Court insisted that such police conduct is sub-
ject to the fourth amendment, but permitted it on a general showing
of reasonableness under the circumstances. 54 By applying the
fourth amendment to such routine and often transitory police prac-
tices, the Court reaffirmed the Katz principle that the amendment
regulates governmental actions less intrusive than arrests or physi-
cal entries. 55 The Court's willingness to tolerate such intrusions
under a reasonableness standard, however, undercut the warrant
and probable cause requirements by endorsing the notion that
courts may examine fourth amendment searches and seizures under
51 390 U.S. 234 (1968).
52 Id. at 236. "Plain view" and "open view" are technically distinct concepts,
although the line between them is not always clear. An explanation of the difference is
found in Scales v. State, 13 Md. App. 474, 284 A.2d 45 (1971). In Scales Judge Charles
Moylan, a respected fourth amendment scholar, stated that the plain view doctrine
refers exclusively to the legal justification-the reasonableness-for the seizure of
evidence which has not been particularly described in a warrant and which is inad-
vertently spotted in the course of a constitutional search already in progress or in
the course of an otherwise justifiable intrusion into a constitutionally protected
area. It has no applicability when the vantage point from which the "plain view" is
made is not within a constitutionally protected area.
Id. at 477 n.1, 284 A.2d at 47 n.1.
The plain view doctrine allows seizure of an object "when an officer's access to an
object has some prior justification under the Fourth Amendment." Texas v. Brown, 460
U.S. 730, 738 (1983). The Court distinguished this from "an officer's mere observation
of an item left in plain view," which it found "involve[d] no Fourth Amendment search."
Id. at 738 n.4. The latter is in "open view."
53 392 U.S. 1 (1968).
54 Id. at 27. The factual background of Terry shows its roots in routine police-citizen
confrontations. An experienced police officer observed several persons acting in a man-
ner that suggested to him that they were likely to commit a theft. Id. at 5-6. The officer
approached them, asked their names, and patted down Terry's outer clothing, in which
he found a firearm. Id. at 7. The Court suggested that the officer's action was a permis-
sible limited intrusion, based on a reasonable suspicion of criminal conduct and a rea-
sonable concern for personal safety. Id. at 22-27. Later decisions have expanded the
officer's authority in this setting, but have continued to emphasize the twin requirements
of reasonable justification and a limited search. See Pennsylvania v. Mimms, 434 U.S.
106, 110-12 (1977)(an officer may order driver of lawfully-stopped vehicle to get out of
car and may frisk driver for weapons if circumstances reasonably suggest the possibility
that driver is armed); Adams v. Williams, 407 U.S. 143, 144-48 (1972)(information from
an informant, only a limited search permitted in absence of probable cause).
55 Terry, 392 U.S. at 10.
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some sliding scale of justification. 56
The Court entered the 1970s trying to give shape to this
broader but more fluid concept of protected fourth amendment in-
terests. Perhaps the clearest principle to emerge was that the open
fields doctrine survived Katz.57 The Court in 1984 held that "the
56 One cannot steam past the Teny siren without taking a closer look to investigate its
allure. Fourth amendment analysis modeled on Terry is inevitably attractive because it
allows courts to assert constitutional control over the police action but also allows courts
to jettison the warrant and probable cause requirements if they seem inappropriate
under the circumstances. Professor Amsterdam suggests that Terry "might support a
general fourth amendment theory that increasing degrees of intrusiveness require in-
creasing degrees ofjustification and increasingly stringent procedures for the establish-
ment of that justification." Amsterdam, supra note 2, at 390. For example, if officers
intrude but only at the edge of a curtilage, summons several persons to appear in a
lineup, or engage in naked-ear eavesdropping, perhaps only a reasonable basis for the
action is necessary rather than a warrant based on probable cause. Id. at 391-93. Use of
a sliding scale would certainly ease the pressures on the boundaries of the fourth
amendment's scope; courts would not have to decide between "in or out" in close cases,
but could instead design compromise approaches.
Another commentator also sees Terry as a "crack in the monolithic model" of the
fourth amendment and proposes a different approach for its use in this area. Note,
Sense-Enhancing Devices, supra note 41, at 1171. "Courts could regulate police use of
sense-enhancing devices that are not intrusive enough to require probable cause and a
warrant by imposing an objective evidentiary standard to ensure the reasonableness of
the intrusion." Id. at 1203-04. The standard would be that the officer must be "aware of
specific and articulable facts that would lead a reasonable man to believe that a crime
had been or was being committed." Id. at 1204. This would not constitute a sliding
scale; the same requirement would apply to all enhanced observations, which the author
calls "subsearches." Id.
Despite his dalliance with these semi-search models, Professor Amsterdam con-
cludes that sole reliance on the reasonableness clause would be unwise because it is "too
amorphous either to guide or to regulate." Amsterdam, supra note 2, at 414. He mixes
metaphors well: A graduated fourth amendment would be both "one immense Rohr-
schach blot," id. at 393, and a "monstrous abyss," id. at 415. See also Note, Concept of
Privacy, supra note 26, at 155 (suggesting that "too much pliability in the application of a
rule becomes dysfunctional by fostering inconsistency and uncertainty").
Terry is, perhaps, a true but dangerous friend of the fourth amendment. It is a use-
ful tool for cutting an escape from an unduly rigid fourth amendment labyrinth, but it is
also a tool that the courts must carefully supervise because it may not know precisely
when to stop cutting.
57 This was not the immediate reading of Katz, despite Justice Harlan's assertion that
the open fields doctrine remained viable. Katz. 389 U.S. at 360-61 (Harlan, J., concur-
ring). "After Katz, many courts found the curtilage and open fields doctrines to be
archaic and unnecessary, or simply ignored them." Note, The Fourth Amendment in the Age
of Aerial Surveillance: Curtains for the Curtilage?, 60 N.Y.U. L. REV. 725, 737 (1985). See also
I W. LAFAVE, SEARCH & SEIZURE 336 (Ist ed. 1978)("[A] direct and unthinking applica-
tion of the Hester 'open fields' doctrine will on occasion produce a result which is offen-
sive to the theory underlying Katz [which] ... in the last analysis, calls for the making of
an important value judgment ...."); Hendricks, Eavesdropping, Wiretapping and the Law of
Search and Seizure-Some Implications of the Katz Decision, 9 ARIZ. L. REV. 428, 435
(1968)("Under Katz, even activities carried on in an open field might be the subject of
fourth amendment protections if the parties reasonably rely on the fact that such activi-
ties will remain private."); Tomkovicz, supra note 2, at 720 (calling for protection of
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government's intrusion upon the open fields is not one of those 'un-
reasonable searches' proscribed by the text of the Fourth Amend-
ment." 58  Law enforcement officers thus may enter a person's
property, presumably to just outside the curtilage, without raising
fourth amendment issues.59 As the Court has repeatedly stated that
a person's residence is entitled to special protection under the
fourth amendment, 60 this revitalized open fields doctrine may to
open fields to promote and safeguard property values). Numerous courts concluded
that reasonable expectations analysis necessarily replaced curtilage/open fields analysis
after Katz. See, e.g., United States v. DeBacker, 493 F. Supp. 1078, 1080-81 (W.D. Mich.
1980) (disagreeing with courts concluding that the fourth amendment automatically does
not apply to searches in open fields); United States ex rel. Gedko" v. Heer, 406 F. Supp.
609, 614-15 (W.D. Wis. 1975), vacated, 588 F.2d 840 (7th Cir. 1978)(Katz "abolish[ed]
reliance upon common law property concepts which would include 'open fields' and
'curtilage,' in search and seizure cases."); Phelan v. Superior Court, 90 Cal. App. 3d
1005, 1010-11, 153 Cal. Rptr. 738, 741-42 (1979)(concluding that Hester was aban-
doned); State v. Brady, 406 So. 2d 1093, 1095 (Fla. 1981), vacated, 467 U.S. 1201
(1984)(no longer a carte blanche for warrantless intrusions merely because neither
home nor curtilage is searched); People v. Stanton, 7 Or. App. 286, 294, 490 P.2d 1274,
1278 (197 1)(finding open fields doctrine to be inconsistent with much of the analysis in
Katz).
58 Oliver v. United States, 466 U.S. 170, 177 (1984). Oliver involved two cases in
which law enforcement agents located marijuana patches on private property marked
with "No Trespassing" signs. Id. at 173-75. The Court relied on the plain language of
the fourth amendment, concluding that open fields are neither houses nor effects. Id. at
176-77. One commentator has harshly criticized Oliver for overlooking significant facts
in the cases, for erroneously reading common law doctrines, and for leaving open the
possibility that many non-residential buildings are no longer protected by the fourth
amendment. Saltzburg, Another Victim of Illegal Narcotics: The Fourth Amendment (as Illus-
trated by the Open Fields Doctrine), 48 U. Prrr. L. REv. 1, 6-19 (1986). While Oliver is a
strong and broadly written opinion, the decision was not unanticipated. In 1974 the
Court unanimously upheld a warrantless air quality inspection conducted on outdoor
industrial property. Air Pollution Variance Bd. v. Western Alfalfa Corp., 416 U.S. 861,
866 (1974). The Court there described "open fields" as an "exception to the Fourth
Amendment." Id. at 865. Air Pollution can be distinguished from most criminal cases,
however. First, it involved an administrative search subject to less burdensome fourth
amendment restrictions than are traditional law enforcement activities. See, e.g., Dono-
van v. Dewey, 452 U.S. 594, 605-06 (1981)(warrantless administrative searches are per-
missible in various situations); Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523, 538-39
(1967)(while administrative searches require warrants, the standard for issuance is rea-
sonableness rather than probable cause). Second, despite the trespass onto the com-
pany's property, the Court stressed that the inspector "sighted what anyone in the city
who was near the plant could see in the sky-plumes of smoke"-and that the record did
not indicate "that he was on premises from which the public was excluded." Air Pollu-
tion, 461 U.S. at 865.
59 The Court's most recent sally into open fields supports this notion. In United
States v. Dunn, 480 U.S. 294 (1987), the Court reviewed a warrantless intrusion onto a
ranch. Id. at 297. It concluded that there was no fourth amendment search because no
agent entered the curtilage of the house. Id. at 301-05.
60 See, e.g., Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573, 589 (1980)(quoting U.S. CoNsT.
amend. IV)("In [no setting] ... is the zone of privacy more clearly defined than when
bounded by the unambiguous physical dimensions of an individual's home-a zone that
finds its roots in clear and specific terms: 'The right of the people to be secure in their
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some extent overrule the expectations paradigm and reestablish the
entry paradigm with respect to actual physical invasions.
The Supreme Court has found it far more difficult to draw such
bright lines when dealing with remote intrusions. While it has con-
tinued to rely on Katz, it has failed to set forth any consistent
method of evaluating the relationship between people's expecta-
tions and intrusive governmental actions. Several lines of analysis
have emerged.
First, the Court upheld the warrantless use of a pen register, a
device that identifies the numbers dialed on a telephone without in-
tercepting or recording any conversations. 6' It concluded that peo-
ple do not reasonably believe that the numbers they dial are
confidential because standard telephone company billing and re-
cordkeeping practices in this regard are known to the public. 62 A
somewhat different analysis convinced the Court to declare that it is
not a search for police to use trained narcotics detection dogs to
sniff luggage in public places. 63 The "technique is much less intru-
sive than a typical search[,] . . .discloses only the presence or ab-
sence of narcotics .... [and] ensures that the owner of the property
is not subjected to the embarrassment and inconvenience" of more
traditional law enforcement methods.64 Where this action requires
the detention of luggage, however, it constitutes a fourth amend-
ment seizure subject to a Terry-like evaluation of its reason-
ableness.
65
... houses.., shall not be violated.' "). See also Welsh v. Wisconsin, 466 U.S. 740, 748-
54 (1984)(relying on the principle in disapproving a warrantless arrest at a person's
home even under exigent circumstances); Steagald v. United States, 451 U.S. 204, 221
(198 1)(arresting officers must have search warrant as well as arrest warrant when person
arrested is in someone else's home). Cf Alderman v. United States, 394 U.S. 165, 171
(1969) (homeowner has standing to challenge search of home even without any interest
in items seized).
61 Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 736 n.1 (1979).
62 Id. at 741-45. Thus, regardless of Smith's actual expectations, it was objectively
unreasonable for him to rely on the privacy of the numbers he dialed, and, therefore, the
fourth amendment had no application. Id. at 743-46. The Court necessarily paid special
attention to an analytical problem inherent in the Katz inquiry: the relationship between
subjective and objective expectations of privacy. It emphasized that even if the defend-
ant had a subjective expectation of privacy, it was unavailing because society did not
recognize it as "reasonable." The Court cited precedents for denying a reasonable ex-
pectation of privacy for items turned over to third parties, and suggested that the de-
fendant simply assumed the risk that the information he provided would be given to the
police. Id. at 744-45.
63 United States v. Place, 462 U.S. 696, 707 (1983).
64 Id. at 707.
65 Id. at 703-06. The agents detained Place's luggage for ninety minutes. Id. at 699.
The Court concluded that this constituted an unreasonable seizure. Id. at 709-10.
Other fourth amendment settings in which reasonableness is emphasized include admin-
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The Supreme Court has seemingly taken a third line of analysis
in two decisions dealing with "beepers," radio transmitters that are
secreted in a car or other personal property and emit signals picked
up by police receivers. Monitoring a beeper is unregulated as long
as the beeper remains in public areas because there is no reasonable
expectation of privacy from visual observation in public. 66 Monitor-
ing a beeper in a private location, on the other hand, requires a war-
rant because it breaches the "justifiable interest in the privacy of the
residence." 67 This suggests that beeper law largely tracks the house
and curtilage/open fields dichotomy.
The Court's "aerial search" cases, California v. Ciraolo,68 Dow
Chemical Co. v. United States,6 9 and Florida v. Riley, 70 at once adhere to
this distinction and suggest its ephemeral nature for technologically
aided observations. Ciraolo and Dow involved governmental use of
airplanes to observe and photograph areas that could not lawfully
be entered without a warrant or, apparently, observed in any detail
without reliance on aerial surveillance.7' The Supreme Court held
that there had been no search in Dow because the industrial complex
was "open to the view and observation of persons in aircraft lawfully
in the public airspace immediately above or sufficiently near the area
istrative searches, see infra note 152, examination of international mail, see United States
v. Ramsey, 431 U.S. 606 (1977), border detentions, see United States v. Montoya De
Hernandez, 473 U.S. 531 (1985), and searches of student belongings at a public school,
see NewJersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325 (1985).
66 United States v. Knotts, 460 U.S. 276, 280-85 (1983).
67 United States v. Karo, 468 U.S. 705, 714 (1984). The Court referred to such mon-
itoring as "a search of a house." Id. at 718. The analysis stressed that use of a beeper is
not particularly intrusive, "but it does reveal a critical fact about the interior of the
premises that the Government is extremely interested in knowing and that it could not
have otherwise obtained without a warrant." Id. at 715. While the Court required a
warrant, it specifically declined to address the appropriate standard for issuance. Id. at
718 n.5. Knotts and Karo together may have the practical effect of requiring warrants for
all monitoring, as the item containing the beeper may be moved into a house or other
protected area and monitored before the agents are aware that this has occurred. Cf.
Fishman, supra note 2, at 345 (identifying the line as a form of "Fourth Amendment
Roulette"). This may eliminate some of the confusion 'concerning the many issues the
Court avoided in these cases, such as the application of the fourth amendment to the
installation and conduct of monitoring as well as the required showing for issuance of a
beeper warrant. See generally I W. LAFAVE, supra note 17, at 530-31.
68 476 U.S. 207 (1986).
69 476 U.S. 227 (1986)..
70 109 S. Ct. 693 (1989).
71 Dow, 476 U.S. at 229 ("At all times, Dow has maintained elaborate security around
the perimeter of the complex barring ground-level public views of these areas."); Ciraolo,
476 U.S. at 209 ("Police were unable to observe the contents of respondent's yard from




for the reach of cameras." '72 The Court came to the same conclu-
sion in Ciraolo even though the surveillance observed marijuana
growing within the curtilage of the defendant's residence. 73 In Riley
the Court upheld observations into a private greenhouse from a he-
licopter circling over the curtilage of a residence at an altitude of
400 feet.74 The fourth amendment played no role in any of these
cases because officers were able to "enter" the property without any
physical invasion.
A similar rationale would have upheld the electronic surveil-
lance in Katz, yet it is difficult to believe that the Supreme Court
would now declare electronic eavesdropping exempt from the
fourth amendment's proscriptions. The problem is that the expec-
tations paradigm does not present a satisfactory method for evaluat-
ing the role of technological aids or other forms of sense-
enhancement in determining whether governmental action consti-
tutes a search or seizure. Indeed, the Supreme Court simply failed
to recognize that airplanes and helicopters are technological aids to
surveillance not unlike wiretapping equipment. 75 If there is a coher-
ent approach to analyzing technologically-enhanced government
observations, one can discover it only after re-examining the prem-
ises of Katz in light of the broader concept of the visual search.
3. Logical Applications of Katz to Visual Searches
The Supreme Court could have invalidated warrantless elec-
tronic surveillance in Katz without examining the meaning of the
72 Dow, 476 U.S. at 238. The Court characterized the complex as "fall[ing] some-
where between 'open fields' and curtilage, but lacking some of the critical characteristics
of both." Id. at 236.
73 Ciraolo, 476 U.S. at 213-14. The Court determined that any expectation of privacy
was unreasonable because of the public's unobstructed line of sight from the air. Id.
74 Riley, 109 S. Ct. at 695-97. A plurality of the Court seemed to rely most heavily on
the fact that the helicopter was at a lawful altitude. Id. at 696-97. Concurring Justice
O'Connor and the two dissenting justices, with whom two justices concurred, seemed to
conclude that the critical factor was the likelihood of casual observation from helicopters
at that altitude. Id. at 698 (O'Connor, J., concurring); id. at 701 (Brennan, J., dissent-
ing); id. at 705 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
75 A technological surveillance aid or enhancement device is anything that allows a
person to perceive something he or she could not perceive lawfully through unaided
senses. Wiretapping is a technological aid because it allows listeners to hear something
they could not hear with the naked ear. Binoculars and telescopes, the main devices
discussed in this Article, are aids because they allow observers to see what they could
not see with the naked eye. Airplanes and helicopters are technological aids not unlike
binoculars; the difference is that they allow their passengers to see what they could not
see from the ground while binoculars improve the vision from the ground. Not all tech-
nological aids are man-made. Dogs trained to sniff drugs or to track a human scent




term "search" by simply declaring that a governmental interception
of spoken words constitutes a fourth amendment seizure. 76 It is
therefore fair to assume that the majority truly intended to create a
new model for fourth amendment analysis. The critical aspect of
that new model is its shift from an emphasis on governmental tres-
passes to an emphasis on the nature and extent of the privacy inter-
est invaded. The necessary implication of this framework is that
fourth amendment analysis turns on beliefs and attitudes about pri-
vacy rather than on the government's methods. Accordingly, the
courts should subject governmental observations to the fourth
amendment if they invade an area where an individual has a suf-
ficent expectation of privacy.77 There is no logical difference be-
76 The Court readily concluded in Katz that electronic interception constitutes a
seizure. Katz, 389 U.S. at 353. See supra note 33. The only additional step that the
Court had to take was to was hold that the fourth amendment applies to electronic sur-
veillance because agents "seize" conversations. This option may not have occurred to
the Court, perhaps because the parties structured their arguments around the "constitu-
tionally protected places" theory. Id. at 349-51. Another possibility is that the Court
was concerned that fourth amendment protection of spoken words in the absence of a
search would reopen an issue that the Court had found to be particularly troubling, the
legitimacy of consent monitoring by undercover agents and informants. This issue had
closely divided the Court in a number of decisions over the previous fifteen years,
although a majority had always upheld the government's action. See, e.g., Osborn v.
United States, 385 U.S. 323, 326 (1966)(permitting an informant to tape conversations
with an attorney attempting to obstruct justice); Lopez v. United States, 373 U.S. 427,
430-31, 437-39 (1963) (permitting an agent to record conversations with the target of a
criminal investigation); On Lee v. United States, 343 U.S. 747, 749-51 (1952)(permitting
use of an informant carrying a concealed radio transmitter). These cases are certainly
distinguishable from Katz, as a plurality of the Court later concluded in White v. United
States, 401 U.S. 745, 748-50 (1971). White upheld radio monitoring of an informant's
conversations with a suspect even though only the informer had given consent. Id. at
746-47, 750. Justice Brennan concurred, but only on the ground that Katz did not apply
to White under the retroactivity doctrine, id. at 755-56 (Brennan, J., concurring), and
Justices Douglas, Harlan, and Marshall joined in dissent, concluding that the practice
violated the fourth amendment, id. at 756-96 (Douglas,J., dissenting). Justice Black pro-
vided a fifth vote approving consent monitoring, but did so only because he adhered to
his view that Katz was wrongly decided. Id. at 754 (Black, J., concurring). Given the
somewhat different make-up of the Court in 1967 and the fact that Osborn and two com-
panion cases were decided only one year before, it seems likely that a simple "seizure of
conversations means fourth amendment protection" holding would have resulted in a
splattered majority or worse in Katz, rather than the strong holding supported by seven
of the eight participating justices. Nevertheless, commentators have criticized the
Court's apparent inconsistency in Katz and the consent monitoring cases. See Kitch,
supra note 18, at 141-42, 152 (arguing that there is no principled distinction between the
electronic eavesdropping in Katz and the use of secret agents); Note, Telescopic Surveil-
lance as a Violation of the Fourth Amendment, 63 IowA L. REv. 708, 710 (1978)(suggesting
that Katz's protection of reasonable expectations of privacy is inconsistent with the
Court's casual dismissal of similar arguments in On Lee)[hereinafter Telescopic
Surveillance].
77 Professor Amsterdam notes that Katz required courts to rethink the traditional
view that observations into the home were not searches even if aided by electronic or
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tween "hearing" that invades a reasonable expectation of privacy
and "seeing" that does the same thing.
The fact that this was not immediately and obviously recog-
nized may have had more to do with common perception than with
logical dictate. Ironically, the conventional wisdom is that seeing is
more intrusive than listening:
Unfortunately, although visual stimuli come to the eye in the same
manner as sound waves enter the ear, our use of language makes it
difficult to view the two modes of perception as comparable. We look
"into," "at," or "through," but couch our aural perception in passive
terms. Language has a significant influence on our views of reality:
our eyes can search without entering, our ears merely listen. Yet it
should be clear that these forms of sensory perception are indeed
comparable; both are passive in the physical sense, but both may be
tools of the probing, acquisitive mind.
78
Under this analysis, enhanced viewing would be treated like elec-
tronic eavesdropping-necessarily subject to the probable cause
and warrant requirements after Katz, perhaps even more so if courts
share the common misperception that vision is "active" while hear-
ing is "passive."
This may, however, be one of those areas in which experience
trumps logic. It may be wholly inappropriate to impose the same
analytical construct on observations and eavesdropping. Katz itself
contains several seeds of such a counter argument. In refuting the
government's intrusion-based argument that Katz was visible in the
telephone booth, the majority stated: "But what he sought to ex-
clude when he entered the booth was not the intruding eye-it was
the uninvited ear. He did not shed his right to do so simply because
he made his calls from a place where he might be seen."' 79 This
other visual enhancement devices. Amsterdam, supra note 2, at 356-57. His own view,
which certainly includes visual searches, is that "a 'search' is anything that invades inter-
ests protected by the amendment." Id. at 383. Another broad view is the following:
"[Any apperception of information, acts, or words which the original possessor or actor
did not intend to publicize might constitute a search and seizure within the meaning of
the fourth amendment." Note, Private Places, supra note 2, at 976.
78 Note, Private Places, supra note 2, at 974-75. Courts rarely discuss scientific princi-
ples in fourth amendment cases. Justice Harlan did note in his Katz concurrence that the
failure to treat wiretapping as a search was "bad physics as well as bad law." Katz, 389
U.S. at 362 (Harlan, J., concurring). Judge Jasen of the New York Court of Appeals
relied on science in dissent in People v. Smith, 42 N.Y.2d 961, 367 N.E.2d 648, 398
N.Y.S.2d 142 (1977), concerning a police officer's use of a flashlight, noting that virtu-
ally all observations occur only because light from some source is reflected off the ob-
ject. Id. at 963, 367 N.E.2d at 649, 398 N.Y.S.2d at 143, (Jasen, J., dissenting). He
concluded that the assistance of a flashlight at night is no different from the assistance of
the sun during the day and neither turns an observation into a search. Id. (Jasen, J.,
dissenting).
79 Katz, 389 U.S. at 352. The Court went on to note that a person using a public
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suggests a certain minimum dichotomy in the realm of the senses-
in certain circumstances one may have a reasonable expectation of
privacy from eavesdropping but not from observation. The major-
ity's citation of United States v. Lee 8° for the proposition that the
fourth amendment is inapplicable to matters "knowingly expose[d]
to the public" is more troubling.81 So limited, the reference does
not necessarily require different standards for visual and aural
searches, but Lee seems to suggest a wide if not unlimited authority
for visual intrusions and many courts after Katz have seen Lee in this
light.8 2 There is also the Supreme Court's post-Katz jurisprudence
telephone booth "is surely entitled to assume that the words he utters into the mouth-
piece will not be broadcast to the world." Id. It seems evident that the Court had no
difficulty with the agent seeing Katz in the telephone booth.
The contemporary design of public telephones suggests that the expectations para-
digm may no longer protect some conversations. Most public telephones are not en-
closed but are instead open to the elements and the naked ear, no less than the eye, of
the casual passerby. Since an outside observer can now hear as well as observe conver-
sations over such devices, users may no longer have a reasonable expectation of privacy
in their conversations under the Katz paradigm. While Title III of the Omnibus Crime &
Safe Streets Act of 1968, Pub. L. No. 90-351, 86 Stat. 197 (1968), probably still prohibits
the interception of the portion of the conversation traveling over wire, see 18 U.S.C.
§ 2511 (1982), there may be nothing to prevent the police from placing an electronic
listening and recording device outside the telephone and intercepting the user's end of
the conversation. This would be consistent with at least some views of the reasonable
expectation of privacy limitations on visual surveillance. See infra notes 92-100 and ac-
companying text and note 157.
80 274 U.S. 559 (1927). For a description of Lee, see supra note 22.
81 Katz, 389 U.S. at 351.
82 See, e.g., United States v. Minton, 488 F.2d 37, 38 (4th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 416
U.S. 936 (1974)(use of binoculars is permitted); Commonwealth v. Ortiz, 376 Mass. 349,
353, 380 N.E.2d 669, 672 (1978)(use of binoculars is approved); State v. Bennett, 205
Mont. 117, 119, 666 P.2d 747, 750 (1983)(something that can be seen by a spotting
scope is knowingly exposed and not the object of a search); State v. Lee, 633 P.2d 48, 51
(Utah), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1057 (1981)(use of a flashlight is not a search); State v.
Manly, 85 Wash. 2d 120, 122, 530 P.2d 306, 307, cert. denied, 423 U.S. 855 (1975)(noting
that Lee "approved, at least inferentially" the use of binoculars). Lee held that coast
guardsmen did not engage in a search when they used a searchlight to help them see
cases of liquor on the deck of a boat. Lee, 274 U.S. at 563. Accordingly, it is direct
authority for visual enhancement devices that illuminate rather than magnify. Still, Jus-
tice Brandeis for the Court analogized this action to "use of a marine glass or a field
glass." Id. See also On Lee v. United States, 343 U.S. 747, 766-67 (1952) (analogizing the
use of a radio transmitter to the use of binoculars). See supra note 76. The change in
governing paradigms in the sixty years since Lee was decided necessarily weakens the
holding. See, Note, Telescopes, Binoculars, and the Fourth Amendment, 67 CORNELL L. REV.
379, 385 (1982)(noting that Lee was decided in the trespass era). Nevertheless, since
Justice Brandeis dissented so strenuously only one year later in Olmstead v. United
States, 277 i.S. 438 (1928), see supra note 27, it is evident that he recognized substantial
distinctions between wiretapping and enhanced visual surveillance. Nor was Katz the
last example of Supreme Court reliance on Lee. See United States v. Dunn, 480 U.S. 294,
305 (1987)(use of a flashlight does "not transform observations into an unreasonable
search").
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to consider. By and large the decisions acquiesce in or only lightly
regulate a broad range of constructive intrusions.83 Finally, there is
a prevalent if not universal belief that electronic eavesdropping is a
more intrusive and ultimately more demeaning investigative tech-
nique than are most methods of visual surveillance.
8 4
These various strands have worked together to create an amor-
phous tangle of doctrine applicable to both enhanced and
unenhanced visual surveillance. This problem, one "at the fringes
of fourth amendment law," 85 is becoming more complex as the so-
phistication and use of enhancement devices appears to be increas-
ing. Perhaps for that reason, one answer lies in a close examination
of the simplest, oldest, and most common aid-the visual enhance-
ment device, a category that includes items ranging from simple
eyeglasses to airplanes, from binoculars to infra-red nightscopes.
B. THE REASONABLE EXPECTATION OF PRIVACY FROM OBSERVATION
The expectations paradigm applies the fourth amendment in
cases in which the government has invaded a protected privacy in-
terest. In the area of visual surveillance, this requires courts to eval-
uate the relationship among three factors: the government agent
(observer), the person or thing seen (object), and the person whose
expectations are at issue (target). The critical issue is whether the
observer has invaded the target's actual and reasonable expectation
of privacy (REOP) with respect to the object. There are several dif-
ferent models of applying the expectations paradigm to visual ob-
servations. Courts strictly adhering to the Katz analysis follow one
83 See supra text accompanying notes 51-74.
84 A typical statement of this principle is:
[T]he notion here is that in assigning values to various privacy interests in our soci-
ety, there is more reason to protect the expectation that one can converse in private
where no one else is in hearing range than there is to protect the expectation that
public conduct will be unobserved when no one is within range to see it with the
naked eye.
1 W. LAFAVE, supra note 17, at 360. See also Note, Sense-Enhancing Devices, supra note 41,
at 1202 (seeing electronic eavesdropping as "much more far-reaching and sinister in its
implications than are most of the other sense enhancing aids"). Still, at least when so-
phisticated visual enhancement devices are at issue, the intrusion can be very substan-
tial. One commentator notes that "[t]he seizure of one's physical actions conducted in
private is an extreme intrusion upon one's right of privacy, especially since careful pre-
paratory steps to ensure privacy cannot close out the unwanted electronic eye from ob-
serving and recording the most intimate activities for others to examine in detail."
Comment, Electronic Visual Surveillance and the Right of Privacy: When is Electronic Observation
Reasonable, 35 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1043, 1049 (1978)(footnote omitted). As discussed
below, the variety of visual enhancement devices and the fact that some are routinely
used by private individuals suggests that no single categorical evaluation of the impact
of their use on "reasonable" expectations of privacy is possible. See infra Part IV.B.2.
85 Note, Sense-Enhancing Devices, supra note 41, at 1167.
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of several "pure" REOP approaches in which the observer's method
is irrelevant.8 6 While such approaches are consistent with Katz in an
abstract sense, the reality of enhanced observation renders them an
incomplete model for fourth amendment analysis. Accordingly,
many courts return to pre-Katz notions based on the locations of the
observer or the object, while others find the government's methods
of observation relevant to determining whether a fourth amendment
issue is presented. These approaches are not totally inconsistent;
some are in fact specific applications of other, more general, theo-
ries. More importantly, each model attempts to apply the Katz para-
digm, and each fails to 'present a coherent and generally applicable
solution. The following sections analyze the "pure" REOP, loca-
tion, and technological approaches.
1. Pure REOP Approaches
The various pure REOP approaches agree that the appropriate
judicial course is to evaluate the target's actual expectation of pri-
vacy and then determine whether that expectation is "sufficient" for
fourth amendment protections to attach.8 7 The Katz facts provide a
classic example of such expectations-a person conversing over a
86 Analysis concerning methods of observation seems alien to the underlying theory
because the analytical construct relies on the target's state of mind. A key problem is
that courts should not expect people to anticipate all possible enhanced visual observa-
tions. Some courts require only that people protect themselves from naked-eye intru-
sions, at least in certain settings. See United States v. Taborda, 635 F.2d 131, 138-40 (2d
Cir. 1980)(enhanced viewing into the home intrudes on a REOP); People v. Arno, 90
Cal. App. 3d 505, 511, 153 Cal. Rptr. 624, 627 (1979)(enhancement is permitted only if
the object could be identified by a naked eye). Others weigh various aspects of the intru-
siveness of the government's methods; this is particularly common in cases analyzing
aerial surveillance. See infra note 166. Other courts have hpheld binocular observations
while noting that more intrusive devices might not be allowed. See State v. Stachler, 58
Haw. 412, 421, 570 P.2d 1323, 1329 (1977)(distinguishing between binoculars and "so-
phisticated electronic surveillance techniques"). Finally, courts have sometimes upheld
warrantless enhancement on a theory that the particular method involves only a minimal
intrusion. See United States v. Solis, 536 F.2d 880, 882 (9th Cir. 1976)(a dog sniff consti-
tutes a "reasonably tolerable" invasion).
The Supreme Court in Dow Chem. Co. v. United States, 476 U.S. 227 (1986), al-
lowed fairly intrusive aerial surveillance of private property but left open whether it
would similarly permit the use of "highly sophisticated surveillance equipment not gen-
erally available to the public." Id. at 238. The dissenting justices found any distinction
based on method to be at odds with the Court's prior decisions. Id. at 251 & n.13 (Pow-
ell, J., dissenting). This close division underscores the tension between the logical the-
ory of the expectations paradigm and the way many people actually determine their
privacy expectations.
87 As might be expected, there are major disagreements concerning the nature and
level of "sufficiency." This Article uses "sufficient" to express only that the court finds




public telephone has a sufficient expectation that no outsider can
hear the conversation.88 The courts have had little difficulty evalu-
ating actual expectations of privacy. While courts have denied some
fourth amendment claims because the target had no true expecta-
tion of privacy,89 courts rarely analyze this issue closely. Instead,
they usually accept that the target believed, however foolishly, that
law enforcement officers could not see the object.90 The result is
that the "actual expectation of privacy" requirement is largely disre-
garded as a potentially dispositive factor in fourth amendment anal-
ysis.9 1 As a consequence, pure REOP analysis almost always turns
88 The Katz facts also reveal that the object may be the target. Katz, 389 U.S. at 348-
49. This is quite common but not necessary. Consistent with the language of the fourth
amendment, an object can be a person, house, paper, or effect.
89 See, e.g., United States v. Rucinski, 658 F.2d 741, 746 (10th Cir. 1981)(person can-
not have any actual expectation of privacy when his contract with the government per-
mits inspections at any time without notice); Lightfoot v. State, 356 So. 2d 331, 334 (Fla.
Dist. Ct. App. 1978)(keeping marijuana plants in open view of neighbor's yard "implies"
the absence of any expectation of privacy); Sponick v. City of Detroit Police Dep't, 49
Mich. App. 162, 198, 211 N.W.2d 674, 690 (1973)(one cannot have expectation of pri-
vacy from observation in a public bar); State v. Holt, 291 Or. 343, 347-49, 630 P.2d 854,
857-58 (1981)(no expectation of privacy in restroom stall for behavior intentionally dis-
played or where target is aware of possibility of observation). An instructive, if unusual,
decision is State v. Louis, 296 Or. 57, 672 P.2d 708 (1983). A police officer photo-
graphed Louis exposing himself from his living room window on several occasions. Id.
at 59, 672 P.2d at 709. The court held that there was no search because one could see
the defendant's actions from outside "without any special effort." Id. at 61, 672 P.2d at
710. Logically, proof beyond a reasonable doubt of the offense of public exposure of
one's genitals effectively rebuts any claim that observation constitutes a violation of an
actual expectation of privacy.
90 See, e.g., Florida v. Riley, 109 S. Ct. 693, 696 (1989)(assuming that the target "in-
tended and expected" privacy); Kitzmiller v. State, 76 Md. App. 686, 690, 548 A.2d 140,
142 (1988)(recognizing that the defendant anticipated privacy in his backyard); State v.
Harp, 48 Or. App. 185, 190, 616 P.2d 564, 566 (1980)(assuming that defendant had
actual expectation of privacy that his marijuana plants would not be discovered). See
generally Note, Protecting Privacy, supra note 41, at 328 (noting that actual expectation
requirement causes difficulties and that courts often presume it satisfied in order to re-
solve the case through the objective portion of the inquiry). The Georgia Court of Ap-
peals stated the basis for assuming the existence of an actual expectation of privacy in
explaining why it is not by itself a sufficient basis for fourth amendment protection:
"[S]urely unless [the defendant] expected to remain undiscovered he would not risk
possession of property carrying a highly undesirable penalty." Williams v. State, 157
Ga. App. 476, 477, 276 S.E.2d 923, 925, cert. denied, 454 U.S. 823 (1981). Katz is consis-
tent with this reliance on a presumption; the Supreme Court never questioned that Katz
had in fact expected that someone would overhear his calls, even though it was not clear
from the way the parties framed the issues that Katz had ever formally asserted that he
had any such expectation.
Some courts avoid the question by noting thatJustice Harlan's formulation refers to
whether the person "exhibited . ..an expectation of privacy." Katz, 389 U.S. at 361
(Harlan, J., concurring)(emphasis added). They therefore look to the efforts taken to
assure privacy. For a discussion of such efforts, see infra note 105.
91 The most troubling aspect of the "actual" expectation of privacy requirement is
that in theory the prosecution can defeat it by prior notice of governmental use of any
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on the reasonableness of that actual expectation of privacy. Here
the courts splinter in their understandings of "sufficient." Three
approaches dominate the cases; they can be characterized as the
"successful," the "likely," and the "honored."
Many courts seem to demand that an expectation of privacy
from observation be successful in order to be reasonable. That is, if
the police were able in fact to observe the object, an individual
could not have a reasonable expectation of privacy because observa-
tion was possible.9 2 Katz is distinguished, if at all, on the perceived
surveillance technique. Professor Amsterdam notes this problem in arguing that actual
expectations should be irrelevant to fourth amendment analysis. Amsterdam, supra note
2, at 383-85. He argues that otherwise "the government could diminish each person's
subjective expectation of privacy merely by announcing half-hourly on television that...
we were all forthwith being placed under comprehensive electronic surveillance." Id. at
384. See also People v. Agee, 200 Cal. Rptr. 827, 832 (Cal. Ct. App. 1984)(characterizing
an argument that the existence of "routine" helicopter patrols defines people's expecta-
tions of privacy as "bootstrapping" that would allow the government to manipulate
fourth amendment coverage); 1 W. LAFAvE, supra note 17, at 308-10 (discussing Profes-
sor Amsterdam's hypothetical and others that undercut the notion that subjective expec-
tations should affect the application of the fourth amendment). Justice Harlan himself
came to conclude that subjective expectations of privacy are not important in defining
the scope of fourth amendment protections from constructive invasions. United States
v. White, 401 U.S. 745, 768 (1970)(Harlan, J., dissenting).
Still, the Supreme Court has adhered to its two-part inquiry in the face of Professor
Amsterdam's hypothetical, noting that "[i]n such cirumstances, where an individual's
subjective expectations had been 'conditioned' by influences alien to well-recognized
Fourth Amendment freedoms, those subjective expectations obviously could play no
meaningful role." Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 740-41 n.5 (1979). Moreover, there
are some situations in which notice might legitimately affect the application of the fourth
amendment. See infra note 293 and accompanying text.
92 Several Pennsylvania cases provide examples. In Commonwealth v. Busfield, 242
Pa. Super. 194, 363 A.2d 1227 (1976), the court dealt with the validity of an observation
into the curtained window of a house. Id. at 196, 363 A.2d at 1228. Despite citing Katz
and characterizing the issue as turning on the intent of the target to maintain privacy,
the court found no reasonable expectation because the officers could see through the
curtain. Id. at 198, 363 A.2d at 1228-29. In Commonwealth v. Hernley, 216 Pa. Super.
177, 263 A.2d 904 (1970), cert. denied, 401 U.S. 914 (1971), the court upheld a more
adventurous observation. Here the agent was unable to peek through a curtain so he
climbed a ladder on abutting property and used binoculars to observe illegal activity
inside the premises. Id. at 178-79, 263 A.2d at 905. The court was untroubled by the
use of binoculars or the agent's unusual efforts to gain a vantage point. Id. at 181-82,
263 A.2d at 906-07. Professor LaFave describes Hernley as "a perversion of the reason-
ing underlying Katz." 1 W. LAFAvE, supra note 17, at 342. The court used somewhat
similar analysis in Commonwealth v. Williams, 262 Pa. Super. 508, 396 A.2d 1286
(1979), in which it held that there was no REOP against police use of a startron (night
vision scope) to view activities in darkened rooms in an apartment. Id. at 518, 396 A.2d
at 1290. It concluded that "the use of curtains or other window coverings would have
rendered the startron, as well as more conventional techniques of observation, ineffec-
tive." Id. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court reversed and seemed shocked by the intru-
siveness of the startron. Commonwealth v. Williams, 494 Pa. 496, 500, 431 A.2d 964,
966 (1981). A more recent Pennsylvania case in this area, Commonwealth v. Lemanski,
365 Pa. Super. 332, 529 A.2d 1085 (1987), viewed the scope of the fourth amendment
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if technically erroneous difference between hearing and seeing.93
This approach is exemplified by United States v. Whaley, 94 a case in
which the court decided that binocular aided observations into a tar-
get's home did not constitute a search.95 All possible observation
points were closed to general public access but agents were able to
see into Whaley's basement from forty yards away by entering a
neighboring property and climbing down an embankment to a canal
that formed one of the property's boundaries. 96 The court empha-
sized that the object-a cocaine factory-was "in a lighted room di-
rectly in front of uncurtained windows . . . [and] could be viewed
with the naked eye from a position on the canal or on neighboring
property. ' 97 Of equal importance, the court found the secluded na-
ture of the target's house irrelevant, essentially tossing off the argu-
ment that Whaley had a reasonable expectation that no one would
look into the building.98 It was conceivable that someone might
climb down to the canal and look in the windows; moreover, the
target's suspicious behavior elsewhere should have warned him that
law enforcement surveillance was likely.99
very differently than it had in Busfield, Hernley, and Williams. It held that enhanced obser-
vations into a greenhouse attached to a house breached the defendant's REOP. Id. at
347, 529 A.2d at 1093. Still, a dissenting judge noted that the "glass enclosing the
greenhouse invited the prying eye of anyone, including the police, to view its contents."
Id. at 360, 529 A.2d at 1098 (Popovich, J., dissenting).
93 The Hernley court emphasized that Katz had not successfully avoided visual obser-
vation. Hernley, 216 Pa. Super. at 181 n.5, 263 A.2d at 907 n.5. Its conclusion was that a
reasonable expectation of privacy from such observation requires one "to preserve his
privacy from visual observation." Id. at 181, 263 A.2d at 907.
94 779 F.2d 585 (11th Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 1055 (1987).
95 Id. at 589-92.
96 Id. at 587-88.
97 Id. at 590. Here the connection to the Pennsylvania cases is particularly clear.
Whaley did not curtain his windows, thus he had no REOP from observations from
outside those windows.
98 Id.
99 Id. These conclusions do not really respond to Whaley's claim. The fact that
some casual observation was possible does not mean that the defendant should have
expected nightly observations for three months. The court's point, it seems, is that an
expectation of probable privacy is not necessarily reasonable. It must, at least in the
context of visual observation, be successful as well. The suggestion that one loses a
REOP in one's secluded home by acting suspiciously in public is at odds with fourth
amendment doctrine. See, e.g., United States v. Taborda, 635 F.2d 131, 138-39 n.10 (2d
Cir. 1980)("What varies with the nature of the activity is not the likelihood, but rather
the consequences, of its being observed. In other words, the nature of the activity does
not alter the odds, but only the size of the wager."); People v. Agee, 200 Cal. Rptr. 827,
831-32 (Cal. Ct. App. 1984)(fact that contraband is the object of observation has no
relevance to fourth amendment); Commonwealth v. Lemanski, 365 Pa. Super. 332, 350,
529 A.2d 1085, 1093 (1987)("[T]he Fourth Amendment makes no distinctions between
lawful and unlawful conduct.").
The Whaley court seems to have meant that the defendant's suspicious behavior in-
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This approach eviscerates the fourth amendment's application
to visual observations. Even in cases assuming the existence of an
actual expectation of privacy, targets inevitably lose because the
mere fact of observation renders satisfaction of the "reasonable ex-
pectation" aspect impossible. To these courts, the only real protec-
tions from visual surveillance are good luck and barricaded
windows, probably in that order.100
Other courts attempt to protect "likely" privacy. That is, they
deem the Katz test satisfied if observation was practically unlikely.10 '
creased the likelihood of law enforcement interest in his activities, thereby making it
more probable that agents would attempt to watch his basement laboratory. While this
may be true, it is inconsistent with the court's conclusion that the reasonableness of
Whaley's expectation of privacy turns on the possibility of observation by members of
the general public. Whaley, 779 F.2d at 591. More fundamentally, it reinforces the sus-
picion that this method of analysis is inherently circular. If the only "reasonable" expec-
tations of privacy are those that succeed in foiling surveillance by suspicious law
enforcement officers, courts are unlikely to analyze any "reasonable expectations of pri-
vacy" in the real world of criminal litigation.
100 See generally United States v. Head, 783 F.2d 1422, 1424, 1427-28 (9th Cir.), cert.
denied, 476 U.S. 1171 (1986)(no REOP where it was possible for officer to look into van,
notwithstanding target's coating window to deter all but the most determined attempts
to look in); United States v. Bellina, 665 F.2d 1335, 1344 (4th Cir. 1981)(no REOP
because curtains were not drawn and observers could see into window of airplane); Peo-
ple v. Joubert, 118 Cal. App. 3d 637, 646, 173 Cal. Rptr. 428, 434 (1981)(farmers as-
sume risk of observation by aerial surveillance; no REOP unless marijuana is cultivated
"in a hothouse or [is] otherwise cover[ed]"); Sims v. State, 425 So. 2d 563, 567 (Fla.
Dist. Ct. App. 1983)(gaps in bushes around property defeat any expectation of privacy
from observation); State v. Thompson, 196 Neb. 57, 58, 241 N.W.2d 511, 512-13
(1976)(no REOP because officers in alley could see marijuana use through sheer curtain
across window). Cf.James v. United States, 418 F.2d 1150, 1151 n.1 (D.C. Cir. 1969)(of-
ficer may look under a garage door; observations are lawful even if the officer has "to
crane his neck, or bend over, or squat"). The lesson of these cases may be that privacy is
protected only where all possible efforts are made to ensure it. One commentator calls
this "the fort," Note, Katz and the Fourth Amendment, supra note 44, at 70-72, and disagrees
with the premise: "Neither Katz nor the fourth amendment requires life in a fort in
order to preserve one's security against arbitrary governmental intrusion." Id. at 72.
101 See People v. Lovelace, 116 Cal. App. 3d 541, 548-54, 172 Cal. Rptr. 65, 69-73
(1981)(REOP found because courts could not expect members of public to see through
the fence); Burkholder v. Superior Court, 96 Cal. App. 3d 421, 428-29, 158 Cal. Rptr.
86, 90-91 (1979)(REOP found because area was restricted and concealed from view,
thereby rendering entry unforseeable); State v. Kender, 60 Haw. 301, 303-07, 588 P.2d
447, 449-51 (1978)(REOP found despite officer's ability to make observations after
climbing fence because view of marijuana in defendant's backyard was effectively
blocked from normal vantage points); State v. Stanton, 7 Or. App. 286, 296-97, 490 P.2d
1274, 1279 (1971)(emphasizing factors concerning likelihood of observation, conclud-
ing that there was no REOP because property was open and contraband was discovera-
ble by the general public); Buchanan v. State, 471 S.W.2d 401, 404 (Tex. Crim. App.
1971), cert. denied, 405 U.S. 930 (1972)(fourth amendment privacy in public bathroom
depends on whether or not the stalls have locking doors). Professor LaFave criticizes
this approach:
[I]t might be assumed that police investigative activity constitutes a search whenever
it uncovers incriminating actions or objects which the law's hypothetical reasonable
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In such cases courts evaluate various factors relating to the target
and the object. The courts may consider secluded or camouflaged
objects, for example, private under this approach even if police of-
ficers are able to make an observation through happenstance or the
use of sophisticated technological devices.' 02 If the Whaley court
had followed this approach it could not have dismissed the privacy
claim in so cavalier a fashion. It would instead have had to deter-
mine whether casual observation was sufficiently likely to render
Whaley's actual expectation of privacy unreasonable.
State v. Kaaheena10 3 presents an example of the approach em-
phasizing likely privacy. A police officer climbed onto a crate and
looked into a window from approximately six feet above ground
level through a one-inch gap in venetian blinds.10 4  The court
deemed this to constitute a search even though the blinds did not
successfully conceal the object. The target's expectation of privacy
was reasonable because the gap in the blinds was "high enough off
the ground so that no one could look in unassisted."' 1 5 Under this
man would expect to be private, that is, which as a matter of statistical probability
were not likely to be discovered. But this is not really what Katz is all about.
1 W. LAFAVE, supra note 17, at 311 (footnote omitted). He supports his analysis by dis-
cussing a hypothetical found in Note, Private Places, supra note 2. The hypothetical posits
that a police officer inadvertently happens upon a night-time narcotics transaction in a
remote part of New York's Central Park. Although observation is highly unlikely as a
matter of statistical probability, there is no fourth amendment violation. Note, Private
Places, supra note 2, at 983. There is a realistic or likely expectation of privacy, but not an
expectation that society considers reasonable. Id. See also United States v. Fisch, 474
F.2d 1071, 1077 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 412 U.S. 921 (1973)(Private Places concludes that
the reasonableness aspect of the Katz inquiry "bars the bizarre, the freakish, and the
weird expectations").
102 See Phelan v. Superior Court, 90 Cal. App. 3d 1005, 1011-15, 153 Cal. Rptr. 738,
742-44 (1979)(REOP for rural marijuana garden well protected from discovery by natu-
ral terrain and camouflage activities); People v. Fly, 34 Cal. App. 3d 665, 667, 110 Cal.
Rptr. 158, 159-60 (1973)(REOP found for plants in yard because observer had to
"squeeze into a narrow area between the neighbor's garage and defendant's fence and
that area was almost blocked by heavy foliage and weeds"); State v. Brady, 406 So. 2d
1093, 1097-98 (Fla. 1981), vacated, 467 U.S. 1201 (1984)(REOP found largely because
property was remote and discovery was unlikely); State v. Knight, 63 Haw. 90, 93-94,
621 P.2d 370, 373-74 (1980)(REOP because observation was into a "remote area, sur-
rounded by vegetation and forest"). Arguably, one can be sufficiently secluded in a city.
See, e.g., People v. Arno, 90 Cal. App. 3d 505, 509, 153 Cal. Rptr. 624, 626 (1979)(REOP
from observation in an office on the eighth floor of a building at least 200 yards from a
vantage point of similar height).
103 59 Haw. 23, 575 P.2d 462 (1978).
104 Id. at 24, 29 n.7, 575 P.2d at 464, 467 n.7.
105 Id. at 29, 575 P.2d at 467. The clearest distinction between this approach and the
"successful" expectation of privacy approach is in the large number of cases that stress
that there are limitations on the precautions that must be taken to preserve a sufficient
expectation of privacy. See United States v. Cuevas-Sanchez, 821 F.2d 248, 251 (5th Cir.
1987)(fencing the backyard sufficiently evidenced an intention to maintain privacy);
United States v. Kim, 415 F. Supp. 1252, 1257 (D. Haw. 1976)("whether and when
[Vol. 80
VISUAL SEARCHES
theory, outdoor objects may be sufficiently shielded from observa-
tion to support a reasonable expectation of privacy; either the ter-
rain or artificial efforts may make observation improbable. 106 At
least before the Supreme Court's aerial search cases,10 7 courts often
evaluated the reasonableness of expectations of privacy from aerial
surveillance in terms of the likelihood that such observations would
occur.108
Under this second approach, the Katz engine is driven solely by
the likelihood of observation. While this approach sounds workable
Kim's curtains were shut has no relevance in this case"); Lorenzana v. Superior Court, 9
Cal. 3d 626, 636, 511 P.2d 33, 41, 108 Cal. Rptr. 585, 593 (1973)(window openings do
not negate expectation of privacy; there is no requirement that a person "encase himself
in a light-tight, air-proof box"); Vidaurri v. Superior Court, 13 Cal. App. 3d 550, 553, 91
Cal. Rptr. 704, 706 (1970)("a person who surrounds his backyard with a fence, and
limits entry with a gate, locked or unlocked, has shown a reasonable expectation of pri-
vacy for the area"); Wheeler v. State, 659 S.W.2d 381, 390 (Tex. Crim. App. 1983)(one
need not "erect a stone bastion, or retreat to the cellar to exhibit a reasonable expecta-
tion of privacy"). These points are often made in response to arguments to impose the
"successful" approach indirectly by suggesting that the failure to use the most effective
method of protection means that the target has no actual expectation of privacy. The
common sense response of the Kim court was that if true, then "anyone taking steps to
protect his privacy would run the risk of being considered to have foresaken it." Kim,
415 F. Supp. at 1257. See also Note, supra note 76, at 715 (arguing that preventative steps
establish the subjective expectation of privacy rather than negate it).
Consistent with this notion, some courts emphasize that Katz requires that the tar-
get exhibit a reasonable expectation of privacy, see Katz, 389 U.S. at 361 (Harlan, J.,
concurring), and therefore emphasize the target's efforts to maintain secrecy. See, e.g.,
People v. Lovelace, 116 Cal. App. 3d 541, 550, 172 Cal. Rptr. 65, 69-70 (1981)(six-foot
high fence sufficiently demonstrates expectation of privacy); Commonwealth v. Soychak,
221 Pa. Super. 458, 463, 289 A.2d 119, 122-23 (1972)(use of louvers on fan and door-
man sufficiently exhibits the necessary expectation of privacy); State v. Peck, 143 Wis. 2d
624, 638-42,422 N.W.2d 160, 166-67 (Wis. Ct. App. 1988)(emphasis is on what steps an
individual has taken to prevent observation). Cf. United States v. Broadhurst, 805 F.2d
849, 854 (9th Cir. 1986)(efforts to block observation into greenhouse meets the subjec-
tive aspect of Katz test). See also Tomkovicz, supra note 2, at 653; Note, supra note 57, at
744; (both emphasizing that the inquiry pertains to manifestations rather than beliefs).
106 See supra note 102.
107 See supra text accompanying notes 68-74.
108 See United States v. Allen, 675 F.2d 1373, 1381 (9th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 454
U.S. 833 (1981) (no REOP, the key factor being that helicopter flights were common and
should have been expected); United States v. DeBacker, 493 F. Supp. 1078, 1081 (W.D.
Mich. 1980)(no REOP from aerial surveillance in open fields where overflights "are not
infrequent"); Burkholder v. Superior Court, 96 Cal. App. 3d 421, 425, 158 Cal. Rptr.
86, 88-89 (1979)(no REOP from aerial observation because farmers should expect that
overflights will observe the cultivation of contraband); State v. Stachler, 58 Haw. 412,
419, 570 P.2d 1323, 1328 (1977)(emphasizing the likelihood of aerial overflights, noting
that helicopters flew over the area every day); State v. Rogers, 100 N.M. 517, 518, 673
P.2d 142, 143 (N.M. Ct. App. 1983)(no REOP from helicopter observation where air-
craft are commonly in area). Cf. Williams v. State, 157 Ga. App. 476, 477, 277 S.E.2d
923, 925, cert. denied, 454 U.S. 823 (1981)(unreasonable to expect privacy from over-
flights at lawful heights because "[t]he sky, like the road, is a highway over which those
licensed to do so may pass").
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and is somewhat consistent with the Supreme Court's attempts to
apply the expectations paradigm in other areas, 0 9 it fails in the vis-
ual area. The "level" of likelihood is indeterminate, as it allows
courts to pick and choose among probabilities and realities in a
nearly random fashion. This is aggravated by the fact that pure
REOP approaches purport to ignore the government's methods,
which renders artificial any attempt to assess the reasonableness of
the target's expectations concerning the likelihood of observation.
In Kaaheena, for example, the court stated that it would have held
the observation valid if the gap had been at eye level because then
"[a]ny member of the curious public could, without any assistance,
glance into the building." 0 Yet even with the opening at six feet,
anyone of the not uncommon height of six feet could have seen
through the gap with relative ease on tip-toes. The critical fact in
Kaaheena seems to be that this particular officer was assisted by the
crate, a mechanical aid to visual observation akin in some respects to
a nearby hill or a seat in an airplane."'
109 The Court has evidenced several different minds on this matter. In Oliver v.
United States, 466 U.S. 170 (1984), it seemed to approve of a likelihood approach when
it noted that open fields are generally accessible to the public notwithstanding fences or
signs. Id. at 179. The Court nevertheless purported to reject reliance on likelihood:
"[I]t may be that because of [seclusion and efforts to deter trespassers] ... few members
of the public stumbled upon the marijuana crops seized by the police .... The test of
legitimacy... is whether the government's intrusion infringes upon the personal and
societal values protected by the Fourth Amendment." Id. at 182-83. For further discus-
sion of Oliver, see supra note 58. Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735 (1979), on the other
hand, suggests a somewhat different likelihood approach, noting that people assume the
risks that the telephone numbers they dial will be revealed to the police because most
people know that the telephone company has access to this information. Id. at 742-45.
The aerial search cases are clearest on this point and edge even further in the direction
of the "successful" REOP approach. The Court in Dow Chem. Co. v. United States, 476
U.S. 227, 239 (1986), noted that there is no REOP from aerial photography where it is
feasible from public airspace. In California v. Ciraolo, 476 U.S. 207 (1986), the Court
stated: "In an age where private and commercial flight in the public airways is routine, it
is unreasonable for respondent to expect that his marijuana plants were constitutionally
protected from being observed with the naked eye from an altitude of 1,000 feet." Id. at
215. Dissenting Justice Brennan described the plurality's analysis in Florida v. Riley,
109 S. Ct. 693 (1989), as defeating a REOP whenever "a single member of the public
could conceivably position herself to see into the area in question without doing any-
thing illegal." Riley, 109 S. Ct. at 700 (Brennan, J., dissenting). See also Note, The
Supreme Court, 1985 Term, 100 HARV. L. REV. 1, 142 (1986)(characterizing the decisions
as "reduc[ing] the test of whether an expectation is reasonable to nothing more than an
empirical assessment of actual risks").
'10 59 Haw. at 30, 575 P.2d at 467.
111 Courts generally uphold the use of vantage points. See United States v. Allen, 675
F.2d 1373, 1381-82 (9th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 833 (1981)(flatly approving
both helicopter and hill vantage points for visual surveillance); United States v. Bellina,
665 F.2d 1335, 1345-46 (4th Cir. 1981)(use of ladder to gain view of inside of airplane is
permissible); United States v. Minton, 488 F.2d 37, 38 (4th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 416
U.S. 936 (1974)(officers may station themselves on embankment looking down on de-
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Even if the courts agreed on a level of likelihood sufficient to
trigger the fourth amendment, they would still have to agree on an
underlying standard concerning the permissible efficiency of law en-
forcement observations. Courts cannot ignore method to focus on
likelihood because likelihood often depends on method. Because
pure REOP approaches deem methods of observation irrelevant,
presumably there is only a sufficient expectation of privacy where
the target takes those measures likely to ward off the most intrusive
methods. If so, as surveillance techniques become more sophisti-
cated, the REOP will inevitably shrink to the expectation that suc-
ceeds. This may be the practical effect of the Supreme Court's
aircraft and beeper cases. 1 2 Fortunately, however, those decisions
leave open one vehicle for protecting privacy under this rubric,
namely the "honored" expectation."13
The "honored" expectation of privacy approach focuses on the
nature of the object. That is, regardless of the likelihood of obser-
vation, some actions or things are so inherently private that observa-
tion violates a reasonable expectation of privacy. This approach is
based on the normative reading of the Katz "justifiable" or "reason-
able" expectation requirement." 4 While several lines of cases sug-
fendant's property); Murphy v. State, 413 So. 2d 1268, 1270 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
1982) (helicopter may be lowered close to ground to get better view of field); State v.
Holbron, 65 Haw. 152, 153-55, 648 P.2d 194, 196 (1982)(vantage point on hill is per-
missible); Kitzmiller v. State, 76 Md. App. 686, 692-94, 548 A.2d 140, 143 (1988)(up-
holding observation into curtilage made after climbing 40 feet up a tree). Cf. James v.
United States, 418 F.2d 1150, 1151 n.1 (D.C. Cir. 1969)(officer may get down on ground
and peer under garage door).
112 The Supreme Court's aerial search cases seem to suggest that if an aerial observer
can see into an area, the observation does not constitute a search. See supra text accom-
panying notes 68-74. The beeper cases are even more direct, at least with respect to
visual observations. The beeper surveillance in United States v. Knotts, 460 U.S. 276
(1983), allowed agents to track an automobile from St. Paul, Minnesota to Shell Lake,
Wisconsin, despite the fact that the target successfully foiled the efforts of agents trying
to follow his car by sight. Id. at 278.
In essence, use of a beeper renders perfect the difficult technique of mobile visual
surveillance. The Court had no difficulty upholding the use of the beeper to track the
car; because successful visual observation in public would not have violated any REOP,
there was no objection to "the police ... augmenting the sensory faculties bestowed
upon them at birth with such enhancement as science and technology afforded them in
this case." Knotts, 460 U.S. at 282.
113 See, e.g., Ciraolo, 476 U.S. at 215 n.3 (suggesting that more intrusive methods and
observations that disclose intimate details or intrude on privacy may not be permitted);
United States v. Karo, 468 U.S. 705, 714-16 (1984) (monitoring beeper inside house con-
stitutes invasion of privacy in the home). For further discussion of Karo, see supra note
67.
114 See supra notes 41 and 43-46 and accompanying text. As suggested, most commen-
tators emphasize this strand of Katz and suggest that the reasonableness aspect of the
test mirrors community values-the ideal of what the public wants from a police force
sensitive to civil liberties rather than the reality of what the public anticipates from the
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gest the use of such an approach, 1 5 asking courts simply to
determine whether an object is deemed by society as worthy of con-
stitutional protection' 16 is to invite grossly inconsistent decision-
making in which community prejudice is elevated to constitutional
principle. Rigor and fairness require the identification of definable
categories. Perhaps because courts recognize that a general stan-
average police agency. To these commentators it was the fact of communication, not the
closing of the door, that provided Katz with full fourth amendment protection. See 1 W.
LAFAVE, supra note 17, at 360 (since it is "the nature of the thing to be protected that is
critical," a lip-reader using binoculars would violate the fourth amendment by "listen-
ing" to private conversations through his eyes); Note, Protecting Privacy, supra note 41, at
315 (calling for a "sociologically accurate" definition of privacy founded on individual
needs and desires for both "secrecy and solitude").
115 Despite its flirtations with various versions of a likelihood approach, the Supreme
Court has usually relied on societal norm terminology. See Oliver v. United States, 466
U.S. 170, 179 (1984)("There is no societal interest in protecting the privacy of those
activities, such as the cultivation of crops, that occur in open fields."). See also id. at 189
(Marshall, J., dissenting)(defining the reasonable expectation of privacy as falling into
three categories: those determined by "positive law," such as property interests, those
turning on particular uses, and those that are manifested in a way most people under-
stand and respect); Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128, 143 n.12 (1978)(the necessaryjustifi-
able expectation must have some "source outside of the Fourth Amendment, either by
reference to concepts of real or personal property law or to understandings that are
recognized and permitted by society"). Other courts describe the standard in similar
language. See United States v. Cuevas-Sanchez, 821 F.2d 248, 251 (5th Cir. 1987)(ana-
lyzing the use of video surveillance in terms of what society deems to be appropriate);
United States v. Solis, 536 F.2d 880, 881 (9th Cir. 1976)("the critical question is the kind
of intrusion a free society is willing to tolerate"); People v. Agee, 200 Cal. Rptr. 827, 830
(Cal. Ct. App. 1984)(seeing appropriate inquiry as involving societal values and asking
"should people be 'entitled' to enjoy the domain of their backyards without being seen,
heard or noted by their government?"). Cf. Abislaiman v. State, 437 So. 2d 181, 183
(Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1983), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 833 (1984)(combining likelihood and
societal views, suggesting that defendant should have expected traffic in hospital's emer-
gency room parking lot in the middle of the night, but also noting that it is permissible
to use a remote camera to scan that area because society believes that a hospital "has a
right to protect its patients, employees, and property"). An instructive line of cases
concerns observations into restrooms. See infra notes 277-80 and accompanying text.
116 Indeed, such an approach would endanger the fourth amendment's application to
evidence of crime. After all, the Katz Court applied the fourth amendment to evidence
of gambling even though it obviously disapproved of illegal gambling. Society does not
favor the privacy of criminal behavior; it favors the privacy of law-abiding behavior. But
the only way to protect legitimate behavior is to insist that all intrusions on privacy be
reasonable. There is a line of authority concerning intrusions that do nothing more
than identify illegal contraband. In this area of the "dishonored" expectation of privacy,
courts are quite willing to uphold most intrusions. This explains in part the Supreme
Court's dog-sniff case, United States v. Place, 462 U.S. 696 (1983). See supra notes 63-65
and accompanying text. Since the dog revealed only the presence of contraband, no
innocent privacy was invaded. Place, 462 U.S. at 707. See Tomkovicz, supra note 2, at
722 (approving the result because no legitimate information about the target was re-
vealed). See also United States v.Jacobsen, 466 U.S. 109, 122-23 (1984) (concluding that
a field test for cocaine is not a search because it reveals only the presence of an illegal
substance). Cf. Lucas v. United States, 411 A.2d 360, 364 (D.C. 1980)(fact that sensora-
matic device reveals only unpurchased merchandise makes it a reasonable search).
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dard for "honored" expectations of privacy would become a tool for
abuse, courts have most often used the approach in connection with
location approaches.
2. Location Approaches
Cases emphasizing location draw on principles that pre-date
Katz but do not adopt the narrow view of fourth amendment cover-
age usually associated with that period. There are two distinct and
somewhat inconsistent approaches. The first emphasizes the loca-
tion of the observer. The second focuses on the location of the
object.
The "observer" approach is simple to describe and is usually
simple to apply. Observations are lawful as long as the observer is
at a "lawful" location. 1 7 The determination is primarily based
upon the open fields doctrine; unless the officer invades the curti-
lage of the home, all observations are fair game. 11 The logic of the
117 See United States v. Dunn, 480 U.S. 294, 304-05 (1987)(no fourth amendment
search where agents look into curtilage from a place outside curtilage); United States v.
Coplen, 541 F.2d 211, 214 (9th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1073 (1977)(it is "well
settled" that observations from lawful locations are permitted); Lorenzana v. Superior
Court, 9 Cal. 3d 626, 634, 511 P.2d 35, 39, 108 Cal. Rptr. 585, 591 (1973)
("[O]bservations of things in plain sight made from a place where a police officer has a
right to be do not amount to a search in the constitutional sense."); Sims v. State, 425
So. 2d 563, 567 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1983) (if police are at a lawful location, defendant can
have no constitutional challenge to observation); People v. Wright, 41 111. 2d 170, 175-
76, 242 N.E.2d 180, 183-84 (1968), cert. denied, 395 U.S. 933 (1969)(trespass doctrine
still applies to information obtained without reliance on electronic or other methods
that enhance natural senses); People v. Clark, 133 Mich. App. 619, 627-28, 350 N.W.2d
754, 759 (1984)(implying that observation was permissible only because it was made
from outside the defendant's property).
118 This principle permits some intrusions into the curtilage or its functional
equivalent. See United States v. Eisler, 567 F.2d 814, 816 (8th Cir. 1977)(it is permissi-
ble to enter and listen in common hallway of apartment building); United States v.
Magana, 512 F.2d 1169, 1171 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 826 (1975)(entry into
driveway may be permitted as it "is only a semi-private area"); Lorenzana, 9 Cal. 3d at
629, 511 P.2d at 35, 108 Cal. Rptr. at 587 ("A sidewalk, pathway, common entrance or
similar passageway offers an implied permission to the public to enter which necessarily
negates any reasonable expectation of privacy in regard to observations made there.");
People v. Superior Court (Stroud), 37 Cal. App. 3d 836, 840, 112 Cal. Rptr. 764, 766-67
(1974)(recognizing that front yard areas are likely to be crossed by tradespeople and
other strangers); State v. Lee, 633 P.2d 48, 51 (Utah), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1057
(198 1)(observations upheld in part because "[t]he open pathway to the front door was
an implied invitation to members of the public to enter thereon"). See also 1 W. LAFAvE,
supra note 17, at 393-96 (police officers may legitimately enter the curtilage if they use
normal paths or similar means of access to house). The critical point seems to be the
justification rather than the place. See People v. Superior Court (Spielman), 102 Cal.
App. 3d 342, 344, 347-50, 162 Cal. Rptr. 295, 296, 298-300 (1980)(officer was on top of
fence because he was following burglary suspect, majority concludes no search because
officer was in legitimate place under the circumstances).
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theory is that no person can have a reasonable expectation of pri-
vacy from observation if another person can view his or her actions
or property from a "legitimate" location.' 1 9 Consistent with a gen-
erally formalist bent, many courts following the "successful" expec-
tation of privacy approach couple it with a rigid enforcement of the
lawful location approach. 120 Blinds must be closed only enough to
prevent observations by persons outside the curtilage; thus there is
at least some possibility of maintaining access to light and air with-
out giving up all privacy protection. In short, this approach affords
the object a buffer zone of protection.
Still, this approach should provide only cold comfort to many
targets. While it may eliminate invasions from eyes peeking in
poorly shuttered windows from the target's own yard, modem hous-
ing and building practices often make such buffers small or nonexis-
tent. 2 1 Perhaps more importantly, even simple vision-enhancing
119 See, e.g., 1 W. LAFAVE, supra note 17, at 391 (one has no REOP when neighbors can
see or hear person). See id. at 390 (an officer may "see or hear what is occuring inside a
dwelling while he is in an area adjacent to that dwelling's curtilage which is open to the
public"); Note, Electronic Visual Surveillance, supra note 1, at 273 (no one can have REOP
for activity that can be viewed through the unaided senses of other persons); Note,
Tracking Katz, supra note 41, at 1482 ("The government must stand in the shoes of the
public: it may see, know, and take without a warrant only what members of the public
may see, know, and take."). See also State v. Littleton, 407 So. 2d 1208, 1211 (La.
1981) (one cannot have REOP where object is in open view from public road); Common-
wealth v. Ortiz, 376 Mass. 349, 352, 380 N.E.2d 669, 672 (1978)(observations made in
public cannot invade REOP); State v. Grawien, 123 Wis. 2d 428, 437, 367 N.W.2d 816,
820 (Wis. Ct. App. 1985)("The undisputed fact in this case is that the marijuana was
easily viewed from an adjoining cornfield.").
120 See, e.g., Florida v. Riley, 109 S. Ct. 693, 696-97 (1989)(emphasizing that helicop-
ter was in lawful public airspace); Caplen, 541 F.2d at 214-15 (observations from lawful
location are permitted even with visual enhancement); United States v. Christensen, 524
F. Supp. 344, 347 (N.D. 111. 198 1)(stressing that agents making the observations were at
lawful location); People v. Wright, 41 111. 2d at 176, 242 N.E.2d at 184 (emphasizing that
observations were made from public property); State v. Thompson, 196 Neb. 55, 57,
241 N.W.2d 511, 513 (1976)(emphasizing that observing officers had right to be in alley
from which they made their observations); Commonwealth v. Hernley, 216 Pa. Super.
177, 180, 263 A.2d 904, 906 (1970), cert. denied, 401 U.S. 914 (1971)(visual observation
permitted in part because made from outside defendant's property). Still, a number of
courts have permitted "technical" trespasses in some circumstances. See United States v.
Bellina, 665 F.2d 1335, 1344-45 & n.7 (4th Cir. 1981)(permissible to climb onto air-
plane wing under circumstances and make observations because there was no REOP
from observations of airplane's interior); United States v. Hanahan, 442 F.2d 649, 654
(7th Cir. 197 1)(commission of technical trespass does not constitute search and render
observations invalid); State v. Kaaheena, 59 Haw. 23, 27, 575 P.2d 462, 465 (1978)(if
trespass is technical, the observation is not automatically invalid but is instead a factor in
analyzing whether there is a REOP).
121 Numerous cases uphold observations or overhearings from common areas such as
hallways. See, e.g., United States v. Eisler, 567 F.2d 814, 816 (8th Cir. 1977)(hallways of
apartment building are for common use and a person can have no REOP in such areas);
United States v. Llanes, 398 F.2d 880, 882-84 (2d Cir. 1968)(agent permitted to listen to
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devices destroy the impact of the buffer by moving the observer, in
effect, well into the curtilage. t22 Privacy is further diminished in
cases in which aerial surveillance is coupled with the use of visual
conversations in apartment from common hallway); People v. Winograd, 125 Misc. 2d
754, 757, 480 N.Y.S.2d 419, 421-22 (N.Y. Grim. Ct. 1984)(landlord may give permission
for hidden video camera to film events in common hallway, even where camera can ob-
serve the inside of the target's business premises when office door is open). Cf. United
States v. Kim, 415 F. Supp. 1252, 1258 (D. Haw. 1976)(upholding observations of a
shared walkway). Some courts are reluctant to chisel down privacy in this fashion. In
Eisler, the court held that there was a REOP for a conversation occurring inside the
apartment, even though it was overheard without enhancement by a person in the com-
mon hallway. Eisler, 567 F.2d at 816 n.2.
Professor Amsterdam is troubled by the effects on the fourth amendment of the
limited seclusion possible in contemporary housing. Amsterdam, supra note 2, at 401
(noting that there is little privacy from neighbors in urban and inexpensive housing, and
that if officers may lurk in common hallways and similar places there is no real zone of
privacy from governmental inquiry). See also United States v. Wright, 449 F.2d 1355,
1369 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 405 U.S. 947 (197 1)(Wright, J., dissenting)(suggesting that
curbing observations is necessary to protect privacy because "in many homes now a
'plain view' of the bedroom" is feasible); Note, Protecting Privacy, supra note 41, at 333
(noting that those with disposable incomes can take precautions against invasions of
privacy but that the poor cannot do so).
The Sixth Circuit appeared to be sympathetic to such concerns in United States v.
Carriger, 541 F.2d 545 (6th Cir. 1976), in which an agent observed a suspected drug
transaction after slipping into a locked apartment building when the door was opened by
workmen. Id. at 548. The court concluded that tenants "have a personal and constitu-
tionally protected interest in the integrity and security of the entire building against
unlawful breaking and entry." Id. at 550. Noting that the building was locked and that
the entry was in violation of state law, id. at 550-51 & n.1, the court suppressed the
evidence resulting from the agent's observations in the building. Id. at 552. See also
Fixel v. Wainwright, 492 F.2d 480, 484 (5th Cir. 1974)("Contemporary concepts of liv-
ing such as multi-unit dwellings must not dilute Fixel's right to privacy any more than is
absolutely required.").
122 See, e.g., Note, supra note 82, at 384-86 (criticizing cases reaching this result); Note,
A Reconsideration of Katz, supra note 49, at 179 (criticizing Fullbright v. United States, 392
F.2d 432 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 830 (1968) for this result); Note, Constitutional
Law: Use of Binoculars as Constituting an Unreasonable Search, 27 OKLA. L. REv. 254, 257
(1974) (arguing that the use of binoculars to this effect violates the fourth amendment).
Some courts evidence concern in this regard. See, e.g., People v. Arno, 90 Cal. App. 3d
505, 511-12, 153 Cal. Rptr. 624, 627-28 (1979)(suggesting that the observation was un-
lawful because the binoculars in effect placed the observer right outside of the office
windows); Riley v. State, 511 So. 2d 282, 286-87 (Fla. 1987), rev'd, 109 S. Ct. 693
(1989)(disapproving helicopter surveillance in part because it intrudes too severely on
the curtilage). Cf. State v. Barnes, 390 So. 2d 1243, 1244 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1980)(ob-
servations are permitted if conducted without special equipment that unduly intrudes on
private areas). Many other cases ignore the issue or are untroubled by the problem. See
Fullbright, 392 U.S. at 434-35 (binocular-aided observations of house and shed are per-
mitted); United States v. Minton, 488 F.2d 37, 38 (4th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 416 U.S.
936 (1974)("Nor did the use of binoculars by the officers constitute an extension of their
persons so as to put them within the curtilage."); State v. Bennett, 205 Mont. 119, 123,
666 P.2d 747, 750 (1983)(enhanced observation of marijuana plants in garden within a
fenced lot surrounded by open fields is permissible).
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enhancement devices. Where this occurs, observers constructively
breach the curtilage from above as well as from the ground.
The result of combining open fields access and technological
assistance is a substantial breakdown of the traditional privacy pro-
tections associated with the home. For example, in United States v.
Lace,123 the Second Circuit approved the open fields use of binocu-
lars and a spotting scope to scrutinize activities in the vicinity of a
house and its outbuildings-all traditionally part of the curtilage.124
The court concluded that there was no fourth amendment search
because law enforcement officers are permitted to enter private
property outside the curtilage and the enhancement devices merely
improved observations made from such lawful locations. 25 If the
analysis is logical, its application is troubling. The police conducted
a major paramilitary operation, but the intrusion was unregulated
by the fourth amendment simply because no officer physically in-
vaded the curtilage.126 In essence, the government may do
whatever it chooses because this approach excludes from the REOP
all objects visible from beyond the curtilage.12 7 This shotgun mar-
riage between the common law definition of the house and modern
technology means that few, if any, outdoor objects are safe from
governmental surveillance.128 Whatever the Supreme Court meant
123 669 F.2d 46 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 854 (1982).
124 669 F.2d at 50-51. The district court did suppress enhanced observations of the
interior of the house. United States v. Lace, 502 F. Supp. 1021, 1041 (D. Vt. 1980),
aff'd, 669 F.2d 46 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 854 (1982). The property was observed
for three weeks by 24 to 30 state police officers working three shifts a day. Id. at 1027.
For further discussion on Lace, see infra notes 261-64 and accompanying text.
125 Lace, 669 F.2d at 51.
126 Id. at 53.
127 The following specifically approve enhanced observation of objects within the cur-
tilage: United States v. Grimes, 426 F.2d 706, 708 (5th Cir. 1970)(binocular-aided ob-
servation from an open field is not a search); United States v. Hensel, 509 F. Supp. 1376,
1384 n.9 (D. Me. 1981), aft'd, 699 F.2d 18 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 461 U.S. 958 (1983)(en-
hanced observations permitted at least where there are no observations into buildings
within the curtilage); Sims v. State, 425 So. 2d 563, 567 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1982)(obser-
vation with binoculars from outside the property is permitted); People v. Ferguson, 47
Ill. App. 3d 654, 657, 365 N.E.2d 77, 79-80 (1977)(binocular-aided observation into an
apartment approved); Kitzmiller v. State, 76 Md. App. 686, 692-94, 548 A.2d 140, 142-
43 (1988)(upholding binocular-aided observation into defendant's curtilage from a tree
outside the curtilage); People v. Clark; 133 Mich. App. 619, 627, 350 N.W.2d 754, 758
(1983)(approving the use of binoculars from outside the curtilage to view a vehicle in
defendant's garage); State v. Harp, 48 Or. App. 185, 189-90, 616 P.2d 564, 566
(1980)(binocular-aided observation of marijuana plants upheld). See also supra notes
117-20 (citing and discussing cases of observation into curtilage).
128 See 1 W. LAFAvE, supra note 17, at 403 ("[lIt is bizarre that the curious concept of
curtilage, originally taken to refer to the land and buildings within the baron's stone
walls, should ever have been deemed to be of controlling significance as to the constitu-
tional limits upon the powers of the police."). See also People v. Agee, 200 Cal. Rptr.
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by the reasonable expectation of privacy in Katz, it could not have
anticipated that the term would be turned around and used to man-
date nearly absolute security before fourth amendment protection
attaches.
One method of limiting this effect of the "observer" approach
is to define it as applicable only to unaided observations. That is, an
observation from a lawful location is not permissible unless the ob-
server can make it by use of the naked eye. While various courts rely
on this version of the approach,' 29 it too is problematic. Decisions
using the approach do not usually prohibit use of enhancement de-
vices from outside the curtilage under a theory that only naked-eye
observations are permissible. Instead, courts usually pretend en-
hancement never occurred by omitting the results of such observa-
tions from judicial consideration13 0 or by concluding that they
827, 834 n.10 (Cal. Ct. App. 1984)(noting that the only significance of curtilage/open
fields line under common law was as an aspect of the law of burglary).
129 See, e.g., United States v. Taborda, 635 F.2d 131, 138-39 (2d Cir. 1980)("any en-
hanced viewing of the interior of a home impair[s] a legitimate expectation of privacy");
State v. Ward, 62 Haw. 509, 516, 617 P.2d 568, 572 (1980)(there is a REOP unless the
activities were exposed to the naked eye). Cf. People v. Arno, 90 Cal. App. 3d 505, 511-
12, 153 Cal. Rptr. 624, 627-28 (1979)("[T]he reasonable expectation of privacy extends
to that which cannot be seen by naked eye or heard by the unaided ear."); Common-
wealth v. Lemanski, 365 Pa. Super. 332, 347-50, 529 A.2d 1085, 1093 (1987)(use of
binoculars to identify objects not identifiable to naked eye violates defendant's REOP);
State v. Blacker, 52 Or. App. 1077, 1081, 630 P.2d 413, 415 (1981)(REOP found be-
cause marijuana plant could not be seen without enhancement). See also Note, supra note
82, at 391-93 (use of binoculars or telescopes to observe otherwise unseen objects
breaches a REOP) and Note, The Post-Katz Problem of When "Looking" Will Constitute Search-
ing Violative of the Fourth Amendment, 38 LA. L. REv. 635, 640 (1978)(proposing that war-
rants be required if the observer needs to use an enhancement device) [hereinafter Post-
Katz Problem]. Professor Amsterdam appears to accept this as a general principle, but
concludes that it would not resolve all problems. Amsterdam, supra note 2, at 400.
130 This occurs in a variety of forms. In Cooper v. Superior Court, 118 Cal. App. 3d
499, 173 Cal. Rptr. 520 (1981), for example, the police asked the magistrate who issued
the search warrant not to consider information obtained from a binocular-aided obser-
vation into an apartment. Id. at 503, 173 Cal. Rptr. at 522. Reviewing courts commonly
suggest that an enhanced observation was probably lawful but then evaluate whether
independent evidence was sufficient to support an arrest or physical search. See, e.g.,
United States v. Whaley, 779 F.2d 585, 592 (11 th Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 1055
(1987); United States v. Christensen, 524 F. Supp. 344, 348 (N.D. Ill. 1981); United
States v. Bifield, 498 F. Supp. 497, 508-09 (D. Conn. 1980)(alU finding sufficient in-
dependent evidence to support arrests, searches, or seizures). Courts concluding that
the observation was unlawful follow a similar process. See, e.g., United States v. Taborda,
635 F.2d 131, 139-41 (2d Cir. 1980) (remanding for determination whether unenhanced
observations provided probable cause for the search warrant); United States v. Lace, 502
F. Supp. 1021, 1042 (D. Vt. 1980), aft'd, 669 F.2d 46, 50-51 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 459
U.S. 854 (1982)(weighing the sufficiency of evidence other than enhanced observations
into house). Cf. Commonwealth v. Williams, 494 Pa. 496, 500, 431 A.2d 964, 966
(198 1)(disapproving lengthy enhanced observations of an apartment's interior but not-
ing that most important evidence was obtained in a permissible fashion).
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merely confirmed or clarified naked-eye observations. 13 1 Attempts
to incorporate enhanced observations into a theory premised on na-
ked-eye observations are inherently unavailing. Accordingly, courts
that purport to limit the observer approach to such "natural" obser-
vations must find another vehicle for evaluating enhanced
observations.
One approach capable of distinguishing enhanced from naked-
eye observations focuses on society's respect for privacy within the
home. The most influential case using this approach is United States
v. Kim, t 32 which suppressed evidence resulting from a telescopic
surveillance.133 Agents looked into the defendant's apartment from
approximately a quarter-mile away and observed him making tele-
phone calls while reading a sports tip sheet.' 34 The court refused to
regard Kim's failure to close his curtains or his unsuccessful efforts
to avoid detection as undercutting his REOP. 135 Instead, the court
focused on the fact that the government used an extremely intrusive
technique directed at a private home.' 3 6 Still, Kim hardly took an
absolutist position; only artificial aids were involved, and the court
upheld some observations by enhancement devices.'3
7
Later decisions have underscored both thejustifications for and
the limitations of the Kim analysis.138 The Second Circuit, for exam-
131 See infra notes 157-60 and accompanying text.
132 415 F. Supp. 1252 (D. Haw. 1976). Kim is cited approvingly in United States v.
Lyons, 706 F.2d 321, 328 (D.C. Cir. 1983); United States v. Taborda, 635 F.2d 131, 138
(2d Cir. 1980); LaDuke v. Castillo, 455 F. Supp. 209, 211 (E.D. Wash. 1978); People v.
Arno, 90 Cal. App. 3d 505, 512, 153 Cal. Rptr. 624, 627 (1979); State v. Barnes, 390 So.
2d 1243, 1244 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1980); State v. Ward, 62 Haw. 509, 515, 617 P.2d 568,
572 (1980); State v. Lee, 633 P.2d 48, 58 (Utah)(Maughan, C.J., dissenting), cert. denied,
454 U.S. 1057 (1981); 1 W. LAFAVE, supra note 17, at 343-44; Note, supra note 82, at 387;
Note, supra note 76, at 709-23; Note, Sense-Enhancing Devices, supra note 41, at 1181-82.
133 Kim, 415 F. Supp. at 1258.
134 Id. at 1254.
135 Id. at 1256-57. The government also argued that the prevalence of private use of
telescopes to spy on apartment dwellers vitiated Kim's expectation of privacy. Id. at
1256. The court quickly dismissed the argument, noting that "[t]he fact that Peeping
Toms abound does not license the government to follow suit." Id. The public use of
visual enhancers is nevertheless relevant to fourth amendment analysis in some circum-
stances. See infra notes 337-42 and accompanying text.
136 Kim, 415 F. Supp. at 1256-57. "It is inconceivable that the government can in-
trude so far into an individual's home that it can detect the material he is reading and
still not be considered to have engaged in a search." Id. at 1256.
137 The court specifically noted that its ruling did not concern naked-eye observa-
tions, id. at 1255, and left open its application to enhanced observations of Kim's private
balcony. Id. at 1257. It upheld enhanced surveillance of a shared walkway from the
building's elevator to Kim's apartment on the ground that no one has a legitimate ex-
pectation of freedom from observation in a public area. Id. at 1258.
138 Additional cases emphasizing the special fourth amendment protections attached
to the home include United States v. Cuevas-Sanchez, 821 F.2d 248, 251 (5th Cir.
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pie, has stated: "The very fact that a person is in his own home
raises a reasonable inference that he intends to have privacy, and if
that inference is borne out by his actions, society is prepared to re-
spect his privacy."' 3 9 Courts emphasize the deeply personal nature
of items and conduct within the home and conclude that they should
not be subject to observation by means of visual-enhancement de-
vices. x40 Still, many decisions disapproving of such observations
stress that their analysis does not apply to observations made with-
out technological assistance.' 4 ' Thus, to some extent this approach
1987) (traditional fourth amendment analysis protects curtilage of home); United States
v. Thomas, 757 F.2d 1359, 1366-67 (2d Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 819 (1985)(not-
ing "heightened expectation of privacy" in one's home); Riley v. State, 511 So. 2d 282,
286-87 (Fla. 1987)(home and curtilage receive a "high degree of protection"), rev'd, 109
S. Ct. 693 (1989); State v. Louis, 296 Or. 57, 60, 672 P.2d 708, 710 (1983)("living
quarters . . .are the quintessential domain protected by the constitutional guarantee
against warrantless searches"); Commonwealth v. Lemanski, 365 Pa. Super. 332, 349,
529 A.2d 1085, 1093 (1987)(emphasizing special protections due home and curtilage
under fourth amendment). See also Note, Katz and the Fourth Amendment, supra note 44, at
81; Comment, Trespass and Fourth Amendment Protection, supra note 49, at 727-28 (both
arguing for retention of "constitutionally protected areas" approach to serve privacy in
the home and to avoid complexity and uncertainty inherent in REOP analysis).
139 United States v. Taborda, 635 F.2d 131, 138 (2d Cir. 1980).
140 The Sixth Circuit stated in its decision in Dow:
The home is fundamentally a sanctuary, where personal concepts of self and family
are forged, where relationships are nurtured and where people normally feel free to
express themselves in intimate ways. The potent individual privacy interests that
inhere in living within a home expand into the areas that enclose the home as well.
The backyard and area immediately surrounding the home are really extensions of
the dwelling itself.... [P]eople have both actual and reasonable expectations that
many of the private experiences of home life often occur outside the house. Per-
sonal interactions, daily routines and intimate relationships revolve around the en-
tire home place.
Dow Chem. Co. v. United States, 749 F.2d 307, 314 (6th Cir. 1984), aff'd, 476 U.S. 227
(1986). See also United States v. Taborda, 635 F.2d 131, 138-39 (2d Cir. 1980) ("The vice
of telescopic viewing into the interior of a home is that it risks observation... of inti-
mate details of a person's private life ...."); United States v. On Lee, 193 F.2d 306, 315-
16 (2d Cir. 195 1)(Frank, J., dissenting) (any "sane, decent, civilized society" must treat a
person's home as an "inviolate place,") aft'd, 343 U.S. 747 (1952); Riley v. State, 511 So.
2d 282, 287 (Fla. 1987)(quoting Dow, 749 F.2d at 314), rev'd, 109 S. Ct. 693 (1989);
Commonwealth v. Williams, 494 Pa. 496, 500, 431 A.2d 964, 966 (1981)(disapproving
use of visual enhancement device, noting that it observed private sexual conduct in a
private residence). This general principle does not always resolve specific cases. In Cal-
ifornia v. Ciraolo, 476 U.S. 207 (1986), for example, both the majority and dissent
stressed the particularly strong privacy interests associated with the home but came to
opposite conclusions concerning aerial surveillance of the curtilage. Id. at 213-15 & n.3;
id. at 220, 225 & n.10 (Powell, J., dissenting).
141 See Taborda, 635 F.2d at 139 (use of "unenhanced vision from a location where the
observer may properly be does not impair a legitimate expectation of privacy"); United
States v. Kim, 415 F. Supp. 1252, 1255 (D. Haw. 1976)(suggesting that warrantless ob-
servations into home without "artificial amplification" would be approved); Cooper v.
Superior Court, 118 Cal. App. 3d 499, 510, 173 Cal. Rptr. 520, 526 (1981)(no problem
with looking into a home with the naked eye); People v. Ciochon, 23 Il1. App. 3d 363,
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merely tracks the naked-eye version of the observer approach from
the opposite direction. Rather than simply permitting naked-eye
observations, the "house" approach flatly prohibits enhanced ob-
servations into areas that are entitled to special constitutional
protection.
This approach curiously returns fourth amendment jurispru-
dence to the "constitutionally protected areas" theory seemingly
superceded in Katz. But, as Justice Harlan suggested 42 and later
decisions have confirmed, 43 an expectation of privacy is most
clearly legitimate or reasonable in a home or other distinctly private
area.144 The error of the Court in Katz, or perhaps only of courts
misinterpreting Katz, is in believing that the inability of the "consti-
tutionally protected areas" theory to regulate electronic surveillance
required replacing that theory in all cases with the amorphous ex-
pectations paradigm.
1 4 5
Katz's relevance to visual observations is underscored by an-
other aspect of the location approach. At a minimum, Katz both
overruled the physical invasion requirement and brought electronic
eavesdropping under the control of the fourth amendment. Even
today, most courts analyzing naked-ear eavesdropping find it per-
missible in the absence of a physical invasion. The theory is that a
person speaking loudly enough to be overheard without artificial
amplification has no justifiable reliance on the privacy of his or her
366, 319 N.E.2d 332, 335 (1974) (distinguishing enhanced from unenhanced obser-
vations).
142 See supra text accompanying note 40.
143 See supra notes 58-60 and 67 and accompanying text.
144 Such other areas may include: (1) airplanes, United States v. Amuny, 767 F.2d
1113, 1128 (5th Cir. 1985)(a greater expectation of privacy in airplanes than in
automobiles); United States v. Bellina, 665 F.2d 1335, 1340-41 (4th Cir. 1981)(analogiz-
ing airplanes to automobiles for fourth amendment purposes); (2) dormitory rooms,
Piazzola v. Watkins, 442 F.2d 284, 289 (5th Cir. 1971); (3) business offices, People v.
Arno, 90 Cal. App. 3d 505, 509, 153 Cal. Rptr. 624, 626 (1979); (4) buildings in general,
United States v. Hensel, 509 F. Supp. 1376, 1384 n.9 (D. Me. 1981), af'd, 699 F.2d 18
(Ist Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 461 U.S. 958 (1983); (5) public restrooms, State v. Bryant,
287 Minn. 205, 211, 177 N.W.2d 800, 804 (1970); and (6) department store fitting
rooms, People v. Diaz, 85 Misc. 2d 41, 47, 376 N.Y.S.2d 849, 854-55 (N.Y. Crim. Ct.
1975). One commentator criticizes the common equation of specially protected areas
with the home, suggesting that this is too limited because the justifications for special
privacy apply to a variety of locations. Tomkovicz, supra note 2, at 674-75.
145 The debate concerning whether the Katz formulation was designed to supplement
or reshape fourth amendment analysis is critical in this setting. See supra note 49. The
willingness of courts to use the protected area approach as a tool for applying Katz sug-
gests that even if it was occasionally "awkward" and "inequitable," it was "a workable
tool" that courts can render rational and fair through sensitive analysis. Note, Private
Places, supra note 2, at 968. See also Note, Katz and the Fourth Amendment, supra note 44, at




words. 146 Rather, such conversations are "knowingly expose[d] to
the public"'147 wherever they occur, at least in the sense that a per-
son speaking loudly enough to be heard by natural hearing is held
to assume the risk of being overheard. 48 The Katz holding is thus
inextricably tied to eavesdropping techniques that enhance natural
hearing. Similarly, courts cannot resolve the application of the
fourth amendment to the use of visual enhancement devices without
taking note of the impact of technology. Of the approaches dis-
cussed above, only the "home privacy" approach draws this neces-
sary distinction, and it is limited to a particular object.
146 Courts have reached this result through slightly different routes. Most such
overhearings occur in hotels in which agents are in adjoining rooms or public areas.
This recurring fact-pattern encourages courts to cite three factors-the lack of enhanced
hearing, the legitimate location of the eavesdropper, and the diminished expectation of
privacy in a hotel room. See United States v. Bums, 624 F.2d 95, 98-100 (10th Cir.), cert.
denied, 449 U.S. 954 (1980)(upholding naked-ear eavesdropping of a motel room con-
versation by agent in common hallway); United States v. Agapito, 620 F.2d 324, 330-31
(2d Cir.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 834 (1980)(finding no reasonable expectation of privacy
due to these three factors); United States v.Jackson, 588 F.2d 1046, 1051-55 (5th Cir.),
cert. denied, 442 U.S. 941 (1979)(no justifiable expectation of privacy concerning hotel
room conversations overheard by agents with their naked ears while located in lawful
location); Ponce v. Craven, 409 F.2d 621, 624-25 (9th Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S.
1012 (1970)(emphasizing that it is the general access to motel areas that creates the
lesser expectation of privacy). Cases involving apartments cannot rely on the location of
the object but still find eavesdropping permissible in most circumstances. See, e.g.,
United States v. Llanes, 398 F.2d 880, 884 (2d Cir. 1968)(concluding that a conversation
overheard by a person outside the home is "knowingly exposed to the public"); People
v. Wright, 41 111. 2d 170, 175, 242 N.E.2d 180, 183-84 (1968), cert. denied, 395 U.S. 93
(1969)(limiting Katz to electronic eavesdropping and upholding naked-ear eavesdrop-
ping of conversations within apartment). Professor LaFave recognizes but criticizes this
open door to naked-ear eavesdropping, 1 W. LAFAvE, supra note 17, at 396-99, and some
courts suggest that protections may exist. See Jackson, 588 F.2d at 1054 n.13 (leaving
open whether an officer in a legitimate location is permitted to obtain information
through use of natural senses in all situations); United States v. Eisler, 567 F.2d 814, 816
n.2 (8th Cir. 1977)(upholding eavesdropping in a common hallway but indicating that
conversations within an apartment would be protected).
147 Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 351 (1967).
148 Jackson, 588 F.2d at 1052. The reliance on "assumption of risk" in this setting
underscores the extent to which courts apply the "successful" REOP approach. Several
cases deal with officers who overheard conversations with their naked ears but only after
taking extreme measures to eavesdrop. See, e.g., Agapito, 620 F.2d at 328 (placing ears to
crack between door and door frame);Jackson, 588 F.2d at 1049 (pressing ears to crack at
the bottom of a connecting door); United States v. Fisch, 474 F.2d 1071, 1074 (9th Cir.),
cert. denied, 412 U.S. 921 (1973)(agents lying a few inches from crack between carpet and
door). Each case upheld the eavesdropping despite the unusual positions of the listen-
ing agents. Agapito, 620 F.2d at 332; Jackson, 588 F.2d at 1054-55; Fisch, 474 F.2d at
1077. The eavesdropping cases, then, adopt the premise occasionally applied in visual
observation cases-the officer may "crane his neck, or bend over, or squat." James v.
United States, 418 F.2d 1150, 1151 n.1 (D.C. Cir. 1969). Apparently, one "knowingly
exposes" those spoken words that are in fact overheard, not just those that one reason-




Several lines of cases directly confront the issue of enhanced
visual observation. Perhaps because the emphasis on method ap-
pears to be facially inconsistent with the Katz paradigm, the cases do
not indicate the relevance of enhancement to any general scheme of
fourth amendment analysis. Still, three conceptually different ap-
proaches can be discerned in this area. They are: the permissive
approach, which allows enhancement without meaningful inquiry;
the confirmation approach, which tries to put enhanced observa-
tions into naked-eye terms; and the factor approach, which evaluates
the legality of enhanced observations on the basis of a variety of
facts concerning locations and expectations as well as the nature
and level of technological assistance.
Numerous decisions have followed the permissive approach,
flatly approving binocular or telescopic observations without analy-
sis or explanation. 149 Similarly, a long line of cases holds that law
enforcement officials may use flashlights without limitation to en-
hance observations. 150 The underlying theory is that light does no
149 See, e.g., United States v. Allen, 675 F.2d 1373, 1380-82 (9th Cir. 1980), cert. denied,
454 U.S. 833 (198 1) (general approval of use of sense-enhancing devices); United States
v. Minton, 488 F.2d 37, 38 (4th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 416 U.S. 936 (1974)(noting only
that use of binoculars did not violate the fourth amendment by putting observers into
curtilage); United States v. Loundmannz, 472 F.2d 1376, 1379 (D.C. Cir. 1972)(binocu-
lar observations considered-no fourth amendment analysis); United States v. Grimes,
426 F.2d 706, 708 (5th Cir. 1970)(no analysis other than conclusion that binocular-aided
observations were lawful); Fullbright v. United States, 392 F.2d 432, 434 (10th Cir.), cert.
denied, 393 U.S. 830 (1968) (use of binoculars poses no issue, reliance on a pre-Katz deci-
sion, United States v. McCall, 243 F.2d 858 (10th Cir. 1957)); United States v. Christen-
sen, 524 F. Supp. 344, 347 (N.D. Ill. 1981)(seeing no problem with use of binoculars
from legitimate location); Sims v. State, 425 So. 2d 563, 567 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
1982)(use of binoculars does not render unlawful an observation from a legitimate loca-
tion); People v. Hicks, 49 111. App. 3d 421, 427, 364 N.E.2d 440, 444 (1977)(court "un-
able to find a single case which has extended [the Katz] doctrine to find a use of
binoculars improper"); State v. Bennett, 205 Mont. 117, 122-23, 666 P.2d 747, 749-50
(1983)(use of binoculars and other aids "has been determined to be legitimate"); State
v. Thompson, 196 Neb. 55, 57, 241 N.W.2d 511, 513 (1976)(approving use of binocu-
lars without any real analysis).
150 United States v. Dunn, 480 U.S. 294, 305 (1987) (use of flashlight to look into barn
poses no fourth amendment issue); United States v. Booker, 461 F.2d 990, 992 (6th Cir.
1972)(flashlight-aided observation is not a search); United States v. Hanahan, 442 F.2d
649, 654 (7th Cir. 1971)(use of flashlight "is of no consequence"); Ensor v. State, 403
So. 2d 349, 351-53 (Fla. 198 1)(flashlight examination of car interior is a valid "open
view" observation); Scales v. State, 13 Md. App. 474, 477-78, 284 A.2d 45, 47-48
(1971)(flashlight-aided observation does not implicate the fourth amendment); State v.
Powell, 99 N.M. 381, 383, 385, 658 P.2d 456, 458, 460 (N.M. Ct. App. 1983)(shining
flashlight into car is not a search); State v. Lee, 633 P.2d 48, 52 (Utah), cert. denied, 454
U.S. 1057 (1981)(use of flashlight to aid in observing interior of car is permissible). See
generally Note, Sense-Enhancing Devices, supra note 41, at 1172-77 (collecting cases).
Most courts require that the observer be located in a legitimate place. See supra
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more than render visible at night what would be in open view during
the day,15' and the result is that no one has a REOP from this form
of visual enhancement. Aerial surveillance may now be similarly ex-
cused from intensive fourth amendment scrutiny. Yet, even without
the use of direct visual aids such as binoculars or telescopes, air-
planes and helicopters enhance observations in at least two respects.
notes 117-28 and accompanying text. Cases suppressing flashlight observations usually
rely on a prior unlawful invasion or stop. See, e.g., United States v. Cody, 390 F. Supp.
616, 617-18 (E.D. Tenn. 1974)(invalid observation, search, and seizure of items in car
because warrant authorized search of house only); State v. Schmidt, 359 So. 2d 133,
135-36 (La. 1978)(no justification for traffic stop); People v. Smith, 42 N.Y.2d 961, 962,
367 N.E.2d 648, 648-49, 398 N.Y.S.2d 142, 142 (1977)(insufficient cause to stop de-
fendant's car). See also Note, Sense-Enhancing Devices, supra note 41, at 1175 (noting that
flashlight-aided observations are more likely to present fourth amendment issues when
they involve observations into cars in private driveway or into houses, in both settings
largely because of the physical invasion).
Professor LaFave disagrees with the nearly universal approval of the use of flash-
lights. 1 W. LAFAvE, supra note 17, at 328-37. He suggests that there is a substantial
difference between illumination to make visible at night what would be visible during the
day, and illumination to make visible what is normally dark, such as the inside of a build-
ing. Id. at 334-35. See also Raettig v. State, 406 So. 2d 1273, 1277 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
1981)(relying on same analysis in Professor LaFave's 1978 treatise to invalidate flash-
light observations into inside of camper through 1/2 inch wide crack). Cf. LaDuke v.
Castillo, 455 F. Supp. 209, 210-11 (E.D. Wash. 1978)(flashlight sweep of darkened resi-
dence constitutes fourth amendment search). Professor LaFave is also concerned with
the fourth amendment implications of more sophisticated illumination devices. 1 W.
LAFAvE, supra note 17, at 336-37. Courts have generally ignored the difference between
such devices and simple visual aids. See, e.g., State v. Denton, 387 So.2d 578, 584 (La.
1980)(finding no significant difference between binoculars and nightscopes); Newberry
v. State, 421 So.2d 546, 549 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1982)(analogizing night scope to flash-
light). Cf. United States v. Ward, 546 F. Supp. 300, 309-10 (W.D. Ark. 1982), aff'd in
part, rev'd in part on other grounds, 703 F.2d 1058 (8th Cir. 1983)(recognizing nature of
device as a factor but treating the nightscope simply as defeating darkness).
151 Judge Goldberg of the Fifth Circuit explains this principle in his usual crisp
fashion:
The mere use of a flashlight . . . does not magically transmute a non-accusatory
visual encounter into a Fourth Amendment search. When the circumstances of a
particular case are such that the police officer's observations would not have consti-
tuted a search had it occurred in daylight, then the fact that the officer used a flash-
light to pierce the nighttime darkness does not transform his observation into a
search. Regardless of the time of day or night, the plain view rule must be upheld
where the viewer is rightfully positioned, seeing through eyes that are neither accu-
satory nor criminally investigatory. The plain view rule does not go into hiberna-
tion at sunset.
Marshall v. United States, 422 F.2d 185, 189 (5th Cir. 1970). See also United States v.
Coplen, 541 F.2d 211, 215 (9th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1073 (1977)("The fact
that the officer was forced to use a flashlight is immaterial. Being dark outside, it was
necessary to employ such a device."); Newberry v. State, 421 So. 2d 546, 549 (Fla. Dist.
Ct. App. 1982)("There is no license to engage in criminal activity with impunity after
sunset in an open area that would not be so protected after sunrise"). See generally Note,
Sense-Enhancing Devices, supra note 41, at 1174-75 (seeing flashlight cases as pragmatic
and based on conclusion that the degree of privacy afforded by darkness is not sufficient
to prohibit warrantless use of flashlights).
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First, they permit law enforcement agencies to patrol and seek out
information over wide areas.1 52 Second, they provide visual access
to areas not realistically open to observation from the ground. Nev-
ertheless, the Supreme Court has generally approved aerial surveil-
lance while specifically declining to address the fourth amendment's
application to "highly sophisticated surveillance equipment not gen-
erally available to the public."'
153
152 General patrols are problematic under the fourth amendment. In some respects, a
general aerial patrol is just a more efficient version of a general automobile patrol, which
is an accepted aspect of contemporary police practices and has not been deemed a
search. The court in People v. Superior Court (Stroud), 37 Cal. App. 3d 836, 112 Cal.
Rptr. 764 (1974), viewed helicopter patrols in a similar light, noting that "[p]atrol by
police helicopter has been a part of the protection afforded the citizens of the Los Ange-
les metropolitan area for some time. The observations made from the air in this case
must be regarded as routine." Id. at 839, 112 Cal. Rptr. at 765. The California Supreme
Court later upheld a random aerial surveillance program under a slightly different ra-
tionale. In People v. Mayoff, 42 Cal. 3d 1302, 729 P.2d 166, 233 Cal. Rptr. 2 (1986),
that court used balancing to determine that law enforcement needs outweigh the intru-
sion on personal privacy caused by such patrols. Id. at 1316-18, 729 P.2d at 174-76, 233
Cal. Rptr. at 10-12. This approach resembles the general reasonableness test used to
evaluate administrative searches. Lack of individualized suspicion is not a problem. See
United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543, 560-64 (1976)(routine stops at immigra-
tion checkpoints may be made in the absence of individualized suspicion); Camara v.
Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523, 535-39 (1967)(approving area housing inspections).
The fact that whole classes of people are subject to intrusion negates any stigma at-
tached to being searched. See Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. at 559-60 (there is little likeli-
hood of abusive or harassing practices and routine stops are unlikely to be "frightening
or offensive"); United States v. Albarado, 495 F.2d 799, 806 (2d Cir. 1974)(a magnetom-
eter "does not annoy, frighten or humiliate those who pass through it"); People v. Hyde,
12 Cal. 3d 158, 167, 524 P.2d 830, 835, 115 Cal. Rptr. 358, 363 (1974)(airline passen-
gers usually appreciate limited safety screening measures).
The other way of looking at the problem is that if a random patrol is a search, it is a
general search, invalid by definition. The court in People v. Agee, 200 Cal. Rptr. 827
(Cal. Ct. App. 1984), used this reasoning in excoriating the ruling in Stroud. Agee, 200
Cal. Rptr. at 831-32. The upshot of the Agee court's analysis is that "calling a general
search a non-search because it is general" does violence to the fourth amendment and
common sense. The Agee court was particularly concerned that the Stroud analysis would
allow the government to retract the fourth amendment at will. Id. at 832. Cf. supra note
91. See also Note, Aerial Surveillance, supra note 44, at 279 (this analysis "permits govern-
ments to control an amendment that was created to control them"). No one should
place undue reliance on either Stroud or Agee. The California Supreme Court disap-
proved of some of the language in Stroud in People v. Cook, 41 Cal. 3d 373, 385, 710
P.2d 299, 307, 221 Cal. Rptr. 499, 508 (1985), and remanded Agee for the appellate
court's consideration of later decisions on aerial surveillance. People v. Agee, 43 Cal. 3d
638, 738 P.2d 720, 238 Cal. Rptr. 374 (1987). ChiefJustice Bird raised concerns about
general searches in her Mayoff dissent: "Random surveillance is nothing more than an
exploratory search, i.e., an effort to discover evidence of criminal activity undertaken
without a warrant, probable cause or even particularized suspicion." Mayoff, 42 Cal. 3d
at 1330, 729 P.2d at 184, 233 Cal. Rptr. at 20.
In short, there is agreement that there is a line between random patrols and
searches directed at particular targets or objects, but there is substantial disagreement
on the significance of that line.
153 Dow Chem. Co. v. United States, 476 U.S. 227, 238 (1986). Neither Dow nor Cali-
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These cases suggest a search/non-search dichotomy premised
on some benchmark of technological assistance to "standard" police
practices. Short of that benchmark, enhancement is irrelevant and a
search exists only if it would exist under the entry paradigm. Air-
planes and helicopters are no longer deemed unusual or sophisti-
cated, therefore overflights do not exceed the benchmark. Courts
have implicitly recognized lights to be routine law enforcement
tools at least since the Supreme Court decided United States v. Lee 154
and binoculars may also be sufficiently common to be an acceptable
law enforcement device. 155 This approach has its strengths. It legit-
fornia v. Ciraolo, 476 U.S. 207 (1986), involved a general patrol and the Court deemed
the theoretical possibility of "plain view" observation to negate any reasonable expecta-
tion of privacy, no matter how unlikely such an observation might be in fact. In Ciraolo,
the Court was required to postulate an observation over two fences by a person
"perched on the top of a truck or a 2-level bus" in order to analogize the aerial observa-
tion to a ground observation. Ciraolo, 476 U.S. at 211-12. In Dow the Court used some-
what different analysis. An individual could not have observed the area in question from
ground level, but the Court found no REOP because the complex could be viewed and
photographed by private persons in the public airspace. Dow, 476 U.S. at 239. This
effectively destroys any REOP from aerial observation in any uncovered outdoor area
because there is "a public right of freedom of transit through the navigable airspace of
the United States." 49 U.S.C.A. .§ 1304 (West Supp. 1988). In Florida v. Riley, 109 S.
Ct. 693 (1989), a majority of justices relied on likelihood principles even though the
plurality relied on the legality of helicopter overflights at the altitude of 400 feet. Id. at
696-97 (plurality opinion); id. at 698 (O'Connor, J., concurring); id. at 701 (Brennan, J.,
dissenting); id. at 705 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). Only Justice Brennan noted that a
helicopter is an "expensive and sophisticated piece of machinery." Id. at 701 (Brennan,
J., dissenting). The analysis in all three cases necessarily moots the general search issue
because under this reasoning, if there is never a REOP in an open area, observation of
open areas is never a search. It also arguably moots questions concerning the intrusive-
ness of the government's methods. But see infra notes 251-60 and accompanying text.
154 274 U.S. 559 (1927). For discussion of Lee, see supra notes 22 and 82. Most of the
cases examining flashlight-aided observations, see supra note 150, engage in no analysis
of the impact of the enhanced vision provided by the flashlight. See, e.g., Newberry v.
State, 421 So. 2d 546, 549 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1982)(treating flashlights as standard
police tools). See also Note, Telescopic Surveillance, supra note 76, at 720 (flashlights are
routinely used for many police duties). This implies that courts find flashlights no more
remarkable than eyeglasses.
155 One commentator distinguishes flashlights from binoculars on two grounds.
Flashlights overcome darkness, while binoculars overcome distance, which has been ac-
cepted as a protection against governmental intrusion, and flashlights are more useful
for law enforcement purposes. Note, Telescopic Surveillance, supra note 76, at 719-20.
Still, any attempt to distinguish enhanced illumination from simple visual aids such as
binoculars must explain away Lee. In approving the searchlight-aided observation, the
Lee Court described it as "comparable to the use of a marine glass or a field glass." Lee,
274 U.S. at 563. This non-analytical acceptance of visual enhancement may be the result
of the then-dominant entry paradigm, but unlike Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S.
438 (1928), this holding was not controversial. For discussion of Olmstead, see supra text
accompanying notes 23-29. It is possible to draw lines here, as the court did in Bernstiel
v. State, 416 So. 2d 827 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1982). In Bernstiel, the court held that ordi-
nary binoculars, but not "more sophisticated devices such as telescopes," could be used
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imizes a long history of permitting unsupervised law enforcement
use of various technological devices that aid surveillance to some
extent. Modem courts could not be expected to give serious
credence to arguments that the enhanced ability to patrol repre-
sented by the automobile or the increased visual access afforded by
a high cab in a police department truck implicates the fourth amend-
ment. 156 In this model, then, fourth amendment limitations attach
only to new or improved aids to visual observation. Other aids are
part of the law enforcement arsenal and present fourth amendment
issues only to the extent that they are used in a traditional search.
The confirmation approach differs in that it analyzes all en-
hanced observations but it nevertheless attempts to finesse most
fourth amendment questions. Under this approach, courts deter-
mine the legality of enhanced observations by comparing them to
unenhanced observations. If an observation merely "confirms" a
naked-eye observation, the enhancement raises no fourth amend-
ment issue.' 57 The approach seems designed to recognize a stan-
without raising fourth amendment issues. Id. at 828-29. The Lee analogy, however, was
between a search light and a telescope.
156 At one time, of course, law enforcement agencies changed from horses to motor
vehicles, which enhanced their ability to conduct surveillance. Probably at a much ear-
lier time, a police officer first improved his line of sight into a person's home by mechan-
ical means. In all likelhood, the device was a ladder. Ladders still prove to be of
assistance to inquisitive police officers. The agent in Commonwealth v. Hernley, 216 Pa.
Super. 177, 263 A.2d 904 (1970), cert. denied, 401 U.S. 914 (1971), used both a ladder
and binoculars. Id. at 178-79, 263 A.2d at 905. Intriguingly, the majority addressed and
approved only the use of binoculars, id. at 180, 263 A.2d at 906, while the dissenting
judge emphasized the use of the ladder. Id. at 182, 263 A.2d at 907 (Montgomery, J.,
dissenting). See also United States v. Bellina, 665 F.2d 1335, 1345-46 (4th Cir.
1981) (permissible to use ladder to gain view of the inside of airplane). Perhaps the use
of "old" technology no longer violates anyone's reasonable expectations. Once society
has become used to law enforcement use of technology, it passes from a "search" to a
"non-search."
157 See, e.g., United States v. Bassford, 601 F. Supp. 1324, 1335 (D. Me. 1985), aff'd,
812 F.2d 16 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 481 U.S. 1022 (1987)(binoculars may be used to en-
hance "view of a readily visible marjuana plot previously observed with the naked eye");
People v. Arno, 90 Cal. App. 3d 505, 511-12, 153 Cal. Rptr. 624, 627-28 (1979)(en-
hancement is permitted if object is otherwise visible); State v. Holbron, 65 Haw. 152,
155, 648 P.2d 194, 197 (1982)(no problem "where binoculars are used only to confirm
unaided observations"); State v. Barr, 98 Nev. 428, 430, 651 P.2d 649, 650-51
(1982)(use of binoculars to confirm naked-eye suspicion upheld); State v. Manly, 85
Wash. 2d 120, 121, 124, 530 P.2d 306, 309, cert. denied, 423 U.S. 855 (1975)(detective
saw a plant resembling marijuana in window, returned next day and confirmed it with
binoculars, found not to constitute a search). See also Note, supra note 57, at 758 (aerial
surveillance is permissible if conducted from a lawful altitude and binoculars are used
only to confirm unaided observations).
A related theory upholds enhanced observations from a substantial distance if the
target would detect surveillance from a closer lawful location. This is, in essence, a
"constructive confirmation" approach. See, e.g., United States v. Gibson, 636 F.2d 761,
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dard law enforcement practice-an officer sees something
suspicious and seeks to resolve that suspicion by looking through a
pair of binoculars.' 58
Despite its understandable rationale, the confirmation ap-
proach still presents analytical problems. First, as long as the line
between a non-search and a full search subject to the warrant re-
quirement is drawn on the basis of a REOP, this approach subtly
moves that line to expand police authority. The naked-eye observa-
tion is necessarily a non-search or else confirmation would be
equally unlawful; the use of an enhancement device to do more than
confirm is by implication a search. Into the hazy middle comes the
"confirming enhanced observation," which does not intrude on a
REOP under this approach. The target's zone of privacy is dimin-
ished, as it no longer protects objects that cannot be clearly identi-
fied as incriminating by an unenhanced observation. Instead,
763 (D.C. Cir. 1980)(binocular-aided observation of narcotics transaction from apart-
ment building); Arno, 90 Cal. App. 3d at 509, 153 Cal Rptr. at 626 ("if the purpose of the
optically aided view is to permit clandestine police surveillance of that which could be
seen from a more obvious vantage point without the optical aid, there is no constitu-
tional intrusion"); State v. Irwin, 43 Wash. App. 553, 554-55, 718 P.2d 826, 829-30
(1986)(police stayed in woods to avoid detection, enhancement was a mere confirmation
of what could have been seen from a more open vantage point). See also I W. LAFAVE,
SEARCH & SEIZURE 258 (1st ed. 1978); Note, supra note 82, at 392 (proposing use of this
approach). This approach seems inconsistent with Katz. There agents used electronic
devices that constructively put them in the same position they would have been in if they
had placed their ears to the door to Katz's telephone booth. Katz, 389 U.S. at 348. Katz,
of course, would not have made his incriminating calls if someone's ears had been to the
door, but that is also true of many of the "constructive confirmation" cases. See Fish-
man, supra note 2, at 324-25 (noting the difference between assuming the risk that some-
one will hear when someone is close and assuming the risk that someone could hear if
someone were close).
158 This presupposes the use of binoculars, which are standard issue in patrol cars, in
contrast to more sophisticated visual surveillance devices. Police could use other de-
vices for confirmation purposes, however. For example, in People v. Vermouth, 42 Cal.
App. 3d 353, 116 Cal. Rptr. 675 (1974), the confirming officer came in response to a
report by another officer. Id. at 361, 116 Cal. Rptr. at 680. In this setting, it is conceiva-
ble that the responding officer could bring highly sophisticated equipment to the loca-
tion. There is also no indication in the case law that officers may only confirm
inadvertent observations made with the naked eye. A number of cases deal with aerial
observations of suspected marijuana patches that are then confirmed by a ground
search. See, e.g., Dean v. Superior Court, 35 Cal. App. 3d 112, 114, 110 Cal. Rptr. 585,
587 (Cal. Ct. App. 1973)(aerial discovery of a marijuana field, followed by ground
searches to locate the field and obtain evidence); Williams v. State, 157 Ga. App. 476,
476-77, 277 S.E.2d 923, 925 (1981), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 823 (1981)(aerial observation
of airstrip and trucks unloading what appeared to be bales of marijuana; officers on
ground were advised and then entered); State v. Havlat, 222 Neb. 554, 555-56, 385
N.W.2d 436, 438 (1986)(aerial observation of suspected marijuana plants on farm; later
entries to confirm sighting and seize evidence). Cf. People v. Superior Court (Stroud),
37 Cal. App. 3d 836, 838, 112 Cal. Rptr. 764, 764-65 (1974)(ground response to heli-
copter report that auto parts were seen in a particular yard).
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objects that officials can see but not fully identify without enhance-
ment are treated as if they were in full public view.
Second, while this shrinking of the REOP might be proper
under Katz if it represented a societal decision concerning an appro-
priate level of privacy, courts using this approach fail to engage in
such analysis and opt instead for facile and conclusory language.
There is no attempt to define the level of suspicion needed to justify
the enhanced observation, and there is no attempt to explain the
permissible level of enhancement. Cases simply note that the officer
"thought" an object was contraband and then "confirmed" that ob-
servation through a binocular-aided observation.1 59 This approach
is totally inconsistent with the underlying theory of Katz, for it re-
places an evaluation of the target's privacy expectations with a form
of evidentiary justification for taking an otherwise prohibited intru-
sive action. That is, it determines whether there is a search by creat-
ing an ad hoc standard for a relatively unintrusive search. This
might be an appropriate way to regulate the use of routine enhance-
ment devices, but it is not the method the courts claim to be using.
Moreover, the failure to recognize that this approach is premised on
an evidentiary standard makes it impossible to set meaningful
guidelines. Caught somewhere between "no reason to believe" and
probable cause, the "think and confirm" standard is left undefined.
Standards such as the reasonable suspicion standard applicable to
159 Courts describe permitted enhancement in terms such as "clarify," United States
v. Whaley, 779 F.2d 585, 592 (11 th Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 1055 (1987), "posi-
tively identify," People v. St. Amour, 104 Cal. App. 3d 886, 894, 163 Cal. Rptr. 187, 192
(1980), and "verify," State v. Rogers, 100 N.M. 517, 519, 673 P.2d 142, 144 (N.M. Ct.
App. 1983). There is apparently universal awareness that enhancement devices make
observations better and more accurate, but courts do not see this as a problem. See, e.g.,
United States v. Christensen, 524 F. Supp. 344, 347 (N.D. Ill. 1981)(binoculars are per-
mitted to "magnify" and give "a better view"); United States v. Bifield, 498 F. Supp.
497, 500 (D. Conn. 1980)(the telescope provided "greater detail than would otherwise
have been possible"); People v. Clark, 133 Mich. App. 619, 628, 350 N.W.2d 754, 759
(1983)(binoculars are permitted because they "merely magnify what would in any event
be apparent to the naked eye"); Manly, 85 Wash. 2d at 121, 124, 530 P.2d at 307, 309
(upholding binocular-aided observation making evident that object was marijuana after
naked-eye observation indicated only that object "resembled" marijuana). Indeed, it
seems that this approach permits rather substantial magnification. See, e.g., State v.
Louis, 296 Or. 57, 61, 672 P.2d 708, 710-11 (1983)(telephoto lens used "provides only
modest enlargement, not more than three times normal vision"). See generally 1 W.
LAFAVE, supra note 17, at 339 (suggesting that enhancement not be deemed a search
where it "observe[s] more clearly or carefully that which was in the open" or where
observation from "closer proximity" would reveal that object was under surveillance);
Telescopic Surveillance, supra note 76, at 718 (proposing that enhanced observation be per-
mitted where the object is "visible and identifiable" without binoculars). Cf. Note, Pri-
vate Places, supra note 2, at 986 (electronic surveillance is permissible where it "merely
facilitates the acquisition of what could be perceived by natural means").
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police stops are inherently difficult to apply; 160 where there is no
attempt to provide a coherent definition, they become completely
unmanageable.
The third technological approach also seeks compromise. It in-
volves weighing various factors, including the nature of enhance-
ment techniques. The underlying theory of this approach is that the
determination of the reasonableness of an expectation of privacy
from observation cannot rest solely on one formalistic characteriza-
tion. Instead, proper resolution of the issue depends on a careful
case-by-case weighing of pertinent factors. This approach is exem-
plified by United States v. Ward,16 1 which analyzed the use of a night-
scope and binoculars to see objects otherwise protected by both
darkness and distance. The court described its inquiry as follows:
In the context of visually enhanced surveillance several factors should
be considered: (1) The type of visual aid employed; (2) The suspect's
own privacy-enhancing conduct; (3) The nature and location of the
area or enclosure under surveillance; (4) The number of persons with
legitimate access; (5) The social inhibitions associated with the place
observed; (6) The extent of the suspect's control of the closure; (7)
The manner in which the view was obtained.' 62
The court concluded that law enforcement officials had invaded no
reasonable expectation of privacy.' 6 3 Despite the sophistication of
these devices, the officers did not make their observations in an un-
reasonable manner, the target took few precautions to insure pri-
vacy, and because the objects were in a barn, the agents did not
breach any of the "social inhibitions" associated with observations
into a home. 164 Other courts weigh similar factors. 16 5 Factor bal-
160 Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968), created a doctrine that is exceptionally complex
and often criticized. Over 200 pages in Professor LaFave's treatise is devoted to stop-
and-frisk and related issues. 1 W. LAFAvE, supra note 17, at 332-546. Some criticisms
emphasize the ambiguity of stop-and-frisk law. See id. at 424; C. WHITEBREAD & C.
SLOBOGIN, supra note 17, at 203, 208; Note, The Civil and Criminal Methodologies of the
Fourth Amendment, 93 YALE L.J. 1127, 1132-35 (1984). Other criticisms focus on the ease
with which police officers and courts abuse the doctrine. See Amsterdam, supra note 2, at
395; Comment, Considering the Two-Tier Model of the Fourth Amendment, 31 AM. U.L. REV.
85, 112-22 (1981).
161 546 F. Supp. 300 (W.D. Ark. 1982), aff'd in part, rev'd in part on other grounds, 703
F.2d 1058 (8th Cir. 1983).
162 Id. at 310.
163 Id.
164 Id.
165 A series of decisions by the Hawaii Supreme Court emphasize "the nature of the
place involved, the precautions taken by the defendant to insure his privacy and the
position of the government officer." State v. Kender, 60 Haw. 301, 303, 588 P.2d 447,
449 (1978). In Kender a police officer sought to corroborate a tip that marijuana was
growing on Kender's property. He was able to do so only by climbing a fence at the
edge of Kender's property and using binoculars. Weighing the nature of the location,
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ancing is particularly common in cases analyzing aerial observations
and seems to have survived Giraolo and Dow. 166 In general, courts
Kender's largely successful efforts to prevent observation, and the officer's need to ob-
tain an unusual vantage point and to use binoculars, the court held the observation to
violate the fourth amendment. Id. at 304-07, 588 P.2d at 449-51. These factors might
not raise fourth amendment issues under the other approaches, for the observation was
not into the home, the officer was in a lawful location, and Kender's efforts to secure
privacy were not successful. Taken together, however, the court believed that they re-
quired that the binocular-aided observations be subjected to the warrant requirement.
Id. See also State v. Barnett, 68 Haw. 32, 703 P.2d 680, 684 (1985); State v. Knight, 63
Haw. 90, 93-94, 621 P.2d 370, 373-74 (1980); State v. Ward, 62 Haw. 509, 515, 617 P.2d
568, 571-72 (1980); State v. Kaaheena, 59 Haw. 23, 26-29, 575 P.2d 462, 465-67 (1978);
State v. Stachler, 58 Haw. 412, 418-21, 570 P.2d 1323, 1327-29 (1977)(all characterizing
their analysis as premised on balancing these factors). Other cases emphasizing factor-
balancing include: United States v. Vilhotti, 323 F. Supp. 425,431-32 (S.D.N.Y.), aff'din
part, rev'd in part, 452 F.2d 1186 (2d Cir. 1971) (considering several factors in evaluating
legality of flashlight-aided observations of interior of garage); People v. Dinsmore, 103
Mich. App. 660, 669, 303 N.W.2d 857, 861-62 (1981)(weighing numerous factors to
determine whether a person has REOP outside of home); State v. Barr, 98 Nev. 428,
430, 651 P.2d 649, 650-51 (1982)(noting locations of observer and object as well as the
fact that binoculars were not used until object was spotted); Commonwealth v. Williams,
494 Pa. 496, 500,431 A.2d 964, 966 (198 1)(emphasizing the nature of the enhancement
device, the duration of its use, and that it observed private sexual conduct in bedroom);
State v. Lee, 633 P.2d 48, 55 (Utah), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1057 (1981)(Maughan, C.J.,
dissenting) (urging that REOP be determined by case-by-case analysis of various factors);
State v. Manly, 85 Wash. 2d 120, 124, 530 P.2d 306, 309, cert. denied, 423 U.S. 855
(1975) (analyzing the locations of the observer and the object as well as the use of binoc-
ulars only to confirm). See also supra note 146 and infra note 166 (factor balancing in
naked-ear listening and aerial observation cases).
166 It is not clear whether the Court's decision in Florida v. Riley, 109 S. Ct. 693
(1989), will end the balancing in this area. In the past, courts have weighed factors such
as the frequency of overflights, the altitude of the aircraft, and the nature of the area and
object in determining whether a search has occurred. See, e.g., Giancola v. West Virginia
Dept. of Public Safety, 830 F.2d 547, 550-51 (4th Cir. 1987)(considering duration and
frequency of surveillance, altitude, number of aircraft, effects on ground activities, com-
pliance with flight regulations); United States v. Bassford, 601 F. Supp. 1324, 1330-31
(D. Me. 1985), aff'd, 812 F.2d 16 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 481 U.S. 1022 (1987)(considering
height, size of objects, nature of area observed, frequency of overflights, and intrusive-
ness of surveillance); Burkholder v. Superior Court, 96 Cal. App. 3d 421, 425-26, 158
Cal. Rptr. 86, 88-89 (1979)(examining various factors in determining whether there is
REOP from aerial surveillance); Murphy v. State, 413 So. 2d 1268, 1270 (Fla. 1982)(con-
sidering altitude and location of object); Stachler, 58 Haw. at 418-20, 570 P.2d at 1327-28
(considering height, frequency of overflights, nature of this overflight, and area ob-
served); State v. Vogel, 428 N.W.2d 272, 274-76 (S.D. 1988)(considering inadvertency
of observation, compliance with flight rules, lack of precautions by target, use of equip-
ment in common use). Cf. People v. Reynolds, 71 N.Y.2d 552, 561-63, 523 N.E.2d 291,
296-97, 528 N.Y.S.2d 15, 20-21 (1988)(the court should have weighed such factors in
determining whether there was a REOP)(Hancock, J., dissenting). Other courts also
weigh law enforcement interests, either generally, see, e.g., People v. Mayoff, 42 Cal. 3d
1302, 1317, 729 P.2d 166, 175, 233 Cal. Rptr. 2, 10-11 (1986)(upholding rural aerial
surveillance program in part because it "may be the only feasible means of confronting"
marijuana farming), or with respect to a particularized suspicion of illegal activity at the
observed location, see, e.g., United States v. Allen, 675 F.2d 1373, 1381 (9th Cir.), cert.
denied, 454 U.S. 833 (1981)(suspicion is a factor that "contributes to justification for the
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engaging in this form of analysis attempt to serve the spirit of Katz
by using a fluid approach that weighs in each individual case those
factors pragmatically relevant to the reasonableness of the target's
actual expectation of privacy.1
67
Balancing approaches are inevitably attractive to courts seeking
to do justice in particular cases. Moreover, factor weighing is un-
questionably superior to the often awkward and unfair rules of the
pre-Katz era and to some of the equally rigid approaches now used
to evaluate observations. Still, the failure of the courts to use bal-
ancing on a wide scale in this area at least suggests that it presents
problems. Unless and until the Supreme Court adopts and explains
a workable balancing approach that incorporates the nature of vis-
ual enhancement techniques, this will represent only one of a
number of possible schemes of analysis.
surveillance"); United States v. DeBacker, 493 F. Supp. 1078, 1081 (W.D. Mich.
1980) (noting that aerial observation is a relatively non-intrusive way to investigate a tip).
While the Supreme Court has undercut balancing approaches to aerial surveillance
by seeming to characterize the ability to observe from a lawful altitude as dispositive, see
supra text accompanying notes 68-74, it left maneuvering room in each decision. In
California v. Ciraolo, 476 U.S. 207 (1986), the Court emphasized the absence of visual
enhancement in approving aerial observations of the curtilage. Id. at 213-14. In Dow
Chem. Co. v. United States, 476 U.S. 227 (1986), the Court noted that the result might
differ in cases involving more sophisticated surveillance equipment. Id. at 238-39. In
Riley, even the plurality noted that there was no interference with ground activities.
Riley, 109 S. Ct. at 697. Moreover, state courts may impose stricter requirements under
their own laws, see, e.g., People v. Cook, 41 Cal. 3d 373, 385, 710 P.2d 299, 307-08, 221
Cal. Rptr. 499, 507 (1985)(prohibiting aerial surveillance of curtilage areas under state
constitution), and Riley did not deal with the uniquely intrusive practices of some heli-
copter surveillances. For an example of such a search, see infra notes 256-58 and accom-
panying text.
167 Perhaps the most traditional fluid approach borrows notions of reasonableness
from stop-and-frisk law. See supra notes 53-56 and accompanying text. The doctrine of
Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968), of course, applies only where there is a fourth amend-
ment intrusion. Notwithstanding that limitation, a number of courts have applied as-
pects of the Teny reasonableness standard in evaluating whether the fourth amendment is
involved in a particular observation. See, e.g., Smayda v. United States, 352 F.2d 251,
257 (9th Cir. 1965)(pre-Katz and Terry case, permitting surveillance of a public restroom
where there is "reasonable cause to believe" offenses are being committed and observa-
tions are limited to times when they are likely to occur); United States v. Christensen,
524 F. Supp. 344, 347 n.2 (N.D. Ill. 1981)(noting that court had previously upheld bin-
ocular surveillance applying Teny by analogy); People v. Ciochon, 23 Ill. App. 3d 363,
365, 319 N.E.2d 332, 334 (1974) (suggesting application of "reason to believe" standard
to binocular-aided observations). Other limited intrusions have received similar treat-
ment. See, e.g., United States v. Sullivan, 711 F.2d 1, 2-3 (1st Cir. 1983)(air freight open-
ing of package permitted due to suspicious behavior and public safety concerns
regarding explosives); United States v. Solis, 536 F.2d 880, 882-83 (9th Cir. 1976)(dog
sniff upheld on "founded suspicion" because the intrusion was minimal and inoffen-
sive); Lucas v. United States, 411 A.2d 360, 363-64 (D.C. 1980)(use of sensoramatic tags
on merchandise is reasonable because the limited intrusion is outweighed by need for
effective system of detecting shoplifting).
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III. FORMULATING A NEW PARADIGM
A. THE KATZ FAILURE
The current state of the law is that in any particular case, a court
has a choice among a wide variety of approaches in analyzing law
enforcement observations and other intrusions. This serves no
one's interests. 168 As long as a court may choose an approach that
allows police agencies to use sophisticated visual enhancement de-
vices, many agencies will do so as a routine matter. All persons liv-
ing under the jurisdiction of those agencies must then behave as if
they had no expectation of privacy from visual observation-they
must either accept the risk of observation or live in an environment
sealed from light and air. The police are no better off, for as long as
a court may choose an approach that subjects even unenhanced ob-
servations to the fourth amendment's warrant requirement, they
must use excessive caution in patrolling the streets or accept the risk
that courts will deem observations they conduct through standard
operating procedures unauthorized fourth amendment searches.
Even though it appears that most courts will approve naked-eye ob-
servations made from lawful locations,' 6 9 the fate of observations
made with even "standard issue" technological aids such as binocu-
168 The manipulable character of the Katz paradigm is well-recognized. See, e.g., Con-
rad v. State, 63 Wis. 2d 616, 634, 218 N.W.2d 252, 262 (1974)("There is a theory to fit
almost any preference. Rules of reasonableness can be tailored to fit almost every varia-
tion of reasoning"); Cunningham, supra note 41, at 569 ("the ambiguity and vagueness
of Justice Stewart's opinion in Katz has spawned the incoherence of today's fourth
amendment law"); Tomkovicz, supra note 2, at 683-84 (expectations approach is too
likely to turn on individual attitudes, too likely to be affected by governmental restric-
tions, and too likely to rely on exposure as ending all privacy rights); Comment, Trespass
and Fourth Amendment Protection, supra note 49, at 710, 725-27 (test is too reliant on indi-
vidual attitudes of different judges, and government can change expectations); Note,
Protecting Privacy, supra note 41, at 326 (noting that expectation structure "confuses anal-
ysis and permits manipulation of privacy protection"). The ambiguity of the test is evi-
denced by the hypothetical of the night-time drug transaction in the park. See supra note
101. While this is generally seen as proving that the REOP does not turn on likelihood
factors, see Note, Private Places, supra note 2, at 983, one of the first post-Katz commenta-
ries characterized the expectation of privacy in this setting as justifiable and reasonable.
Kitch, supra note 18, at 139-40.
169 This seems to be the lowest common denominator among all approaches dis-
cussed above. There is one exception, however, for observations in restrooms. See infra
Part IV.B. 1. The line between lawful and unlawful locations is sometimes a hard one to
draw. The curtilage is now identified through a four-part balancing test. See supra note
20. The factors are difficult enough to evaluate after an evidentiary hearing, let alone in
an immediate decision on the street. Other pertinent determinations exacerbate even
this baseline rule. See, e.g., United States v. Hanahan, 442 F.2d 649, 654 (7th Cir.
197 1)(technical trespass may be permitted); Lorenzana v. Superior Court, 9 Cal. 3d 626,
629, 511 P.2d 33, 35, 108 Cal. Rptr. 585, 587 (1973)(normal means of access); People v.
Lovelace, 116 Cal. App. 3d 541, 554, 172 Cal. Rptr. 65, 73 (1981)("lawful location"
does not include areas where members of public are unlikely to make observation).
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lars is substantially in doubt. Police officers must therefore avoid
using such devices in order to be confident that their observations
are lawful. Courts, of course, gain the benefits of a large menu
when no specific approach is mandated, but such a wide variety of
choices increases both the burden of decisionmaking and the likeli-
hood of reversal. This situation makes a particular mockery of the
purposes of the fourth amendment. Under no principle can un-
known standards relating to visual searches either secure personal
privacy or deter police misconduct on any consistent basis.
This has occurred largely because the modern Supreme Court
has never enunciated a clear and principled statement of the scope
of fourth amendment protection. Katz is vague at best, as the Court
was unwilling or unable to delineate with any rigor the parameters
of the new defining principle of the "justifiable" or "reasonable"
expectation of privacy. Later Supreme Court decisions only compli-
cate matters, as the Court often seemed caught between competing
visions of the scope of the protected level of privacy.' 70
Still, the unstated premise of the Court's adherence to the Katz
paradigm is clear. The entry paradigm was unsound, primarily be-
cause of the government's steadily increasing ability to intrude
through technological enhancement. In order to solve that prob-
lem, the Court was required to reexamine the fourth amendment's
underlying policies. It did so, and found those policies to center on
privacy from unreasonable governmental intrusions. 7 1 Society in
the 1960s viewed warrantless wiretapping as a patently unreasona-
ble intrusion1 72 and the application of the warrant requirement to
170 See generally supra notes 43-46 and accompanying text. Traditional legal analysis
emphasizes factual similarities and dissimilarities among cases. Attempts to draw analo-
gies in this area are particularly problematic. Observations are sometimes like casual
overhearings, sometimes like ears to hotel doors, and sometimes like electronic surveil-
lance. Separating observations into similar categories may aid analysis, but additional
questions remain, for there are too many varieties of visual enhancement devices for
neat comparisons to be made. Moreover, if technology is the key to defining the fourth
amendment's scope, courts must somehow determine which technological advances are
of particular concern and why this is the case. Eyeglasses enhance vision, but there is no
justification in logic or law for requiring near-sighted police officers to obtain warrants
for observations their normally-sighted colleagues could make without assistance. No
general rule for technology seems possible, as evidenced by the myriad of rules the
Supreme Court has designed for pen registers, dog sniffs, beepers, and airplanes.
171 Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 352-53 (1967); id. at 360-61 (Harlan, J., con-
curring). For discussion of Katz, see supra notes 30-50 and accompanying text.
172 The publication of books on the subject, see, e.g., S. DASH & R. SCHWARTZ, THE
EAVESDROPPERS (1959); A. WESTIN, PRIVACY AND FREEDOM (1967), and the recurring and
sometimes wide-eyed references in the cases to electronic surveillance techniques evi-
dence this. See, e.g., Berger v. New York, 388 U.S. 41, 46-47 (1967)(referring to minia-
turized bugs, a combination mirror and transmitter, parabolic microphones, and other
devices); Lopez v. United States, 373 U.S. 427, 466 (1963)(Brennan, J., dissent-
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wiretapping was therefore inevitable. Rather than draw on the pri-
vacy based purposes to define the new scope of fourth amendment
protection, however, the Court simply left the matter alone. In
other words, the only guidance was that courts should apply the
fourth amendment when failure to apply it would undercut 'justifi-
able" privacy. Justice Harlan attempted to give some shape to this
concept in his concurrence, but his opinion's success as terminology
and its failure to establish a meaningful defining principle testify to
the ultimately useless nature of the Katz inquiry.'
73
The critical problem is that the purpose behind a law cannot be
its only component. Even in a period of unabashed emphasis on the
policies behind constitutional and other legal rules, Katz was une-
qualed in sacrificing the goal of cognizable meaning in the service of
general values.' 74 The fourth amendment is not a rigid code, but
the result of the Katz paradigm is similar to what would occur if the
Internal Revenue Code were reduced to: Pay whatever you think is
ing) ("Electronic surveillance... makes the police omniscient; and police omniscience is
one of the most effective tools of tyranny."). The Berger Court noted that many states
prohibited some or all forms of electronic surveillance by the mid-1960s. Berger, 388
U.S. at 47-48, nn.5 & 6. Justice Brennan's Lopez dissent describes the techniques men-
tioned in Professor Dash's book as "truly frightening." Lopez, 373 U.S. at 467 (Brennan,
J., dissenting). It may not be coincidental that this was the era of the television Eliot
Ness and his Untouchables, who wiretapped on screen as enthusiastically as their real-
life models did in enforcing prohibition, as upheld in Olmstead v. United States, 277
U.S. 438 (1928).
173 Katz, 389 at 360-61. See supra notes 39-41, 48 and accompanying text. The general
adoption of Justice Harlan's terminology suggests the difficulties of the Katz formula-
tion. Katz cannot be compared to a case in which a concurrence represents the view of a
critical fifth vote for a judgment. In such cases the rationale of the fifth Justice often
establishes the state of the law. Nor was Katz a case in which the majority emphasized
unique aspects of the litigation and the concurrence presented only general analysis of
the most important legal issues. The fact that later courts have turned to Justice
Harlan's analysis suggests that it, in stark contrast to the majority's analysis, provided at
least some tools for resolving difficult problems.
The failure of the Harlan formulation as a workable test, at least for observation
problems, underscores the difficulty of analyzing fourth amendment issues through a
target-oriented approach. An actual expectation of privacy requirement, perhaps cou-
pled with additional requirements, would at least provide lower courts with a directional
signal. The ephemeral content of a reasonable expectation of privacy, however, provides
no guideline for decision. It begs the question in the most important respect, as the
breadth of the protected zone of privacy can differ from judge to judge. See Part II.B.
See also O'Brien, supra note 26, at 718 (finding that the broad view of the policies under-
lying the fourth amendment has had little effect because of continued importance of the
area approach); Note, Telescopic Surveillance, supra note 76, at 708 (the use of "pre-Katz
property concepts and apparent lack of other objective criteria often combine to pro-
duce negligible differences" between decisions under the entry and expectations
paradigms).
174 See Note, supra note 16, at 970-71 (describing Katz as the final step in the Supreme
Court's "relativization" of fourth amendment privacy, which logically followed from the
Court's "pragmatic-realist premises").
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fair, subject to a post hocjudicial determination that you have paid a
fair tax, with penalties for bad guesses.
A good example of the failure of the expectations paradigm in
this respect is its inability to provide any guidance concerning lim-
ited exposure of otherwise private activity. People often expose
conduct or contraband to limited groups, apparently expecting that
it will remain confidential but assuming the risk that it will be dis-
closed.1 75 The facts of Katz suggest that such expectations are pro-
tected, 176 but at some level of openness an expectation of privacy
necessarily becomes unreasonable. The expectations paradigm pro-
vides no help in drawing the appropriate line or identifying the per-
tinent factors.
177
175 See, e.g., United States v. Carriger, 541 F.2d 545, 551-52 (6th Cir. 1976)(tenant
assumes risk of observation by other tenants and their guests);Jacobs v. Superior Court,
36 Cal. App. 3d 489, 494 n.2, 111 Cal. Rptr. 449, 453 n.2 (1974)(no showing of pres-
ence of others to weaken privacy expectation); State v. Holt, 291 Or. 343, 349, 630 P.2d
854, 858 (198 1)(defendant who knowingly exposed indecent conduct to person who
turned out to be a police officer assumed the risk and had no reasonable expectation of
privacy). People have different expectations for different types of exposure. See generally
Note, Aerial Surveillance, supra note 44, at 285. People presumably trust confederates,
family, and friends not to disclose criminal conduct, and rely on the failure of interlopers
such as co-tenants to recognize contraband or evidence of crime.
176 Katz spoke to other persons on the telephone, Katz, 389 U.S. at 348, but this did
not vitiate his justifiable expectation of privacy in the conversations. Id. at 352. Of
course, he assumed the risk that one of those persons was recording the conversation.
See supra note 76. At a minimum, therefore, revealing private things to confederates is
not the same as knowing exposure to the police.
177 Following Katz, one could draw the line at confederates, thereby recognizing con-
spiratorial privacy yet making people assume the risk of exposure to innocent and pre-
sumably law-abiding persons. The cases generally avoid so strict a rule and instead
allow people a margin for gambling on the apathy or ignorance of most private persons
able to observe evidence of crime. See, e.g., United States v. Lyons, 706 F.2d 321, 325
(D.C. Cir. 1983)(limited exposure to selected persons does not vitiate fourth amend-
ment protection); People v. Cook, 41 Cal. 3d 373, 380, 710 P.2d 299, 304, 221 Cal.
Rptr. 499, 504 (1985) (probability of governmental officials entering, seeing, or hearing
is not inconsistent with a reasonable expectation of privacy from "intensive spying"). Cf.
Commonwealth v. McCloskey, 217 Pa. Super. 432, 435-36, 272 A.2d 271, 273 (Pa.
Super. Ct. 1970)(right of college employees to enter dormitory room to check for mis-
use does not amount to student waiver of fourth amendment protection); Note, Concept
of Privacy, supra note 26, at 187 (suggesting that relationship of multiple tenants is one
factor in determining the extent of their reasonable expectations of privacy). Perhaps
the underlying notion is that "merely sharing with persons whom we ordinarily expect
to protect our interests ought not be equated with losing all expectations of privacy."
Coombs, supra note 44, at 1649. Courts are adrift when they attempt to rationalize these
semi-exposure cases. About the most that can be done is to categorize the groups and
guess whether the target has been careful or negligent in his or her gambling on privacy.
See, e.g.. State v. Stanton, 7 Or. App. 286, 296-97, 490 P.2d 1274, 1279 (1971)(recogniz-
ing reasonableness of expectations for certain groups but declining to apply fourth
amendment because contraband was exposed to "a substantial segment of the public" in
a "semi-public area" and defendant could not reasonably assume that no one would
report it to police).
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The Supreme Court was correct to reject talismans and specific
formulae; it was wrong to avoid giving any explanation of the mean-
ing of the fourth amendment. The constitutional language is frozen
in generalities and the history of its adoption is relevant to only
some contemporary privacy concerns. 178 Instead of defining a
fourth amendment that can be a guarantor of its underlying privacy
values, however, the Court supplied only the values themselves,
hedged by the non-informative adjectives "justifiable," "legiti-
mate," and "reasonable." Presented in an opinion of "almost para-
doxical complexity," 179 the open-ended idealism of the Katz inquiry
turns nihilistic in application. 180
178 See generally Amsterdam, supra note 2, at 396-401 (noting the limited focus of the
fourth amendment's framers, the futility of history as a useful guide, and the need to
interpret the amendment to respond to new technology). The result of Katz is that un-
less one accepts Justice Harlan's assertion that it merely restated pre-existing law in
most situations, it shook off precedent as guidance, leaving lower courts helpless in light
of the language and pre-constitutional history. While it is necessary for such constitu-
tional provisions to be somewhat flexible in application, Katz rendered the fourth
amendment flaccid.
179 United States v. Choate, 422 F. Supp. 261, 269 (C.D. Cal. 1976), rev'd, 576 F.2d
165 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 953 (1978). The reversal supports the lower court's
conclusion about Katz's difficulty. The district court quite understandably held that peo-
ple reasonably anticipate that the identity of those with whom they correspond will re-
main confidential. Choate, 422 F. Supp. at 270. It therefore invalidated a "mail cover,"
in which law enforcement agents noted the return address information on letters sent to
the defendant. Id. at 271. The court of appeals, applying its own reading of Katz and its
own values, found return addresses not within Choate's REOP because the information
was "knowingly exposed" to the public on the outside of envelopes. 576 F.2d at 177.
See also United States v. Bifield, 498 F. Supp. 497, 509 (D. Conn. 1980)(this area is "intri-
cate and complex," does not provide "clear guidelines," and holdings are too fact-
bound to be of much use in later cases); Conrad v. State, 63 Wis. 2d 616, 634, 218
N.W.2d 252, 261 (1974)(describing fourth amendment law as "almost as incomprehen-
sible as the law of obscentity").
180 Nihilism about the fourth amendment seems clear in the Supreme Court's aerial
search cases. See supra text accompanying notes 68-74. The Court could have held that
the fourth amendment does not apply to aerial surveillance for any number of reasons
or that even if it does apply, the surveillances in these cases were reasonable. Neverthe-
less, shorn of rationalizations and fuzzy caveats, the Court held in essence that the aerial
surveillance was permissible because it could be done. See also Note, supra note 109, at
143 (characterizing Dow Chem. Co. v. United States, 476 U.S. 227 (1986), and Califor-
nia v. Ciraolo, 476 U.S. 207 (1986), as destroying the REOP standard from opposite
directions, Dow by adopting a flat permissive approach where there is no REOP, Ciraolo
by allowing technological advances to trim back the REOP).
Even if nihilism seems too strong a term, the lack of content resulting from this
mode of analysis produces grossly incoherent decisions, as shown in Part II.B. Com-
mentators disagree on many things about the application of the fourth amendment, but
they tend to agree on the ultimate failure of Katz as an analytical tool. See, e.g.,
Tomkovicz, supra note 2, at 691-92 (expectations approach encourages courts to deny
any privacy protection due to exposure; this inadequately protects privacy because there
are various levels and types of privacy); Note, Sense-Enhancing Devices, supra note 41, at
1169 (suggesting that courts have resolved problems in this area through equivocation);
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B. BUILDING A NEW PARADIGM
Reconstructing fourth amendment law is neither easy nor satis-
fying. The difficulty is self-evident; there is an immense range of
possible applications of the fourth amendment, both because of new
investigative techniques and because individuals have many differ-
ent beliefs concerning the optimal balance between privacy and law
enforcement. The unsatisfactory nature of the endeavor inheres in
the realization that no single rule or test can completely resolve the
matter. Instead, while several general principles can be identified,
the bulk of fourth amendment law is and must be particular in appli-
cation. Perhaps it was the Supreme Court's effort in Katz to draft a
universal rule to resolve the specific problem of wiretapping that
resulted in the present disordered doctrine.
The first step toward rationalizing fourth amendment analysis is
simple enough. The missing piece of the expectations paradigm is
that the fourth amendment regulates police methods of inquiry.
That is, the Katz Court erroneously assumed that in order to serve
the purpose of privacy it had to interpret the amendment by looking
in each case at privacy-the individual expectation of privacy gener-
alized into the REOP. This resulted in judicial emphasis on the tar-
get and the disavowal of interest in the method of intrusion. 18' But
the fourth amendment makes a different choice-it prohibits unrea-
sonable searches and seizures. In order to serve the underlying pol-
icies of the fourth amendment, accurately identified in Katz as the
preservation of privacy, the amendment itself regulates certain law
enforcement techniques. Judicial emphasis should therefore be on
police methods. 18 2
The next step is also simple. One wholly appropriate lesson of
Note, Concept of Privacy, supra note 26, at 154 (noting that as a result of difficulties in
interpreting Katz, courts are required "to make up their own ground rules as they go
along"); Note, Protecting Privacy, supra note 41, at 335 ("a system of law enforcement
based on such indefinite and shifting ground is undesirable for citizens as well as un-
workable for the police").
181 See supra note 86 and accompanying text. In the Supreme Court, however, strict
adherence to this principle appears mainly in dissents. See, e.g., Dow, 476 U.S. at 251
(Powell, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part)(stressing that "manner" and
"method" do not relate to Katz inquiry); Ciraolo, 476 U.S. at 223 (Powell, J., dissent-
ing)(same); On Lee v. United States, 343 U.S. 747, 765 (1952)(Douglas, J., dissent-
ing)("The nature of the instrument that science or engineering develops is not
important.").
182 "To ensure that the fourth amendment keeps pace with this advance in surveil-
lance [aerial observation], courts must consider the method employed by the police as a
•.. factor in determining a reasonable expectation of privacy." Note, Aerial Surveillance,
supra note 44, at 286. See also supra text accompanying notes 112 and 148 and note 156
(addressing various aspects of the impact of method on visual searches).
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Katz is that "searches" cannot be limited to actual physical invasions
if the fourth amendment is to serve its underlying policies. Con-
structive invasions perform some of the same functions as physical
invasions and may be equally intrusive. Thus, "searches" should
take its meaning from common sense and apply to those actions that
in reality rummage through or about persons, houses, papers, or
effects. The government therefore engages in a search whenever it
examines a target's person or other protected place or thing.18 3
Katz is not necessarily inconsistent with this approach; it merely
omitted any inquiry about a search, as such, to focus on the pro-
tected interest, the reasonable expectation of privacy. 18 4 Despite
183 But see Arizona v. Hicks, 480 U.S. 321, 324-25 (1987)(characterizing inspection of
items in plain view as a non-search but moving them, even slightly, as a search). The
problem in Hicks is that both actions took place during a search. The inspection, how-
ever, was a reasonable action under the circumstances and did not violate the fourth
amendment. The movement of the stereo equipment, on the other hand, was unreason-
able, at least to the majority. Id. at 325-29. Cf. United States v. On Lee, 193 F.2d 306,
314 (2d Cir. 1951), aff'd 343 U.S. 747 (1952)(Frank, J., dissenting)(observations are
searches, but most are reasonable and constitutional).
The underlying problem in this area may simply be that the courts have had to rely
on "search" definitions that are inconsistent with one another and which make little
legal or semantic sense. Cunningham, supra note 41, at 542-45. Only under the expec-
tations paradigm could a court conclude that scraping paint from an automobile consti-
tutes neither a search nor a seizure. Yet the Supreme Court so concluded in Cardwell v.
Lewis, 417 U.S. 583 (1974), because there was no invasion of privacy. Id. at 588-89, 591.
It is more logical to equate "search" with actions intended to result or in fact result-
ing in the acquisition of information from a person. See Tomkovicz, supra note 2, at 664-
65 (characterizing this as the "common sense" of the scope of the fourth amendment);
Note, Private Places, supra note 2, at 974 ("The essence of a search is the gathering of
nonpublic information; this is as effectively accomplished by the reception of visual stim-
uli as by actual, physical penetration of a 'constitutionally protected area' "). Looking
constitutes an intrusion, even though the invasion is intangible rather than physical. See
Note, The Post-Katz Problem, supra note 129, at 639 (treating observation as a search
"comports with the spirit of Katz and with the word's common usage"); Note, Concept of
Privacy, supra note 26, at 182-83 (the constructive presence constitutes an undesired in-
trusion). Actions such as the paint scraping in Cardwell are probably reasonable without
a warrant, but certainly they are searches subject to the fourth amendment. Cf. Kitch,
supra note 18, at 134, 144-45 (characterizing a search as "any effort by a government
agent to obtain information" and concluding that informer cases represent a category of
searches that are permitted because they do not intrude on privacy). For a discussion of
the informer cases, see supra note 76.
184 This is another respect in which Katz may be more limited in application than the
Court anticipated, because it recognized that the fourth amendment is not limited to the
protection of privacy. Katz, 389 U.S. at 350. It was able to avoid defining "search" in
terms of governmental methods because the electronic eavesdropping intruded on what
everyone could agree was Katz's reasonable expectation that his telephone conversa-
tions would be confidential. It chose to avoid the issue, perhaps because of concern that
no single explanation or definition of a search would satisfy a majority of the Court. See
supra note 76. What the Court failed to recognize was that one implication of its method
is that in the absence of a reasonable expectation of privacy, there is no search or seizure
and all governmental action is exempt from fourth amendment regulation. As shown
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this omission, some courts have kept alive the notion of the police
"search" as a concept separate from the expectation of privacy.
One of the most influential opinions is a leading flashlight case,
Marshall v. United States,185 which holds that it is not a search to use a
flashlight in a non-investigatory context.1 6 On the other hand, "[a]
probing, exploratory quest for evidence of a crime is a search gov-
erned by Fourth Amendment standards whether a flashlight is used
or not. ' 187 Other statements of the principle emphasize the same
elements: the intent and effect of the police conduct.""' Under this
view, Katz involved a search because the agents sought evidence
through an intrusive method. The fact that the warrantless elec-
tronic eavesdropping violated Katz's reasonable expectation of pri-
vacy did not make it a search, it made it an unreasonable search.
This provides the key to reformulating the role of the fourth
amendment in regulating visual intrusions. An intentional observa-
tion intrudes and is therefore a search subject to judicial regulation
under the fourth amendment. 8 9 This intrusion paradigm is
broader than the Marshall formulation, as it is not limited to investi-
above, however, it is police searches that are regulated by the fourth amendment in order
to assure the protection of reasonable expectations of privacy. The amendment merely
goes further than its policies, using the classification of "searches" to stand in for the
amorphous concept of "invading privacy." Analogizing to equal protection principles,
the fourth amendment is somewhat overinclusive. In order to protect privacy, it goes a
bit further than is necessary and regulates some police actions that come close to violat-
ing privacy.
185 422 F.2d 185 (5th Cir. 1970).
186 Id. at 189. The officer looked into the interior of a car after patrons at a restaurant
raised concerns that the occupant was ill because he drove into the parking lot, left his
lights on, and slumped down on the driver's seat. Id. at 187.
187 Id. at 189.
188 See, e.g., United States v. Kenaan, 496 F.2d 181, 182-83 (ist Cir. 1974)(agents con-
ducted search when they forced defendant to place his hand under ultraviolate lamp
because it was a detailed inspection to seek evidence); United States v. Cody, 390 F.
Supp. 616, 618 (E.D. Tenn. 1974)(flashlight observation of car's interior was a search
because agents went to car and looked in with intention of making general exploratory
search); State v. Stachler, 58 Haw. 412, 417, 570 P.2d 1323, 1327 (1977)(citing State v.
Hanawahine, 50 Haw. 461, 465, 443 P.2d 149, 152 (1968))(describing a search as a
"prying into hidden places"); People v. Clark, 133 Mich. App. 619, 628-29, 350 N.W.2d
754, 759 (1983)(using both concepts, seeing a search as a "probing, exploratory quest"
that violates a REOP); Wheeler v. State, 659 S.W.2d 381, 390 (Tex. Crim. App.
1982)(technologic ally-enhanced observation into greenhouse constituted a search be-
cause agents were looking for evidence). One reason that this line of analysis has sur-
vived Katz is that the inadvertence of finding evidence is significant under the plain view
doctrine. See supra note 52. Inadvertence may help determine whether the search was
reasonable, but inadvertence does not resolve whether a search has taken place.
189 Judge Frank was quite clear on this alternative method of defining "search" in his
On Lee dissent:
Our highest court has never decided that a "search" is valid merely because
made by the eyes or the ears and not the hands. Indeed so to hold would be to
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gative observations. The broader view is necessary to minimize the
importance of evaluating police motivations and to serve the com-
mon meaning of "search" in an age when technology allows remote
actions to be as intrusive as physical invasions. 90 But it does not
mean that all observations are subject to the probable cause and
warrant requirements, although concern about this possibility may
have led to the Supreme Court's ambiguity in Katz concerning the
breadth of fourth amendment coverage.' 9 1 Instead it means that in-
tentional observations, like other intrusive police practices, must be
reasonable, and that in appropriate cases this requires probable
cause and a warrant.
It is impossible to define reasonable police observations by a
simple rule or a concise standard. This is largely because different
disregard the every-day meaning of "search," i.e., the act of seeking. In every-day
talk, as of 1789 or now, a man "searches" when he looks or listens.
Seeing and hearing are both reactions of a human being to the physical envi-
ronment around him-to light waves in one instance, to sound waves in the other.
And, accordingly, using a mechanical aid to either seeing or hearing is also a form
of searching.
On Lee, 193 F.2d at 313 (FrankJ., dissenting). The majority's contrary view was affirmed
by the Supreme Court, 343 U.S. 747 (1952), and Judge Frank failed to recognize that
Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438 (1928), indicated that Court's belief that pas-
sive reception is not a search. For discussion of Olmstead, see supra notes 23-26 and
accompanying text. Nevertheless, On Lee never suggested that "searches" was to be de-
fined with an emphasis on the target, and Olmstead's physical invasion requirement is
consistent only with an emphasis on governmental methods. Katz alone turned the em-
phasis of the fourth amendment from regulation of police practices to protection of
zones of privacy.
190 Criticisms of the Marshall approach's limitation focus on the potential for abuse in
gauging the officer's subjective intent, Comment, Trespass and Fourth Amendment Protection,
supra note 49, at 728-29, and the fact that the offensiveness of an invasion does not
depend on the officer's state of mind. Note, Concept of Privacy, supra note 26, at 183.
Moreover, physical intrusions have not been limited by motivation. A forced entry to
sell tickets to the Policemen's Ball would be a fourth amendment search, regardless of
the lack of investigatory purpose. This broader view is also consistent with judicial treat-
ments of common non-investigative intrusions such as inventory searches, South Dakota
v. Opperman, 428 U.S. 364 (1976), and protective searches, Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1
(1968), which modern courts have always treated as searches. See supra notes 53-56 and
accompanying text.
191 The end of the rigid monolithic model of the fourth amendment, see supra note 17,
means that courts need not exclude police conduct from fourth amendment coverage in
order to avoid the warrant and probable cause requirements in appropriate instances.
Professor Amsterdam notes that a disadvantage of the monolithic model is that it places
"strains" on determining the outer boundaries of the fourth amendment. Amsterdam,
supra note 2, at 393. See id. at 395 (the dilemma was to bring the conduct under the
fourth amendment and thereby be over-restrictive, or leave it outside the fourth amend-
ment and allow almost anything). See also Kitch, supra note 18, at 134 (applying the
warrant requirement to every aspect of governmental investigations that intrude on se-
curity "would reduce the warrant process to a pervasive system of paper shuffling, trivi-
alized by the very frequency of its use.").
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people have definite and strongly held inconsistent opinions about
the propriety of various surveillance techniques and practices.
Judges reviewing particular observations have often expressed an-
ger or fear in response to particular intrusive practices. The rheto-
ric occasionally centers on George Orwell's 1984, with its vision of a
society numbed by surveillance. 192 Historical allusions are also
common, with Adolf Hitler and Sir Thomas More the allegorical
figures in the morality play of governmental repression and legal
protection of individual rights.193 Privacy is repeatedly character-
192 See, e.g., United States v. Cuevas-Sanchez, 821 F.2d 248, 251 n.3 (5th Cir. 1987);
United States v. Torres, 751 F.2d 875, 877 (7th Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 470 U.S. 1087
(1985); United States v. Taborda, 635 F.2d 131, 137 (2d Cir. 1980); United States v. On
Lee, 193 F.2d 306, 317 (2d Cir. 1951), aft'd, 343 U.S. 747 (1952) (Frank, J., dissenting);
People v. Cook, 41 Cal. 3d 373, 382, 710 P.2d 299, 305, 221 Cal. Rptr. 499, 505 (1985);
Lorenzana v. Superior Court, 9 Cal. 3d 626, 637, 511 P.2d 33, 41, 108 Cal. Rptr. 585,
593 (1973); People v. Agee, 200 Cal. Rptr. 827, 827 (Cal. Ct. App. 1984); People v.
Joubert, 118 Cal. App. 3d 637, 647, 173 Cal. Rptr. 428, 434 (1981); People v. Arno, 90
Cal. App. 3d 505, 511, 153, Cal. Rptr. 624, 627 (1979); People v. Teicher, 52 N.Y.2d
638, 653, 422 N.E.2d 506, 513, 439 N.Y.S.2d 846, 853 (1981); Commonwealth v. Wil-
liams, 262 Pa. Super. 508, 534, 396 A.2d 1286, 1299 (1978), rev'd, 494 Pa. 496,431 A.2d
964 (1981)(Spaeth, J., dissenting). See also Saltzburg, supra note 58, at 21; Note, Aerial
Surveillance, supra note 44, at 283 & n. 83.
One commonly-cited passage is Julia's warning to Winston: "'Don't go out in the
open. There might be someone watching. We're all right if we keep behind the
boughs.'" Agee, 200 Cal. Rptr. at 827 (quoting G. ORWELL, NINETEEN EIGErY-FOUR 102
(1949)). Other references are to aerial observation in Oceana: " 'In the far distance a
helicopter skimmed down between the roofs, hovered for an instant like a bluebottle,
and darted away again with a curving flight. It was the Police Patrol, snooping into
people's windows.'" Cuevas-Sanchez, 821 F.2d at 251 n.4 (quoting G. ORWELL, supra, at
6). In dissenting from the approval of helicopter searches in Florida v. Riley, 109 S. Ct.
693 (1989),Justice Brennan asked, "[W]ho can read this passage without a shudder, and
without the instinctive reaction that it depicts life in some country other than ours?" Id.
at 705 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
193 Judge Frank noted in On Lee that "[u]nder Hitler, when it became known that the
secret police planted dictaphones in houses, members of families often gathered in bath-
rooms to conduct whispered discussions of intimate affairs, hoping thus to escape the
reach of the sending apparatus." On Lee, 193 F.2d at 317 (Frank, J., dissenting). This
reference, immediately followed by a lengthy quotation from 1984, is particularly potent
as it was made only six years after Nazi Germany fell and two years after 1984 was pub-
lished. More recent history found its way into Arno, in which the court compared binoc-
ular-aided observations to the Watergate burglary. Arno, 90 Cal. App. 3d at 511, 153
Cal. Rptr. at 627.
The reference to More is in ChiefJustice Krivosha's dissent in State v. Havlat, 222
Neb. 554, 385 N.W.2d 436 (1986), in which the majority upheld aerial observations and
an open fields intrusion because there was no reasonable expectation of privacy. Id. at
561, 385 N.W.2d at 441. His opinion states:
While it is apparent that we must do all we can to combat the ever-growing problem
created by drugs within our society, I am nevertheless reminded of the words of Sir
Thomas More, who, after being told by Roper that he would cut down every law in
England to get after the Devil, said, "And when the last law was down, and the Devil
turned round on you-where would you hide, Roper, the laws all being flat?"
Id. at 567, 385 N.W.2d at 444 (Krivosha, CJ., dissenting). It should not be surprising
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ized as a necessary component of a free society' 9 4 and the use of
technological enhancement is seen as evidence of totalitarianism.19 5
These courts explicitly recognize the harmful possibilities of unfet-
tered law enforcement use of technology.
Nevertheless, the worst outrages remain only possibilities and
extreme rhetoric only confuses analysis. The fact that continuous or
indiscriminate surveillance would be totalitarian does not mean that
some use, under proper conditions, is equally destructive of soci-
ety's privacy values. The many references to real or fictional exam-
ples of repressive surveillances are balanced by comments that
recognize the importance of differences in degree. Intemperate lan-
guage invites reaction: "While defendant has sought to implicate
[privacy] interests by raising the spectre of an omniscient govern-
ment spying on its citizens through the assistance of a vast and ar-
that both On Lee and Havlat were drug cases. Law enforcement officials have used tech-
nological aids widely in drug investigations, and the present war on drugs suggests that
such law enforcement agencies will use their most advanced techniques to stop drug
trafficking. See, e.g., People v. Mayoff, 42 Cal. 3d 1302, 1307, 729 P.2d 166, 168, 233
Cal. Rptr. 2, 4 (1986)(discussing aerial surveillance program designed to eradicate com-
mercial marijuana farming). Mayoff supports Chief Justice Krivosha's concerns. The
court upheld that program despite serious constitutional misgivings, largely because of
the peculiar dangers presented by marijuana growers and law enforcement needs. Id. at
1308-09 n.2, 729 P.2d at 169 n.2, 233 Cal. Rptr. at 4 n.2. Cf. United States v. Bernard,
757 F.2d 1439, 1440-41 (4th Cir. 1985)(noting that marijuana farmers protect their
fields with items such as trip wires, eye-level barbed wire, covered pits, traps, electric
fences, and guard dogs). See also Riley, 109 S. Ct. at 703 (Brennan, J., dissent-
ing)(criticizing the Court for letting its "distaste" for illegal drug trade to influence its
fourth amendment analysis); Saltzburg, supra note 58, at 2-4 (suggesting that courts have
often manipulated and truncated fourth amendment protections out of an understanda-
ble but misguided effort to participate in the war on drugs).
194 See, e.g., United States v. On Lee, 193 F.2d at 315-16 (Frank, J., dissenting)("A
sane, decent civilized society must provide some such oasis, some shelter from public
scrutiny, some insulated enclosure, some enclave, some inviolate place which is a man's
castle."); United States v. Kim, 415 F. Supp. 1252, 1257 (D. Haw. 1976)(binocular-aided
observations into apartment "violate the basic foundations of privacy, security and de-
cency which distinguish free societies from controlled societies"); People v. Cook, 41
Cal. 3d 373, 377, 710 P.2d 299, 302, 221 Cal. Rptr. 499, 501 (1985)("A society where
individuals are required to erect opaque cocoons within which to carry on any affairs
they wish to conduct in private, and the concomitant chill such a requirement would
place on lawful outdoor activity, would be inimical to the vision of legitimate privacy
....."); Lorenzana v. Superior Court, 9 Cal. 3d 626, 641, 511 P.2d 33, 44, 108 Cal. Rptr.
585, 596 (1973)("The prying policeman . . .portrays a sorry figure who violates his
subject's right to privacy-a right ... precious to a free and open society.").
195 See, e.g., United States v. Curtis, 562 F.2d 1153, 1156 (9th Cir. 1977), cert. denied,
439 U.S. 910 (1978)("indiscriminate surveillance for unlimited periods of time of vary-
ing numbers of individuals" violates the "most precious right of privacy"); Lorenzana, 9
Cal. 3d at 629, 511 P.2d at 35, 108 Cal. Rptr. at 587 (observation into a window "too
closely resembles the process of the police state"); Agee, 200 Cal. Rptr. at 832, 837
(describing "discrete surveillance" as "a hallmark of the police state," and noting that
aerial surveillance of residence areas "is a sure and certain path to totalitarian control").
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cane array of sense enhancing devices, all that is actually involved
here is a pair of binoculars."'' 9 6 There is also substantial disagree-
ment concerning specific methods. Courts emphasizing the Orwel-
lian possibilities of aerial surveillance find it reprehensible and
destructive of the social fabric. 197 Other courts are only vaguely
aware of these dangers and seem confident that aerial surveillance is
more of a gain than a loss to society. s98 Those courts that empha-
size the realities of individual observations, however, come to differ-
ent conclusions in different cases. In short, they recognize that it is
the particular use of the surveillance technique that determines
whether the government has behaved reasonably. 99
The fact that there are such strongly held views across a spec-
trum suggests two things. The first is confirmation that no simple
"full search/no search" dichotomy is feasible. Neither pre-Katz no-
tions of protected places nor Katz's target-oriented framework can
resolve all fourth amendment problems. The second, paradoxically,
is that guidelines for applying the fourth amendment to visual
searches can be elicited from the seemingly inconsistent decisions
applying Katz.
Bright line possibilities fall of their own weight. Unlimited au-
thority to use technological devices is clearly out of step with con-
temporary values and would inevitably result in abuses requiring
legislative correction. 200 An unduly restrictive approach, on the
196 United States v. Christensen, 524 F. Supp. 344, 347 (N.D. Ill. 1981). See also
United States v. Dubrofsky, 581 F.2d 208, 211 (9th Cir. 1978)("Binoculars, dogs that
track and sniff out contraband, searchlights, fluorescent powders, automobiles and air-
planes, burglar alarms, radar devices, and bait money contribute to surveillance without
violation of the fourth amendment in the usual case."); United States v. Moore, 562 F.2d
106, 112 (1st Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 926 (1978)(use of beeper differs from mere
"magnification of the observer's senses as in the use of helicopter, binoculars, radar, or
the like").
197 See, e.g., People v. Mayoff, 42 Cal. 3d 1302, 1324-31, 729 P.2d 166, 182-87, 233
Cal. Rptr. 2, 14-21 (1986)(Bird, CJ., dissenting)(condemning random aerial patrols as
unconstitutional general searches that result in indiscriminate police intrusions and evis-
cerate privacy protections for homes and yards); Agee, 200 Cal. Rptr. at 829-37 (gener-
ally castigating aerial surveillance as a police state tactic that destroys personal privacy);
State v. Riley, 511 So. 2d 282, 287 (Fla. 1987)(aerial surveillance is susceptible to abuse
and invasion of privacy), rev'd, 109 S. Ct. 693 (1989).
198 This is the thrust of the Supreme Court's aerial search cases. See supra text accom-
panying notes 68-74, and People v. Superior Court (Stroud), 37 Cal. App. 3d 836, 839,
112 Cal. Rptr. 764, 765 (1974)(noting the value to society of routine police helicopter
patrols). For further discussion on helicopter patrols, see supra note 152.
199 Balancing approaches were particularly common in aerial surveillance cases prior
to the Supreme Court's decisions in this area. See supra note 166. This approach would
be revitalized through application of the reasonableness norm proposed in this Article.
See infra Part IV.A.2.
200 Commentators occasionally note that legislation is unlikely to correct unduly per-
missive judicial decisions. See, e.g., PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION ON LAW ENFORCEMENT AND
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other hand, invites a different reaction-contempt for law and for
judges who forbid reasonable police practices. Courts may try, like
Goldilocks, to find a bright line that fits just right, but no such line
exists. Different devices are used at different times and at different
places for different reasons, and no rule fits all. More importantly,
the lesson history teaches is that technological change is constant,
and the principle that is valid for today's technology may be a laugh-
able anachronism tomorrow. 201
ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE, REPORT, THE CHALLENGE OF CRIME IN A FREE SOCIETY 94
(1967)(general statement of the problem); R. NEELY, How COURTS GOVERN AMERICA
145-67 (1981)(need for judicial role in regulating the criminal process); Amsterdam,
supra note 2, at 378-79 (emphasizing the political restraints on legislative action). This
appears to be less true in the area of surveillance technology than in some others. Con-
gress followed Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438 (1928), with Section 605 of the
Communications Act of 1934, Pub. L. No. 73-416, 48 Stat. 1103 (1934), which prohib-
ited wiretapping, believing that electronic eavesdropping should be prohibited as a mat-
ter of public policy even if the fourth amendment did not regulate the practice. See
Fisher, Congress and the Fourth Amendment, 21 GA. L. REV. 107, 127-32 (1986). Title III of
the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968, Pub. L. No. 90-351, 82 Stat.
197 (1968), was a similar if more subtle reponse to Berger v. New York, 388 U.S. 41
(1967), and Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967). Portions of the Act went further
in regulating electronic surveillance than either decision demanded. Under that statute,
federal agents must obtain authorization from the Attorney General or a designated
Assistant Attorney General and state agents must receive authorization from the princi-
pal local prosecuting attorney prior to seeking court authorization. 18 U.S.C. § 2516
(1982). The Act also prohibits most forms of private electronic surveillance, 18 U.S.C.
§ 2511 (1982), and bans manufacture, distribution, possession, and advertizing of elec-
tronic surveillance devices. 18 U.S.C. § 2512 (1982).
Title III turned out to be insufficient. When cordless telephone technology resulted
in eavesdropping over radio waves, most courts held the action permissible. See, e.g.,
Dorsey v. State, 402 So. 2d 1178, 1180, 1182-84 (Fla. 1981); State v. Howard, 235 Kan.
236, 242-49, 679 P.2d 197, 200-206 (1984); State v. Delaurier, 488 A.2d 688, 692-95
(R.I. 1985). Congress then enacted the Electronic Communications Privacy Act of 1986,
Pub. L. No. 99-508, 100 Stat. 1848 (1986), which updated Title III to deal with this new
technology.
The criticisms of legislative inaction may miss the salient point about public atti-
tudes concerning police surveillance. It is logical to assume that political realities chill
legislative reform in areas in which the public perceives that only criminals will be
helped. But this is not the case where people believe that their own privacy is at stake.
Many technological surveillance practices fall in the second category.
201 Consistent with this notion, a number of dissents can fairly be characterized as
future oriented, responding at least as much to the potential applications of the prevail-
ing rulings to future technology as to the precise problem before the court. See, e.g.,
Florida v. Riley, 109 S. Ct. 693, 702-03 (1989)(Brennan, J., dissenting) (suggesting the
existence of a safe and silent helicopter capable of determining what people are reading
inside a private home); Dow Chem. Co. v. United States, 476 U.S. 227, 251 (1986)(Pow-
ell, J., dissenting)(concern about impact of dissemination and use of new technology);
United States v. White, 401 U.S. 745, 757-58, 764-65 & nn.5-6 (1971)(Douglas, J., dis-
senting)(stressing implications of new surveillance techniques); Olmstead, 277 U.S. at 474
(Brandeis, J., dissenting) (scientific advances as undercutting privacy); Wheeler v. State,
659 S.W.2d 381, 388 (Tex. Crim. App. 1982)(Clinton, J., dissenting)(use of more so-
phisticated techniques will destroy privacy).
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The result, of flexibility need not be the "abyss" feared by Pro-
fessor Anthony Amsterdam.20 2 A positive byproduct of Katz's mis-
guided emphasis on the target's expectations is that there is a
substantial volume of case law evaluating society's norms concern-
ing surveillance practices. Although the Katz inquiry focuses on ex-
pectations of privacy rather than on methods of intrusion, judicial
responses to the many different factual situations presented in the
cases provide indications of the scope ofjudicial control appropriate
to visual searches. A sensitive reading of the cases provides gui-
dance concerning the nature of various law enforcement observa-
tions and their effect on prevailing privacy values.
20 3
The abyss can be avoided; gradations are inevitable. The val-
ues set forth in the observation cases must be organized in a fashion
that encourages consistent and predictable decisionmaking by
judges and police officers. This requires the development of
norms-principles that implement the intrusion paradigm and serve
to anchor judicial analysis of visual searches. Those norms must be
deeply rooted in society's attitudes about law enforcement methods
and must be capable of consistent application. Four such norms can
be identified. First, because of the fourth amendment's critical role
in protecting against arbitrary invasions of privacy, all searches-
and therefore all observations-must be undertaken for legitimate
governmental purposes. Second, law enforcement officials must
conduct all observations in a reasonable manner. These general
norms are joined by others that concern specific types of visual
searches and respond to the "prescriptive and predictive" compo-
nents of the Katz inquiry.20 4 First, certain places and acts are so in-
trinsically private that additional limitations are appropriate;
enhanced and even some naked-eye observations are subject to the
full probable cause and warrant requirements. Second, some tech-
niques are so unexpected and intrusive that they too are subject to
202 See supra note 56.
203 In short, it is necessary to interpret the fourth amendment's regulation of police
conduct with an understanding of societal values concerning police behavior and indi-
vidual privacy. This is consistent with the view of most commentators, who favor fourth
amendment analysis based on "honored" expectations of privacy. See, e.g., I W. LAFAvE,
supra note 17, at 312 (job of court is to decide what sense of security is important in
society, to do that it must look to society's customs and values); Note, supra note 16, at
984 (supporting fourth amendment analysis based on property rights because this is
what society demands in the way of social protection); Note, Concept of Privacy, supra note
26, at 180 (finding that courts draw on the "customs and sensibilities of the populace" in
determining extent of privacy subject to fourth amendment protection); see also supra
note 44 (preference of most commentators for the societal norms approach to interpret-
ing the fourth amendment).
204 See supra note 46 and accompanying text.
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all fourth amendment requirements. Together, these norms pro-
vide minimum standards for permissible visual searches that serve
the purposes of the fourth amendment and permit effective law
enforcement.
IV. FOURTH AMENDMENT PROTECTIONS AND VISUAL SEARCHES
A. GENERAL NORMS
1. Legitimate Purpose
Courts attempting to apply fourth amendment principles to vis-
ual observations face a continuing dilemma: imposing all of the
fourth amendment's requirements may place an undue burden on
law enforcement, but declaring intrusive action a non-search usually
means that there will be no judicial scrutiny at all. The problem is
especially acute where an investigative intrusion is both relatively
inoffensive and the sort of preliminary action that commonly leads
to probable cause to conduct a physical search or arrest. To require
probable cause and a warrant before the police may observe may in
effect deny the police any use of this technique; to declare an obser-
vation a non-search is to invite abuse, a particularly severe problem
when modern technology is involved. In this common setting, it
seems logical to treat an observation as a search under the intrusion
paradigm and emphasize the reasonableness clause of the fourth
amendment.
205
Most observations belong in this category. In the absence of
particularly intrusive methods of surveillance, 20 6 an observation is a
very limited search. The object is to some extent already exposed to
the public, the invasion is remote, and only limited information is
garnered. Moreover, an observation often constitutes a useful and
discrete method of verifying a tip or otherwise checking suspicious
205 There is another source ofjudicial authority, due process under the fifth and four-
teenth amendments. See, e.g., Irvine v. California, 347 U.S. 128, 132-33 (1954)(deter-
mining whether due process bars use of evidence obtained in a particularly offensive
search because the fourth amendment's exclusionary rule had not yet been applied to
states); Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165, 166-72 (1952)(due process applied to bar use
of evidence resulting from forced vomitting by administration of an emetic). While due
process is "the least specific and most comprehensive protection of liberties," Rochin,
342 U.S. at 170, it is not an apt vehicle for judicial control of observations. Its history
suggests that it is best reserved for extreme cases that are not governed by any of the
more specific provisions of the bill of rights. While it could arguably be applied to regu-
late observations of particularly private objects and the use of extremely sophisticated
technology, see infra Part IV.B, it would be difficult to use due process as a vehicle for
imposing the general norms on less intrusive searches.




behavior in order to determine whether a more intrusive search
would be appropriate. 20 7 Imposing the warrant and probable cause
requirements would in essence move observations from the "pre-
liminary investigation" category into the "evidence collection" cate-
gory. Such a requirement would be both unnecessary and unwise.
Courts resistant to permitting warrantless searches often point
to the problem of arbitrary searches.208 Because fourth amendment
theory is no longer premised on the "all in or all out" model, how-
ever, arbitrary searches may be prohibited without imposing exces-
sive restrictions on preliminary investigative actions. The
reasonableness clause can serve the policies underlying the fourth
amendment if courts interpret it as imposing a strict requirement
that all law enforcement observations have a legitimate purpose.
The police should therefore be allowed to conduct visual searches
without a warrant or probable cause, but officers should be required
to justify their actions.
This would generally increase fourth amendment protections
beyond those provided by the incoherent principles discussed in
Part II.B. Most cases that now impose restrictions on observations
do so in settings that would be governed by the more restrictive
guidelines set forth in Part IV.B. In other settings most courts
either impose no requirements at all20 9 or root around without suc-
cess to divine an appropriate level of justification for a warrantless
observation.2
10
That appropriate level is "legitimate." While one line of cases
207 See, e.g., United States v. Lace, 669 F.2d 46, 48-51 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 459 U.S.
854 (1982)(observations led to search warrant); United States v. Taborda, 635 F.2d 131,
133 (2d Cir. 1980)(search warrant and arrest following observations); United States v.
Kim, 415 F. Supp. 1252, 1254 (D. Haw. 1976)(enhanced observations used to establish
probable cause for electronic surveillance). Visual surveillance of suspected criminals
has traditionally been one of the standard investigative techniques that Congress in-
tended to precede electronic surveillance whenever such techniques are feasible. 18
U.S.C. § 2518 (1)(c), (3)(c) (1982). See, e.g., United States v. Vasquez, 605 F.2d 1269,
1282 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 981 (1979)(physical surveillance properly preceded
electronic surveillance); United States v. Losing, 560 F.2d 906, 909-10 (8th Cir.), cert.
denied, 434 U.S. 969 (1977)(exhaustive physical surveillance among preliminary investi-
gative actions).
208 See, e.g., Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25, 27 (1949)(describing the focus of the
fourth amendment as protection from "arbitrary intrusion by the police"); People v.
Triggs, 8 Cal. 3d 884, 891, 894, 506 P.2d 232, 236, 238, 106 Cal. Rptr. 408, 412, 415
(1973)(concern about routine practice of restroom observation); People v. Agee, 200
Cal. Rptr. 827, 828 (Cal. Ct. App. 1984)(characterizing the state's argument as involving
an "unlimited right" of aerial surveillance).
209 The successful REOP and permissive approaches, see supra notes 92-100 and ac-
companying text, are examples.




suggests that probable cause but not a warrant is required, 211 a
more appropriate inquiry for fairly non-intrusive observations is
whether the officer has a reasonable justification for his or her ac-
tion. That justification-legitimacy-may concern any lawful police
function and is not limited to law enforcement.
The propriety of technological enhancement is self-evident for
legitimate non-law enforcement purposes. Remote cameras may be
used to safeguard public property or employees in dangerous ar-
eas;2 12 airplanes and helicopters may be used for commercial, scien-
tific, or agricultural purposes and to transport or rescue;2 13
flashlights may be used to preserve the safety of the officer or
others;214 binoculars and telescopes are used for many purposes
211 See, e.g., United States v. Moore, 562 F.2d 106, 111-13 (lst Cir. 1977), cert. denied,
435 U.S. 926 (1978)(requiring probable cause but not warrant for monitoring beeper on
motor vehicle); Texas v. Gonzales, 388 F.2d 145, 148 (5th Cir. 1968)(declaring that
visual intrusions are governed by the fourth amendment and are unlawful in absence of
probable cause); People v. Wright, 41 Ill. 2d 170, 175-76, 242 N.E.2d 180, 184 (1968),
cert. denied, 395 U.S. 933 (1969) (following Gonzales, upholding observation because prob-
able cause found). One commentator supports the view that probable cause should be
the standard: "It is the existence of probable cause that signals the point at which the
government's interest in law enforcement outweighs the threats posed to society by the
use of telescopes and binoculars to observe private activities." Note, supra note 82, at
395.
212 See, e.g., State v. Abislaiman, 437 So. 2d 181, 183 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1983), cert.
denied, 469 U.S. 833 (1984)(remote camera surveillance of hospital parking lot). Obser-
vations are often suited to the protection of people and property. See, e.g., People v.
Superior Court (Spielman), 102 Cal. App. 3d 342, 349, 162 Cal. Rptr. 295, 300 (1980)
(Grodin,J., concurring)(noting that officers may enter private property and make obser-
vations to protect or to secure property); State v. Jones, 33 Wash. App. 275, 276, 653
P.2d 1369, 1370 (1982)(officers watching for alcohol abuse during state fair). See also
infra note 296 and accompanying text (other purposes for visual surveillance).
213 See, e.g., Dow Chem. Co. v. United States, 476 U.S. 227, 231 (1986)(map-making);
People v. Agee, 200 Cal. Rptr. 827, 828, 837 (Cal. Ct. App. 1984)(disapproving investi-
gative surveillance but stressing that the case did not involve protection, rescue, exigent
circumstances, or efficient transportation of officers); State v. Stachler, 58 Haw. 412,
419, 570 P.2d 1323, 1328 (1977)(noting that the area was subject to military and crop-
dusting overflights).
214 See Marshall v. United States, 422 F.2d 185, 187-88 (5th Cir. 1970)(flashlight ob-
servation to determine whether operator of car was ill); Ensor v. State, 403 So. 2d 349,
351 (Fla. 1981)(standard police procedure requires officers to use flashlights to check
stopped vehicles for self-protection). Cf. State v. Schmidt, 359 So. 2d 133, 135-36 (La.
1978)(flashlight intrusion was unreasonable because safety justifications were not appli-
cable); People v. Smith, 42 N.Y.2d 961, 963-64, 367 N.E.2d 648, 649-50, 398 N.Y.S.2d
142, 143 (1977)(Jasen, J., dissenting)(flashlight observations are necessary for safety of
officer and public).
In Marshall, the court emphasized that the non-investigatory purpose rendered the
officer's action a non-search. Marshall, at 187-88. See supra note 151. This is simply
another way of looking at the same problem. One can treat such observations as permis-
sible under the fourth amendment because 1) there is a legitimate basis for the action, 2)
there is no search, or 3) the plain view doctrine permits the action. However structured,
the point is the same-no warrant or probable cause is necessary because there is a
[Vol. 80
VISUAL SEARCHES
other than criminal investigation. 21 5 No court suggests that such ac-
tions violate the fourth amendment; the legitimate purpose provides
full justification for the resulting intrusion. In fourth amendment
terms, the search is reasonable.
Law enforcement justifications are more troublesome. Still,
courts imposing any requirements in this setting tend to center on
"reasonable cause," which in application turns into a requirement
that the observation not be arbitrary. For example, if there is a rea-
son to believe that offenses might occur at a particular location, ob-
servations of that place may be appropriate. 21 6 It is similarly
reasonable for officers to make even enhanced observations when
their suspicions are reasonably aroused, whether through tips or
their own investigative actions. 217 Warrants are not required in
legitimate reason for the officer's action. See also I W. LAFAvE, supra note 17, at 335
(suggesting that the tendency of courts to characterize use of a flashlight as a non-search
is understandable because the action is "sympathetic" in most settings).
215 Unlike most of the other devices discussed in this Article, many private individuals
own and use binoculars. The fact that these devices may be provided to police officers
for law enforcement purposes does not mean that other legitimate uses are irrelevant.
Magnification devices are obviously useful in searches for lost persons and to identify
distant weather or dangerous conditions. These legitimate uses plainly differentiate bin-
oculars and telescopes from devices such as wiretapping equipment. In one of the
strongest anti-binocular decisions, People v. Arno, 90 Cal. App. 3d 505, 153 Cal. Rptr.
624 (1979), the court refused to decide whether an enhanced observation that intruded
on a REOP would be permitted in a case in which there was a "substantial risk to life,
person or property." Id. at 513, 153 Cal. Rptr. at 628. Another "device" commonly
owned by private persons is a dog, but few privately-owned dogs are capable of identify-
ing narcotics or other contraband. Trained dogs are, of course, useful for non-law en-
forcement duties such as search and rescue. See United States v. Solis, 536 F.2d 880, 882
(9th Cir. 1976).
216 See United States v. Gibson, 636 F.2d 761, 762 (D.C. Cir. 1980)(surveillance to
investigate public complaints of narcotics trafficking); Smayda v. United States, 352 F.2d
251, 252 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 981 (1966)(surveillance of public restroom ap-
parently used for unlawful homosexual conduct); United States v. Bifield, 498 F. Supp.
497, 499-500 (D. Conn. 1980)(observation of service station in response to claims that
weapons had been fired); State v. Irwin, 43 Wash. App. 553, 554-55, 718 P.2d 826, 829-
30 (1986)(observation from woods of area suspected of drug transactions).
217 See, e.g., United States v. Allen, 675 F.2d 1373, 1377, 1381 (9th Cir.), cert. denied,
454 U.S. 833 (1981), United States v. Bassford, 601 F. Supp. 1326, 1331 (D. Me. 1985),
aff'd, 812 F.2d 16 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 481 U.S. 1022 (1987) and United States v.
DeBacker, 493 F. Supp. 1078, 1081 (W.D. Mich. 1980)(all upholding aerial surveillance
in part because conducted in response to information received that officers would locate
evidence of drug trafficking). See also United States v. Bellina, 665 F.2d 1335, 1344-45
(4th Cir. 1982)(upholding observations into airplane, concluding that validity of action
turned on totality of facts, including agent's reasonable suspicions based on circum-
stances of the airplane's arrival at the airport); United States v. Christensen, 524 F.
Supp. 344, 345 (N.D. Ill. 1981)(noting investigative steps leading up to binocular-aided
surveillance of a counterfeiting operation); State v. Manly, 85 Wash. 2d 120, 120-21, 530
P.2d 306, 307-09, cert. denied, 423 U.S. 855 (1975)(officer observed marijuana, second
officer later confirmed suspicion using binoculars); State v. Grawien, 123 Wis. 2d 428,
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such cases; instead, observations that bear out suspicions provide
probable cause for arrests or more intrusive searches. Still, the key
question in deciding whether such observations are reasonable is
"[w]hether, prior to the use of [visual aids], authorities had reason
to believe that a crime had taken place or was taking place."
218
Two related lines of decisions support the legitimacy require-
ment. One line adopts the "challenging situation" doctrine. Ac-
cording to this theory, officers perceiving suspicious behavior may
take additional investigative steps as long as those steps constitute
only minor intrusions. The premise is that "[i]f policemen are to
serve any purpose of detecting and preventing crime by being out
on the streets at all, they must be able to take a closer look at chal-
lenging situations as they encounter them." 2 19 The confirmation
approach discussed in Part II.B.3 is an unarticulated version of the
same principle. An officer sees something suspicious in the normal
course of his or her duties, and then confirms the observation by
using a standard enhancement aid such as a pair of binoculars.
220
438 n.7, 367 N.W.2d 816, 820 n.7 (Wis. Ct. App. 1985)(anonymous letter does not sup-
ply probable cause but distinguishes observations from random surveillance).
218 People v. Ciochon, 23 Ill. App. 3d 363, 365, 319 N.E.2d 332, 334 (1974)(describ-
ing this as "of vital importance").
219 Dorsey v. United States, 372 F.2d 928, 931 (D.C. Cir. 1967). In Dorsey police of-
ficers approached and shined flashlights into a car containing persons they recognized
as having prior convictions for narcotics violations. Id. at 929. See also United States v.
Wright, 449 F.2d 1355, 1356-58 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 405 U.S. 947 (1971)(applying
the doctrine to officer using his flashlight to look into garage after noticing "tell-tale
sweepings of nuts and bolts in front" while investigating theft of car found stripped near
garage). Other cases use different terminology but uphold similarly reasonable investi-
gative actions. See, e.g., United States v. Bellina, 665 F.2d 1335, 1336-38 (4th Cir.
1981)(various suspicious circumstances justified agents in taking steps to examine air-
plane); United States v. Magana, 512 F.2d 1169, 1170-71 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S.
826 (1975)(officers entered driveway to provide protection during arrest); People v. Su-
perior Court (Spielman), 102 Cal. App. 3d 342, 344, 182 Cal. Rptr. 295, 296 (1980)(of-
ficers observed suspected burglars, began to follow, while on top of fence officer
observed marijuana processing in adjacent building); Newberry v. State, 421 So. 2d 546,
547-49 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1982)(use of nightscope not anticipated until targets contin-
ued actions after darkness); State v. Lee, 633 P.2d 48, 50-53 (Utah), cert. denied, 454 U.S.
1057 (1981)(officer observed person acting suspiciously, checked person's truck on two
occasions, learned of burglary in vicinity of items seen in truck, returned to observe
house and truck).
220 See Burkholder v. Superior Court, 96 Cal. App. 3d 421, 426, 158 Cal. Rptr. 86, 89
(1979) (aided observation approved because object was visible without binoculars, which
only provided additional detail); Bernstiel v. State, 416 So. 2d 827, 827-29 (Fla. Dist. Ct.
App. 1982)(upholding binocular-aided observations to confirm previous probable iden-
tification); People v. Ferguson, 47 Ill. App. 3d 654, 656-59, 365 N.E.2d 77, 78-80
(1977)(officer saw suspicious activity and then looked more closely with binoculars);
State v. Barr, 98 Nev. 428, 429, 651 P.2d 649, 650 (1982)(officer used binoculars to
confirm suspicions of use of slugs to cheat gambling devices). See also supra notes 157-59
(confirmation theories and cases).
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The unstated but invariable reason for making the confirming ob-
servation is that the officer perceived something that provided a le-
gitimate law enforcement reason for "taking a closer look" through
enhanced vision.
This suggests taking a second look at United States v. Whaley,
221
the Eleventh Circuit decision largely premised on the "successful"
REOP approach. The decision remains troubling because there was
an enhanced observation into a private house,222 but other aspects
of the court's reasoning are more understandable in view of the rel-
evance of a legitimate purpose. Whaley argued convincingly that
inadvertent observation by members of the public was unlikely
given the secluded nature of his property and the limited vantage
points. The court nevertheless concluded that he had no reasonable
expectation of privacy, in part because his suspicious activity "en-
hanced the likelihood of discovery." 223 This analysis is awkward
and self-defeating under the REOP inquiry,224 but makes sense
under a "legitimate observation" rubric. Whaley's suspicious public
behavior could not affect whether he had a REOP in his secluded
residence, but it provided ample justification for the agents crossing
neighboring property, climbing down the steep embankment to the
canal, and watching his behavior closely.
225
As in Whaley, there is nothing to be gained from trying to locate
"reasonable cause" precisely on the spectrum between no cause and
probable cause, for the point is not that it represents any particular
quantum of evidentiary justification. Instead, the public demands
that police officers act in a good faith attempt to perform legitimate
public functions. 226 The requirement, applicable to all observa-
221 779 F.2d 585 (11 th Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 1055 (1987). For discussion of
Whaley, see supra text accompanying notes 94-99.
222 See supra text accompanying notes 97-99. It would therefore also have to satisfy
the norm applicable to observations of specially protected objects.
223 Whaley, 779 F.2d at 591.
224 See supra note 99.
225 Whaley, 779 F.2d at 587-88.
226 This would include the public safety and general welfare functions as well as law
enforcement. Perhaps the easiest way to describe the standard is to state what police
officers may not do-make observations for arbitrary or corrupt reasons. This is what
society expects of all police actions, but where those actions are subject to the fourth
amendment, this requirement is of constitutional dimension. The dissenting judge in
People v. Arno, 90 Cal. App. 3d 505, 153 Cal. Rptr. 624 (1979), argued in favor of the
binocular-aided observations of the interior of a business office as follows: "This is not a
case of a 'peeping Tom' police officer aimlessly surveying a 'whole building' with the aid
of binoculars just for kicks." Id. at 515, 153 Cal. Rptr. at 629-30 (Hanson, P.J., dissent-
ing). The upshot of his analysis was that the observation was conducted in a reasonable
fashion for a legitimate law enforcement purpose. This would be permitted under the
model proposed in this Article.
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tions, is that the observer have and articulate a rational reason for
making the observation.227
The court would presumably require the officer to articulate the
reason only after the fact, probably most often in affidavits and com-
plaints in support of searches and arrests. A requirement that of-
ficers file pre-observation justifications in court seems both awkward
and unnecessary, at least for most simple observations. 228 Police of-
ficers and others who find even the post-observation requirement
burdensome should note that legislation can be more demanding.
The Electronic Communications Privacy Act of 1986229 regulates
law enforcement use of pen registers notwithstanding the Supreme
Court's holding in Smith v. Maryland230 that such use is outside the
scope of the fourth amendment. 23 1 The Act requires that federal
and state agents obtain court orders prior to installing such devices;
the primary requirement for such an order is that the applicant cer-
tify "that the information likely to be obtained is relevant to an
ongoing criminal investigation being conducted by [the] agency." 232
227 Of course, police officers may lie to cover arbitrary or corrupt reasons for observa-
tions. Still, a warrant requirement would not truly avoid this problem, as a person will-
ing to lie under oath after the fact would presumably be willing to lie under oath before
the fact as well. All in all, there seems to be no reason to assume that deceit would be
more likely under this model than under the existing system of heavy reliance on war-
rantless searches. There is no justification for assuming bad faith; where it is estab-
lished, however, the observation would violate the fourth amendment and be subject to
the exclusionary rule.
By allowing any legitimate police purpose to constitute a sufficent basis for making
the observation, this standard might encourage police officers to testify truthfully con-
cerning their actions rather than to attempt to fashion probable cause out of a series of
marginally suspicious circumstances. The courts could develop principles through this
method that would limit application of this norm if the societal reaction is that a particu-
lar reason is not a sufficient justification for an observation.
228 The California Supreme Court relied on such notions in People v. Mayoff, 42 Cal.
3d 1302, 729 P.2d 166, 233 Cal. Rptr. 2 (1986). The defendant argued that random
aerial observations of rural areas for evidence of marijuana farming should be subject to
a warrant requirement analogous to that applicable to administrative searches. Id. at
1318 n.8, 729 P.2d at 175 n.8, 233 Cal. Rptr. at 11 n.8. The court found the concept
unduly cumbersome and expressed concerns that a magistrate would not be in a good
position to evaluate the propriety of the requested action. Id. The court's analysis
seems to be that unless a probable cause standard is applicable, a warrant process or
other judicial involvement at the investigatory stage would not be an apt vehicle to en-
force the fourth amendment. Unless and until it is shown that post-observation explana-
tions of legitimacy result in abuses, courts should avoid earlier involvement and stay out
of ongoing investigations. Presumably, as in Mayoff, later judicial review would be avail-
able to enforce the reasonableness requirement.
229 Pub. L. No. 99-508, 100 Stat. 1848 (1986).
230 442 U.S. 735 (1979).
231 Id. at 739-46. For further discussion of Smith, see supra notes 61-62 and accompa-
nying text.
232 The provision also applies to trap and trace devices. Section 3121 contains a pro-
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A similar form of legislative regulation of the general use of
enhancement devices can probably be avoided if police agencies and
courts honor the reasonableness mandate of the fourth amendment
and insist that visual searches take place only for legitimate pur-
poses. This represents a common sense balance between law en-
forcement and privacy interests in most cases. 233 More importantly,
it avoids the most unfortunate aspect of exempting observations
from fourth amendment control-the inability of the courts to curb
arbitrary police actions. The legitimacy norm is thus necessary to
anchor all observations to the reasonableness requirement of the
fourth amendment.
2. Reasonable Implementation
Perhaps the most important limitation on law enforcement ob-
servations is that officers must conduct them in a reasonable fash-
ion. As with the legitimacy requirement, the reasonableness norm
applies to all observations, even naked-eye observations of very
public locations.23 4 Warrants serve to control the implementation
of searches with respect to places law enforcement personnel will
search, items to be seized, and permissible times. 235 Because of-
hibition on law enforcement use of pen registers and trap and trace devices except
under court order. 18 U.S.C. § 3121 (Supp. IV 1986). Other provisions set out require-
ments governing the content and implementation of such orders, congressional report-
ing requirements, and definitions. 18 U.S.C. §§ 3123-26 (Supp. IV 1986). The impact
of these provisions is that law enforcement's assertion of unrestricted authority to use
pen registers and judicial abdication of control under the fourth amendment resulted in
legislative regulation beyond constitutional requirements.
233 This seems to be the analysis in Mayoff. Citing the reasonableness clause of the
fourth amendment and Supreme Court "reasonableness" precedents, the Court bal-
anced the need for aerial surveillance against the limited intrusion of overflights. Mayoff,
42 Cal. 3d at 1317-18, 729 P.2d at 174-76, 233 Cal. Rptr. at 10-11. Despite a strident
dissent that the court was approving general searches, id. at 1326-32, 729 P.2d at 182-
86, 233 Cal. Rptr. at 14-21 (Bird, CJ., dissenting), and the fact that the decision permit-
ted observations into the curtilage that it had previously held unlawful, see People v.
Cook, 41 Cal. 3d 373, 710 P.2d 299, 221 Cal. Rptr. 499 (1985), the court essentially held
that the legitimate purpose of locating marijuana farms in open fields outweighed the
limited intrusion of aerial observation and photography. Mayoff, 42 Cal. 3d at 1317-18,
729 P.2d at 174-76, 233 Cal. Rptr. at 10-11.
234 This principle applies to all searches and seizures. See, e.g., Payton v. New York,
445 U.S. 573, 616-17 (1980)(White, J., dissenting)(discussing importance of "reason-
able implementation" rules to assure that arrest in home does not violate fourth amend-
ment); Dalia v. United States, 441 U.S. 238, 258 (1979)(manner of executing search is
subject to judicial evaluation of reasonableness); Irvine v. California, 347 U.S. 128, 133
(1954)(analyzing due process requirements in search setting). See generally 2 W. LAFAvE,
supra note 17, at 206-36 1; Dix, Means of Executing Searches and Seizures as Fourth Amendment
Issues, 67 MINN. L. REv. 89 (1982).
235 The "particular place" and "particular items" requirements serve to limit police
discretion and to prevent unjustifiable and erroneous intrusions. See Marron v. United
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ficers will continue to conduct most observations without warrants,
however, the standards developed to limit the implementation of
observations have a heightened importance. If effective rules can be
developed, visual searches should not substantially decrease per-
sonal privacy; if such rules cannot be developed, a strict warrant re-
quirement that would seriously limit legitimate police observations
may be the only means of preventing unreasonable intrusions.
One unfortunate result of the expectations paradigm is that it
provides no basis for judicial regulation of police intrusions that fall
short of invading a REOP. In theory, unless an observation invades
a constitutionally protected privacy interest, there is no search and
no requirement that the police act in a reasonable fashion. 23 6 Many
courts implicitly recognize this dilemma and attempt to avoid it by
twisting theory to permit review of observations on some basis even
if no Katz search is involved. Perhaps the most common way of do-
ing this is to address two separate issues-whether there was a
search and whether it was reasonable-even if the apparent conclu-
States, 275 U.S. 192, 193-96 (1927)(particularity requirement deters general searches);
Steele v. United States, 267 U.S. 498, 503 (1925) (particular description requirement met
where executing officers could readily determine the intended location). Time of execu-
tion rules are usually imposed by statute or rule. See, e.g., FED. R. CRIM. P. 41 (c)(l)
("The warrant shall be served in the daytime, unless the issuing authority, by appropri-
ate provision in the warrant and for reasonable cause shown, authorizes its execution at
times other than daylight."). Such provisions protect privacy by minimizing the intru-
sion except in exigent circumstances. See Gooding v. United States, 416 U.S. 430, 462
(1974) (Marshall, J., dissenting) ("In my view there is no expectation of privacy more rea-
sonable than the right to expect that we will be let alone in the privacy of our homes
during the night."). See also O'Brien, supra note 26, at 710 (suggesting that Justice
Harlan's opinion in Katz supports the notion of "time" as well as "place" being critical
to determining the reasonableness of privacy expectations). Related issues concern mat-
ters such as the requirement that executing officers announce their identity and pur-
pose, see Sabbath v. United States, 391 U.S. 585, 587-91 (1968)(suppressing evidence
resulting from search begun without such announcement), and the extent of force per-
mitted in making entry. See Gates v. Langford, 43 Cal. 3d 21, 28-32, 729 P.2d 822, 827-
32, 233 Cal. Rptr. 367, 389-95, cert. denied, 108 S. Ct. 87-88 (1987)(concluding that
motorized battering ram may not be used without both judicial authorization and exi-
gent circumstances).
236 A classic example of this undesirable side effect of REOP analysis is Conrad v.
State, 63 Wis. 2d 616, 218 N.W.2d 252 (1974). A sheriff visited and closely examined
Conrad's farm several times because he suspected Conrad of murdering his wife. Id. at
620, 218 N.W.2d at 254. He brought in a backhoe and scraper, moved some doghouses
and a pile of discarded siding, and then dug numerous holes on the property. Id. The
court concluded that Katz rendered this conduct outside the scope of the fourth amend-
ment. Conrad, 63 Wis. 2d at 625-34, 218 N.W.2d at 257-61. The court recognized that
there had been "an outrageous trespass," id. at 624, 218 N.W.2d at 256, and disap-
proved "such random digging of another's property," id. at 633 n.1, 218 N.W.2d at 261
n. 1, but its crabbed and awkward interpretation of "search" under the expectations par-




sion of the first inquiry is that there was no search.23 7 Another com-
mon way around the problem is to treat Katz's apparent insistence
on defining search with respect to expectations of privacy as only
one method and to focus instead in appropriate cases on the pur-
pose and nature of the observation in question.238 Courts occasion-
ally indicate a concern about reasonableness through the back door
by analyzing a "seizure." This occurs, for example, where the ob-
servation limits the target's freedom in some respect. In such set-
tings, the court may discuss the problem in terms of whether there
was a "search or seizure," but the analysis seems to focus on
whether the police conducted themselves in a generally reasonable
fashion.23
9
237 There are various ways of conducting this dual analysis. In State v. Abislaiman,
437 So. 2d 181 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1983), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 833 (1984), the court
declined to decide whether the use of a remote camera was a search but then upheld its
use on the ground that there was no REOP, largely because the use of the camera
seemed reasonable under the circumstances. Id. at 183. See also United States v. Coplen,
541 F.2d 211, 214-15 (9th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1073 (1977)(concluding that
the observation was not a search but then going on to determine.whether the target had
a REOP). In State v. Rogers, 100 N.M. 577, 673 P.2d 142 (N.M. Ct. App. 1983), the
court took a different tack. It first concluded that there was no REOP from aerial obser-
vation. Id. at 518, 673 P.2d at 143. It then analyzed the reasonableness of the observa-
tion under the heading "Form and Degree of Police Surveillance." Id. See also United
States v. DeBacker, 493 F. Supp. 1078, 1081 (W.D. Mich. 1980)(suggesting that exist-
ence of a REOP from aerial surveillance is in part dependent on the manner in which it
was conducted).
238 See supra text accompanying notes 80-83. Cf. State v. Holt, 291 Or. 343, 351-52,
630 P.2d 854, 858-59 (1981); id. at 353-54, 630 P.2d at 860-61 (Linde, J., concur-
ring)(both recognizing that the absence of an expectation of privacy should not immu-
nize the observation from reasonableness analysis and suggesting that it would review
the legality of police methods in other settings).
This flexible approach to defining a search allows courts to do two things. First, as
discussed above, it provides a theoretical basis for requiring reasonableness of those
intrusive actions that do not invade a REOP. Second, it allows courts to judge reasona-
bleness on the basis of the most relevant factors. Marshall v. United States, 422 F.2d
185 (5th Cir. 1970), suggests the interplay of these elements. For a discussion of Mar-
shall, see supra notes 151, 185-87. The officer used his flashlight to examine the interior
of a car with its lights on in response to civilian concerns that the driver was ill. Marshall,
422 F.2d at 187. The purpose was not to probe for evidence and for that reason the
court concluded it was not a search. Id. at 189. Of greater importance, however, his
actions constituted a reasonable implementation of his actual legitimate purpose. Had
he acted in an unreasonable fashion under the circumstances, such as by opening the
trunk or by studying the interior with intensity, the intrusion would have been an unlaw-
ful search under the rationale of the court and the test proposed in this Article.
239 This is essentially the Court's logic in United States v. Place, 462 U.S. 696 (1983).
It is permissible for law enforcement agents to subject luggage to inspection by a narcot-
ics-sniffing dog, but if this unreasonably delays the target's access to his or her luggage,
it constitutes a seizure subject to the warrant requirement. See supra note 65. Analysis
that differs in form but not in substance can be found in United States v. Kenaan, 496
F.2d 181 (1st Cir. 1974) and Raettig v. State, 406 So. 2d 1273 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1981).
In Raellig, officers lawfully detained a truck and its driver for an administrative purpose,
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Another method, perhaps available only to the Supreme Court
and state courts of last resort, is to ignore legal doctrine and declare
unreasonable observations unlawful even where no search seems to
have occurred. McDonald v. United States240 is a case in which the
Supreme Court ignored doctrine. A police officer entered a room-
ing house by climbing into the owner's window and then admitted
other officers; they searched ground floor rooms and then discov-
ered the target's locked bedroom on the second floor; an officer
stood on a chair, looked through the transom, and observed evi-
dence of illegal gambling.24 t The majority's analysis focused on the
fact that no exception to the warrant requirement was applicable but
never explained what it viewed as the search of McDonald or his
property. 242 After all, under the then prevailing entry paradigm,
McDonald was not the victim of a search because the officers had
not entered onto his property. Justice Jackson's concurrence sup-
plied that explanation through its emphasis on the unreasonable-
ness of the intrusion. 243 The police committed an unlawful entry of
the rooming house, acted in an abusive fashion, and frightened the
owner. This impermissible behavior eviscerated the legality of the
otherwise unobjectionable observations. 244 In more general terms
that transcend the unusual facts of McDonald, he concluded that this
"method of law enforcement displays a shocking lack of all sense of
406 So. 2d at 1275, but violated the fourth amendment when they held the defendant
longer than was necessary and spent the time conducting a minute examination of the
truck with a flashlight. Raettig, 406 So. 2d at 1274-76. In Kenaan, the action was quicker
but no more reasonable. While conducting an apparently lawful search for cocaine that
had been dusted with fluorescent powder, agents forced the target to allow his hands to
be scanned by an ultraviolet lamp. Kenaan, 496 F.2d at 182. This became "in effect, a
personal search unauthorized by the warrant to search the premises." Id. The court
could just as easily have deemed it an unreasonable observation.
240 335 U.S. 451 (1948).
241 Id. at 452-53.
242 Id. at 454-56. The Court's opinion was not responsive to the government's argu-
ment that there had been no search under the logic of the existing case law. Instead it
stated: "We do not stop to examine that syllogism for flaws. Asssuming its correctness,
we reject the result." Id. at 454. McDonald is Professor Amsterdam's primary example of
a case in which the Supreme Court twisted fourth amendment doctrine to assure judicial
control of an unreasonable police intrusion. Amsterdam, supra note 2, at 388-89.
243 McDonald, 335 U.S. at 459-61 (Jackson, J., concurring).
244 Id. at 457-59. Justice Jackson's analysis is largely consistent with that of the court
in United States v. Carriger, 541 F.2d 545 (6th Cir. 1976). He specifically noted that the
observation would have been lawful if the police had been admitted to the building with-
out a breach of the peace. McDonald, 335 U.S. at 458 (Jackson, J., concurring). Even
today, prevailing REOP theories would not generally extend to prohibit the officers en-
tering areas other than the target's room. See supra Part II.B.2. Moreover, the use of the
chair and transom would seem to be consistent with the "crane the neck" principle, see





Police insensitivity to the time and duration of their observa-
tions exhibits similar overreaching. 246 Physical location may also be
pertinent. A number of courts have held that certain actions and
observations in open fields were unlawful at least in part because
they occurred after agents acted unreasonably by crossing fenced or
posted private property.247 Even after Oliver v. United States,248
courts may deem certain actions outside the curtilage unreasonable,
if only because the curtilage/open fields distinction should not be as
significant for enhanced observations as it is for physical inva-
sions.249 These various theories suggest that courts recognize the
245 McDonald, 335 U.S. at 459.
246 Commonwealth v. Williams, 494 Pa. 496, 431 A.2d 964 (1981), is a particularly
good example. Although it was unnecessary to its decision, the court indicated that it
was deeply troubled by the use of a startron. Id. at 500, 431 A.2d at 966. The court
concluded that there had been an undue invasion of privacy, emphasizing that the device
was used for nine days and observed private sexual conduct on several occasions. Id.
Time, duration, and the nature of the object all relate to the reasonableness of the police
action. Time and duration are not neatly categorized, however, and cannot serve as a
part of a particularized bright line rule. The nature of the object is more readily catego-
rized for this purpose. See infra Part IV.B. 1.
Smayda v. United States, 352 F.2d 251 (9th Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 981
(1966), suggests an appropriate role for time considerations. The court upheld observa-
tions into a public restroom but imposed two important limitations. It required reason-
able cause to believe that the restroom had been used unlawfully and insisted that
observations be limited "to the times when such crimes are most likely to occur." Id. at
257. Such limitations minimize privacy invasions.
247 See, e.g., United States ex rel. Gedko v. Heer, 406 F. Supp. 609, 610, 614-15 (W.D.
Wis. 1975)(concluding that Katz abolished open fields/curtilage distinction and relying
on the fact that agents made an unconsented entry onto target's property and climbed
fences within it), vacated, 588 F.2d 840 (7th Cir. 1978); State v. Brady, 406 So. 2d 1093,
1094-98 (Fla. 1980)(officers entered and crossed several fences, forcing entry through
gates), vacated, 467 U.S. 1201 (1984). See also United States v. DeBacker, 493 F. Supp.
1078, 1081 (W.D. Mich. 1980)(concluding that "Katz compels a more sensitive reading
of the Fourth Amendment" than simple application of open fields doctrine); State v.
Kender, 60 Haw. 301, 304, 588 P.2d 447, 449 (1978)(refusing to accept mechanical ap-
plication of curtilage doctrine); State v. Lee, 633 P.2d 48, 55 (Utah), cert. denied, 454 U.S.
1057 (1981)(Maughan, CJ., dissenting)(curtilage doctrine no longer dictates the per-
missible extent of law enforcement intrusions). See also supra note 57 (criticisms of the
open fields doctrine).
248 466 U.S. 170 (1984). For further discussion of Oliver, see supra note 58 and accom-
panying text.
249 See Commonwealth v. Lemanski, 365 Pa. Super. 332, 347, 529 A.2d 1085, 1092
(1987)("A police officer parting shrubbery and peering through binoculars into one's
home is certainly an intrusion which infringes upon the values protected by the Fourth
Amendment."). While Lemanski can be read as a simple "house" case, it is more than
that in reality. The court emphasized the unreasonableness of entering warrantless onto
secluded property, hiding in bushes, and creeping over the property to obtain a vantage
point for making a binocular-aided observation. Id. at 349-50; 529 A.2d at 1093. In
Wheeler v. State, 659 S.W.2d 381 (Tex. Crim. App. 1983), the court did not assume that
Katz ended the open fields doctrine, but instead noted that agents entered posted and
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importance of the reasonableness requirement and are capable of
finding ways to implement it in appropriate circumstances.
The principles that courts should apply in such cases can be
drawn from aerial observations and paramilitary operations, two set-
tings in which unreasonably intrusive conduct is likely to occur.
Courts have routinely evaluated the reasonableness of aerial surveil-
lance and have developed a number of helpful guidelines. Paramili-
tary operations, on the other hand, have largely escaped
constitutional regulation despite the fact that they often involve sub-
stantial and not entirely constructive invasions.
Balancing was the preferred method of evaluating the reasona-
bleness of aerial observations before the Supreme Court's consider-
ation of aerial surveillance.2 50 It was fairly well established that
whether or not aerial surveillance constituted a search, it was allowa-
ble without a warrant if the reviewing court concluded that officials
had conducted the surveillance in a reasonable fashion. This re-
quired consideration of factors such as the height of the aircraft, the
duration of the surveillance, the use of additional enhancement
techniques, the nature and size of the object, the frequency of over-
flights in the area, and any resulting disruption. 25' While this in-
quiry was often used in an attempt to define the REOP, it was
sometimes and more appropriately conducted separately. That is,
after the court determined that the fourth amendment was applica-
ble, it then determined whether there was an unreasonable govern-
mental intrusion.252 This second determination resulted in fairly
fenced property, made a number of attempts to observe the interior of a greenhouse
through aerial surveillance and a nightscope, and finally saw into a louvered opening in
the building only with the aid of binoculars. Wheeler, 659 S.W.2d at 382, 390. Using
"search" rather than "reasonableness" analysis, the court concluded that the action was
unlawful based on "the technology employed, its purpose, together with the concerted
effort to view what had tenaciously been protected as private." Id. at 390. "Concerted
effort" seems to be the court's code for a "generally unreasonable effort." Numerous
cases invalidate observations for similar reasons. See, e.g., Burkholder v. Superior Court,
96 Cal. App. 3d 421, 427-28, 158 Cal. Rptr. 86, 89-91 (1979)(entry onto locked and
restricted private property to locate marijuana hidden from ground level observation);
State v. Tarantino, 83 N.C. App. 473, 476-77, 350 S.E.2d 864, 867 (1986)(discovering
and looking through gap in building's siding with aid of flashlight).
250 See supra text accompanying notes 68-74.
251 See supra note 166. See also Note, supra note 57, at 747 (discussing various factors
pertinent to aerial surveillance).
252 See, e.g., People v. Mayoff, 42 Cal. 3d 1302, 1310, 729 P.2d 166, 170, 233 Cal. Rptr.
2, 6 (1986)("The... issues.., are whether defendant's wishes [for privacy] were objec-
tively reasonable and, if so, whether the warrantless aerial observation invaded his ex-
pectations unreasonably."); People v. Sneed, 32 Cal. App. 3d 535, 540, 108 Cal. Rptr.
146, 149 (1973)(same two-part test); State v. Havlat, 222 Neb. 554, 571, 385 N.W.2d
436, 446 (1986)(Shanahan, J., dissenting)(characterizing second part ofJustice Harlan's
Katz test as: "Has such expectation of privacy been violated by unreasonable govern-
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consistent principles governing the conduct of aerial surveillance.
Lawful observation was generally not limited to cdsual or otherwise
inadvertent sightings and there was no prohibition of U-turns or
closer looks,253 but there was general agreement that aircraft must
maintain lawful heights, avoid frightening and disruptive practices,
and respect privacy to the extent that this is feasible from the air.254
Most of the problems were encountered when law enforcement
officials used helicopters for surveillance. The unique positive capa-
bilities of helicopters for law enforcement and other legitimate pur-
poses are accompanied by an equally unique capacity for disruption.
People v. Sneed 255 exemplifies the negative possibilities. A deputy
sheriff responded to a telephone tip by flying in a helicopter "back
and forth across ... [a] twenty acre ranch... hover[ing] as low as 20
to 25 feet above the corral" until two marijuana plants were finally
spotted.256 The court had no difficulty concluding that this action
was patently unreasonable.257
mental intrusion?"). Cf. State v. Rogers, 100 N.M. 517, 518-19, 673 P.2d 142, 143 (N.M.
Ct. App. 1983)(considering reasonableness despite concluding that there was no justifi-
able expectation of privacy).
253 The existence of a particularized suspicion is often treated as a factor in support of
an observation. See supra note 217. Quite a few decisions approve of multiple observa-
tions. In Rogers, for example, the court noted that the pilot made three passes and low-
ered the helicopter somewhat while over a field. Rogers, 100 N.M at 519, 673 P.2d at
144. See also United States v. Broadhurst, 805 F.2d 849, 850 (9th Cir. 1980)(repeated
circling by airplane); United States v. Allen, 675 F.2d 1373, 1377-78 (9th Cir. 1980), cert.
denied, 454 U.S. 833 (1981)(two helicopter overflights); United States v. Bassford, 601 F.
Supp. 1324, 1326-27 (D. Me. 1985), aft'd, 812 F.2d 16 (Ist Cir.), cert. denied, 481 U.S.
1022 (1987)(at least three passes over two days).
254 See, e.g., Giancola v. West Virginia Dept. of Pub. Safety, 830 F.2d 547, 550-51 (4th
Cir. 1987)(using various factors, emphasizing whether the methods were "unreasonably
intrusive"); Bassford, 601 F. Supp. at 1331 (characterizing the surveillance as brief); Peo-
ple v. Romo, 198 Cal. App. 3d 581, 587, 243 Cal. Rptr. 801, 804 (1988)(relying on
compliance with helicopter flight regulations); Mayoff, 42 Cal. 3d at 1316 n.6, 729 P.2d
at 174 n.6, 233 Cal. Rptr. at 10 n.6 (1986)(requiring that the aircraft must maintain a
vertical distance sufficient to obscure the details of human activity below); Rogers, 100
N.M. at 519, 673 P.2d at 143-44 (suggesting the existence of height limitations in its list
of relevant factors and analysis of conflicting testimony on altitude).
255 32 Cal. App. 3d 535, 108 Cal. Rptr. 146 (1973).
256 Id. at 540, 108 Cal. Rptr. at 149.
257 Id. at 542-43, 108 Cal. Rptr. at 151. The court held: "[W]e have concluded that
[the defendant had] a reasonable expectation of privacy from noisy police observation
by helicopter from the air at 20 to 25 feet and that such an invasion was an unreasonable
governmental intrusion into the serenity and privacy of his backyard." Id. The fact that
the low altitude apparently constituted a violation of state and federal law was pertinent
but unnecessary to the court's holding. Id. at 542 & n.1, 108 Cal. Rptr. at 151 & n.1. See
also State v. Stachler, 58 Haw. 412, 418-19, 570 P.2d 1323, 1328 (1977)(if helicopter too
low, or in violation of flight regulations, or engages in harassing or prolonged observa-
tion, court might disapprove surveillance); Commonwealth v. Oglialoro, 377 Pa. Super.
317, 547 A.2d 387, 389-91 (1988) (invalidating helicopter surveillance that hovered at 50
feet above ground level); 1 W. LAFAVE, supra note 17, at 419-20 (discussing Sneed and
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The Supreme Court's 1986 decisions did not eliminate this line
of analysis; at most those decisions assumed that such problems are
not common in airplane overflights. 258 Even its recent plurality de-
cision to uphold a helicopter surveillance emphasized that the heli-
copter remained at a lawful altitude, observed no matters entitled to
privacy, and created no undue disturbance. 259 In a curious way,
therefore, the Supreme Court's strong if closely divided endorse-
ment of aerial surveillance generally may work to turn judicial atten-
tion to the more pertinent issue-the reasonableness of each aerial
observation. 260 The courts could have more appropriately decided
People v. Superior Court (Stroud), 37 Cal. App. 3d 386, 112 Cal. Rptr. 764 (1974)). See
also Comment, supra note 29, at 153 (noting that helicopter observations arguably invade
constitutionally protected interests as a result of noise, light "and perhaps mere knowl-
edge" of private matters).
More extreme practices are detailed in National Org. for Reform of Marijuana Laws
(NORML) v. Mullen, 608 F. Supp. 945 (N.D. Cal. 1985). The court found that hehcop-
ter use in a marijuana eradication program included repeated instances of hovering,
peering into homes, and terrorizing of residents. Id. at 949, 955-59. It accordingly im-
posed stringent requirements on the use of helicopters in the campaign, essentially lim-
iting helicopter observations to reasonable altitudes over open fields and restricting
transportation duties to specified routes. Id. at 965-66. The court of appeals remanded
the case to reconsider portions of the injunction in light of the Supreme Court's 1986
decisions in this area. National Org. for Reform of Marijuana Laws (NORML) v. Mullen,
796 F.2d 276 (9th Cir. 1986).
258 Dow Chem. Co. v. United States, 476 U.S. 227 (1986); California v. Ciraolo, 476
U.S. 207 (1986). After those decisions, courts felt free to determine whether the partic-
ular aerial surveillance was reasonable. See, e.g., Giancola v. West Virginia Dept. of Pub.
Safety, 830 F.2d 547, 550-52 (4th Cir. 1987)(evaluating intrusiveness of helicopter sur-
veillance); United States v. Broadhurst, 805 F.2d 849, 854-56 (9th Cir. 1986)(upholding
observation because it was unenhanced and from public airspace; noting also that area
was near airport and that no abuses took place); People v. Romo, 198 Cal. App. 3d 581,
587-88, 243 Cal. Rptr. 801, 805 (1988)(evaluating helicopter observation in terms of
altitude, use of electronic aids, and intrusiveness of manner); People v. Sabo, 185 Cal.
App. 3d 845, 849-54, 230 Cal. Rptr. 170, 174-76 (1986) (invalidating helicopter observa-
tions from non-navigable airspace), cert. denied, 481 U.S. 1058, 1058-59 (1988)(White, J.,
dissenting)(Justice White dissented from cert. denial, but recognized that unduly intrusive
observation may be unlawful.). But see People v. Reynolds, 71 N.Y.2d 552, 555-57, 523
N.E.2d 291, 293-94, 528 N.Y.S.2d 15, 16-18 (1988)(seeming to look only to open nature
of land); State v. Vogel, 428 N.W.2d 272, 274-75 (S.D. 1988)(upholding aerial observa-
tion, looking only to altitude).
259 Florida v. Riley, 109 S. Ct. 693, 697 (1989).
260 There are various sources of standards and methods of enforcement. As noted
above, numerous cases have found federal constitutional standards of reasonableness
whether or not there was a reasonable expectation of privacy. Moreover, Sneed,
Broadhurst, Stachler, Sabo, NORML, Oglialoro, Vogel, and Romo relied on statutory and regu-
latory flight restrictions. See supra notes 257-58. Mayoffanalyzed the California Consti-
tution as well as federal constitutional standards. Mayoff, 42 Cal. 3d at 1312, 729 P.2d at
171, 233 Cal Rptr. at 5-7. See also People v. Cook, 41 Cal. 3d 373, 385, 710 P.2d 299,
307-08, 221 Cal. Rptr. 499, 504-07 (1986)(relying on California Constitution to invali-
date aerial surveillance into curtilage). Mayoffmakes two other important points. First,
the court encouraged the legislature and law enforcement agencies to adopt clear and
publicly known standards for aerial surveillance. Mayoff, 42 Cal. 3d at 1319, 729 P.2d at
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these cases by holding that the surveillance in each case constituted
a search but that it was conducted for a legitimate reason and in a
reasonable fashion. Only this approach provides doctrinal support
for invalidating abusive or otherwise unreasonable aerial surveil-
lance of areas or activities that do not fit into the Katz REOP.
Even if the reality of judicial review of aerial observation ren-
ders the theory behind the review somewhat academic, there is no
judicial history of resolving similar problems associated with
paramilitary operations. Like helicopter surveillances, paramilitary
operations often "hover" just outside the curtilage and may involve
extraordinarily intrusive behavior. Nevertheless, United States v.
Lace261 suggests that courts are unwilling to place meaningful limita-
tions on such operations other than to exclude enhanced observa-
tions into houses. Yet, Lace involved a large group of officers
engaged in a long-term, around the clock, surreptitious presence on
private property, using a variety of technological devices and mili-
tary techniques to conduct surveillance and to camouflage their ac-
tivities. 262 While the officers had a legitimate reason for making
their observations, did not profit from enhanced observations into
176, 233 Cal. Rptr. at 12. See also United States v. Kim, 415 F. Supp. 1252, 1257 (D.
Haw. 1977)(calling for adoption of standards to govern warrants for visual searches);
People v. Teicher, 52 N.Y.2d 638, 656, 422 N.E.2d 506, 515, 439 N.Y.S.2d 846, 855
(1981)(recommending statuory regulation of video electronic surveillance); State v.
Holt, 291 Or. 343, 352 n.2, 630 P.2d 854, 859 n.2 (1981)(recommending adoption of
legislative rules govering restroom observations); Amsterdam, supra note 2, at 422-23
(proposing rulemaking requirements for defining permissible police observations and
other limited searches). Second, the court noted that civil injunction actions would be
an appropriate vehicle for enforcing reasonableness requirements on random aerial sur-
veillance, which courts can otherwise review only after the fact in suppression hearings.
Mayoff, 42 Cal. 3d at 1318 & n.9, 729 P.2d at 176 & n.9, 233 Cal. Rptr. at 11-12 & n.9.
See Giancola, 830 F.2d at 548 (action for damages and injunction against helicopter sur-
veillance); NORML, 608 F. Supp. at 948 (class action injunction proceeding).
261 502 F. Supp. 1021 (D. Vt. 1980), aft'd, 669 F.2d 46 (2d Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 459
U.S. 854 (1982). For facts of Lace, see supra text accompanying notes 123-24.
262 Judge Newman's concurrence begins as follows:
The facts of this case give new meaning to the term "invasion" of privacy. Dressed
in military camouflage uniforms, 24 to 30 officers of the Vermont State Police
moved onto a 70-acre tract of private property in Sharon, Vermont, leased by one
of the appellants as his residence, and, working in eight-hour shifts, maintained 24-
hour surveillance of the appellants for three weeks. Observations were made of the
appellants while inside and outside a house on the property. The observations were
so continuous as to include viewings of some of the appellants using a toilet.
Among the devices used to enhance the officers' observations were field binoculars
with 12-power magnification, a Bushness spotting scope with 45-power magnifica-
tion, and a Questar lens with 130 power magnification. Some use was made of a
Javelin nightscope, capable of magnifying existing light 50,000 times. The officers
used infrared night goggles to facilitate their movement in the dark and concealed
their presence not only by using the natural cover of trees and shrubs but also by
cutting branches and brush to form a blind.
Lace, 669 F.2d at 53 (Newman, J., concurring).
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the home, and did not use exceptionally intrusive technology with
much success, 2 6 3 the court erred in believing that the nature and
extent of their paramilitary presence was irrelevant to fourth
amendment analysis. It is palpably absurd to apply "reasonable lim-
itation" considerations to the execution of a search warrant but to
ignore them for observations that occur in the course of substantial
invasions that skirt the curtilage. 264
This incongruity results from the fact that fourth amendment
analysis often seems bound in a new formalism even after Katz.
Neat categories are useful and arguably necessary in certain re-
spects;265 they are not helpful, however, in defining the parameters
of privacy from law enforcement observations. Oliver 266 has re-
newed that formalism if it in fact approved all warrantless physical
intrusions onto private property outside the curtilage. Still, there is
a difference between allowing law enforcement officers to enter pri-
vate property to conduct a brief search and allowing them to set up
a semi-permanent surreptitious watching post on private property.
263 The Vermont State Police had received information that the house was used as a
drug warehouse and had sufficient probable cause for the warrant even excluding the
results of the surveillance. Id. at 48-49. The interior observations were suppressed by
the district court. Lace, 502 F. Supp. at 1040-41. While the state police attempted to use
a number of sophisticated optical devices, it found that binoculars and a spotting scope
were the most practical aids. Id. at 1028-29; Lace, 669 F.2d at 50.
264 Several other cases note similar, if somewhat less extreme, paramilitary opera-
tions. By and large they omit reasonableness analysis. See, e.g., United States v. Whaley,
779 F.2d 585, 587-88, 592 (11th Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 1055 (1987)(long-term
binocular-aided surveillance into home upheld); United States v. Allen, 675 F.2d 1373,
1377-79 (9th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 833 (1981)(approval of several weeks of
almost continuous observation, including aerial surveillance, use of seismic sensors, and
other devices); United States v. Hensel, 509 F. Supp. 1376, 1378-79, 1385 n.9 (D. Me.
1981), aft'd, 699 F.2d 18 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 461 U.S. 958 (1983)(month-long aerial
and enhanced ground observations upheld); Sims v. State, 435 So. 2d 563, 564-65, 567
(Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1983)(lengthy enhanced surveillance of suspected marijuana traffick-
ing operation upheld); State v. Denton, 387 So. 2d 578, 580 (La. 1980)(no critical analy-
sis of seven days of twenty-four hour surveillance).
Some judges have expressed concerns similar to those raised by Judge Newman in
Lace. See, e.g., Whaley, 779 F.2d at 592 (characterizing nightly surveillance over three
months as "a continuous warrantless search") (Simpson, J., dissenting); Commonwealth
v. Williams, 494 Pa. 496, 500-01, 431 A.2d 964, 966 (1981)(emphasizing time and dura-
tion of nightscope surveillance).
265 This Article proposes two specific categories of observations permitted only pur-
suant to warrants. See infra Part IV.B. These limitations can be specific only because of
the general societal disapproval of observations of particularly private activity and the
use of highly sophisticated devices unavailable to the general public. As a result, the
specific prohibitions are quite limited in effect and meaningful fourth amendment pro-
tection depends in most instances on the willingness of courts to impose restrictions on
a case-by-case basis using the reasonableness norm.
266 Oliver v. United States, 466 U.S. 170,177 (1984). For discussion of Oliver, see
supra note 58 and accompanying text.
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Unless courts impose reasonableness restrictions on such intru-
sions, a process they have found manageable for aerial surveil-
lance, 2 67 most protections from visual searches will be ephemeral.
Time and duration limitations seem most obvious, but manner and
intensity are equally important.2 68 The fourth amendment protects
society from unreasonable searches, and the courts have a duty to
enforce the fourth amendment regardless of the law enforcement
rationale for any particular intrusion. It may be reasonable to look
from private property outside a curtilage in most settings, but to
deny that such looking constitutes a search prevents courts from in-
sisting that agents act in a reasonable fashion.
Two different situations suggest the application of reasonable-
ness principles to other forms of visual searches. First, even open
police surveillance may be unreasonable under the fourth amend-
ment if it is unnecessarily intrusive or offensive. A constant police
presence in a residential neighborhood, with or without revolving
lights on patrol car roofs or the constant sound of radio static, chills
personal privacy nearly as much as a physical entry.2 69 Exigent cir-
267 See supra notes 166, 250-60 and accompanying text. Some aerial observation cases
suggest that it is the "military occupation" atmosphere that is most troubling. The court
in NORML described the plaintiffs' assertions as centering around a belief that the eradi-
cation program was "'out of control' and has turned its areas of operations into 'war
zones.'" NORML, 608 F. Supp. at 950. One former military pilot submitted a sworn
declaration stating that helicopters in the program" 'appeared to be using tactics similar
to those [he] observed in Viet Nam to terrorize the populace.'" Id. at 956. Ground-
level activities allegedly included warrantless entries and seizures, roadblocks, deten-
tions, and the shooting of household pets. Id. at 950-55.
268 Courts have a relatively easy time describing time and duration limitations injudi-
cial opinions. This may be one reason that judges have emphasized these facts in analyz-
ing the reasonableness of paramilitary operations. See supra notes 262, 264. Manner and
intensity are equally important and courts can evaluate these aspects in a variety of re-
spects. Judge Newman's analysis in Lace seems to suggest that the number of officers,
the extent to which they use enhancement or other devices, and their destruction of
private property all undercut the reasonableness of the surveillance. See Lace, 669 F.2d
at 53-56 (Newman, J., concurring).
This norm should prevent police officers from making impermissible observations
in the course of an otherwise lawful surveillance under the rationale that only the fruits
of the impermissible observation would be suppressed. Present law does not have this
effect. For example, in Lace the unlawful interior observations were suppressed but this
had no effect on the court's treatment of the exterior observations. See Lace, 508 F.
Supp. at 1040-42; 669 F.2d at 50-51. Since all observations were part of one continuous
law enforcement "search," however, it is both realistic and fair to treat the officers' dis-
regard of privacy within the home as detracting from the overall reasonableness of their
surveillance. Alone it should not require invalidation of the entire surveillance; in con-
text with the other examples of intrusiveness, however, it supports Judge Newman's
conclusion that there was a grossly unreasonable invasion of privacy and that the court
should have suppressed all results.
269 There is little reported litigation, perhaps because courts have not previously
treated such activities as searches subject to fourth amendment regulation. In the early
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cumstances may require this form of intrusion, but such action on a
routine basis is exceptionally abusive. Dragnet observations present
a different problem. They are undertaken for legitimate law en-
forcement purposes and need not involve observations of private
conduct or sophisticated technology. They are nevertheless unrea-
sonable in many situations because of their scope, which renders
them in substance much like the general searches that were on the
minds of the fourth amendment's framers.
2 70
These problems can be resolved only through enforcement of
"reasonable implementation" standards. Under the expectations
paradigm, however, judicial authority is limited because such activi-
ties involve neither physical invasions nor objects shielded from
public view. Yet by adopting a functional approach to defining
"searches" and by defusing the rigorous monolithic view of the war-
rant and probable cause requirements, judicial supervision and law
enforcement needs can be met in a manner that serves the privacy
objectives of the fourth amendment. By itself "reasonableness" is a
1960's, however, Sam Giancana brought an action challenging the blanket FBI surveil-
lance of his person and home. Giancana v. Johnson, 335 F.2d 366 (7th Cir. 1964), cert.
denied, 379 U.S. 1001 (1965). The district court issued a preliminary injunction, appar-
ently concluding that the constant overt and tight surveillance violated Giancana's
fourth and fifth amendment rights. Id. at 367; id. at 371 (Swygert, J., dissenting). The
injunction did not prohibit surveillance; instead it limited it in manner and intensity. Id.
at 370 (Swygert, J., dissenting). The court of appeals ordered the case dismissed for
failure to allege the monetary damages then required under the general federal jurisdic-
tion statue, 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (1964). Id. at 368-70. Cf. McGee v. Hester, 724 F.2d 89,
90-92 (8th Cir. 1983)(recognizing civil rights action for open and excessive surveillance
that diminished sales at business under observation), cert. denied, 108 S. Ct. 451 (1987).
Modern entertainment provides a similar example. Many people watching the film
The Godfather felt genuine sympathy for the Corleone family when guests had to pass a
line of police and press photographers to enter the family compound to attend a wed-
ding reception. The overt police presence at so-called "organized crime" funerals is a
similarly oppressive implementation of a search for the legimate purpose of gathering
intelligence.
270 See, e.g., People v. Mayoff, 42 Cal. 3d 1302, 1331 & n.8, 729 P.2d 166, 184 & n.8,
233 Cal. Rptr. 2, 20 & n.8 (1986) (describing random surveillance as exploratory search
analogous to pre-revolutionary searches under general warrants) (Bird, C.J., dissenting).
Cf. United States v. Knotts, 460 U.S. 276, 284 (1983)(asserting that dragnet use of
beepers may be subject to constitutional regulation); Davis v. Mississippi, 394 U.S. 721,
727-28 (1969)(relying on unreasonableness of dragnet for fingerprints to identify rape
suspect); United States v. Bronstein, 521 F.2d 459, 463 (2d Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 424
U.S. 918 (1976)(upholding dog sniff in part because not used "in a dragnet operation
directed at all flight passengers"); Lankford v. Gelston, 364 F.2d 197, 198, 201-05 (4th
Cir. 1966)(requiring injunctive relief against mass house searches for murder suspects);
State v. Stanton, 7 Or. App. 286, 297, 490 P.2d 1274, 1279 (1971)(might be reasonable
expectation of privacy from dragnet searches even in areas generally open to public).
See generally 1 W. LAFAVE, supra note 17, at 315 (noting relevance of dragnet procedures
to validity of using narcotics-trained dogs); Fishman, supra note 2, at 320-21 (distin-
guishing dragnets from targeted use of beepers).
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vague term; in the context of thoughtful legal analysis, however, it
can be given an effective meaning.
B. SPECIFIC NORMS
1. Specially Protected Objects
Society demands additional protection for extremely private
objects. Even if a police officer conducts a visual search for a legiti-
mate purpose and behaves reasonably in terms of time, duration,
and manner, certain objects are entitled to the protections afforded
by the warrant clause. This notion is rooted to some extent in the
"constitutionally protected areas" approach, 27 1 but it is subtly dif-
ferent, as it is premised on the nature of the acts or things observed
rather than simply their location. Location is important, but that is
because location provides a readily discernible guideline for police
officers and courts and not because location is an actual justification
for additional protection.27
2
The protection of private objects is most clearly evident in the
reasoning of the many cases that limit observations into private
homes. 273 These cases recognize a constitutional freedom from en-
hanced observations that would be permissible if they occurred in
public areas. 274 While fourth amendment analysis before Katz pro-
tected houses because they Were property, most modem authorities
recognize that the dwelling place receives protection because of
271 See supra notes 18-22 and accompanying text. This application obviously goes be-
yond pre-Katz theories because observations into constitutionally protected areas were
not generally deemed subject to the fourth amendment. The major exception con-
cerned observations into public restrooms. See Smayda v. United States, 352 F.2d 251
(9th Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 981 (1966); Bielicki v. Superior Court, 57 Cal. 2d
602, 371 P.2d 288, 21 Cal. Rptr. 552 (1962). The Supreme Court's most noted fourth
amendment analysis of an observation proved the general rule by ignoring fourth
amendment theory. McDonald v. United States, 335 U.S. 451 (1948). For discussion of
McDonald, see supra notes 240-45 and accompanying text.
272 A common explanation of the societal value in the privacy of certain locations is
that privacy is truly protected only if people are secure in their beliefs that some pro-
tected areas exist. Note, A Reconsideration of Katz, supra note 49, at 181. "Areas" should
really be restated to refer to "actions and things," but people join fourth amendment
theory in accepting "areas" as a definable category that generally fits their privacy con-
cerns. Note, Concept of Privacy, supra note 26, at 175-76.
273 See supra notes 132-45 and accompanying text.
274 Cases suppressing interior observations usually do so despite the existence of le-
gitimate law enforcement purposes. See, e.g., United States v. Lace, 502 F. Supp. 1021,
1027 (D. Vt. 1980)(informant advised that drugs were stored in home), aff'd on other
grounds, 669 F.2d 46 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 854 (1982); United States v. Kim, 415
F. Supp. 1252, 1254 (D. Haw. 1976) (observations were part of gambling investigation);
State v. Blacker, 52 Or. 1077, 1079, 630 P.2d 413, 414 (1981)(informant reported that
marijuana was being grown in home); Commonwealth v. Williams, 494 Pa. 496,499,431
A.2d 964, 966 (1981)(reason to believe escaped convict would be in apartment).
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what people do and what is located in private houses. The Second
Circuit, for example, has pointed out that "[t]he vice of telescopic
viewing into the interior of a home is that it risks observation ... of
intimate details of a person's life." 275 The cases nevertheless tend
to protect the entire dwelling place, both because intimate behavior
and private possessions may be found anywhere within a house and
because non-fourth amendment principles seem to mandate special
treatment for the house. 276 The sheer number of cases espousing
this view suggests that enhanced observations into private homes
demands more than satisfaction of the general norms concerning
visual searches, regardless of the underlying theory.
Consistent with the notion that it is the nature of the object
rather than its location that provides the reason for additional pro-
tection, a second line of cases recognizes special limitations on
observations into public restrooms. While the courts establish no
single rule, they uniformly recognize that patrons of public
275 United States v. Taborda, 635 F.2d 131, 138-39 (2d Cir. 1980). See also Common-
wealth v. Williams, 494 Pa. 496, 500, 431 A.2d 964, 966 (1981)(noting that device ena-
bled officers to observe sexual conduct occuring in a bedroom); Commonwealth v.
Lemanski, 365 Pa. Super. 332, 347 n.4, 529 A.2d 1085, 1091 n.4 (1987)(concern with
intruding on personal details). Cf. California v. Greenwood, 108 S. Ct. 1625, 1634
(1988)(Brennan, J., dissenting) (noting that "[a] search of trash, like a search of the bed-
room, can relate intimate details about sexual practices, health, and personal hygiene");
United States v. Lace, 669 F.2d 46, 57 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 854 (1982)(New-
man, J., concurring) (arguing that observations of secluded private property intrude
upon highly personal behavior).
276 It is in this sense that other constitutional privacy rights most clearly intersect with
the fourth amendment. See, e.g., Comment, supra note 29, at 152-53 (seeing constitu-
tional right of privacy as arising from Katz, Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557 (1969), and
Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965)); Note, Katz and the Fourth Amendment, supra
note 44, at 72-74 (noting that one fourth amendment theory of a general right to privacy
draws on Griswold); Note, Protecting Privacy, supra note 41, at 313-14 & nn.2-6 (finding
fourth amendment privacy a fundamental right, citing Griswold and other authorities).
While still a circuit judge, Anthony Kennedy relied on these principles in United States
v. Penn, 647 F.2d 876 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 903 (1980). The majority upheld a
search in which an officer offered a young child five dollars to show him where on the
premises drugs were hidden. Id. at 879. Judge Kennedy issued a strong dissent pre-
mised on the police officer's intrusion into the family relationship. Id. at 888-89 (Ken-
nedy, J., dissenting). It is arguable that the protected objects limitation on visual
searches is less a matter of pure fourth amendment law than an application of such other
constitutional principles. Cf. Tomkovicz, supra note 2, at 692 (taking an instrumental
view, arguing that fourth amendment privacy protects such other constitutional rights).
Perhaps for this reason, courts sometimes generalize in describing the nature and
scope of this protection, e.g., Kim, 415 F. Supp. at 1256-57 (focusing on general princi-
pIes of relation between government and society as much as fourth amendment), or find
this line of analysis attractive in decisions premised on property notions, e.g., Lemanski,
365 Pa. Super. at 349, 529 A.2d at 1092 (drawing strict line on premises). While these
are all "fourth amendment" cases, a great deal of their analysis is premised on broader
notions of the need for privacy and private places in modern society. This emphasis, of
course, is encouraged by the analytical structure of the expectations paradigm.
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restrooms are entitled to some privacy from observation even
though the place is neither private nor the target's property.2 77 The
philosophy behind this principle is that our society demands privacy
for evacuation and nudity.278 Still, privacy in such areas is neither
total nor inevitable. Courts often draw distinctions based on the lo-
cation of the observer or the layout of the facilities. 279 The level of
277 See, e.g., Smayda v. United States, 352 F.2d 251, 256 (9th Cir. 1965), cert. denied,
382 U.S. 981 (1966); People v. Triggs, 8 Gal. 3d 884, 891, 506 P.2d 232, 237, 106 Gal.
Rptr. 408, 410 (1973); People v. Biggar, 716 P.2d 493, 496 (Haw. 1986); State v. Bryant,
287 Minn. 205, 211, 177 N.W.2d 800, 801 (1970); State v. Holt, 291 Or. 343, 347, 630
P.2d 854, 857-58 (1981).
278 The public restroom cases are described as follows: "[The courts, perhaps recog-
nizing the sanctity of private bodily functions condemned the 'clandestine exploratory'
surveillance of 'guilty' and innocent alike." State v. Kender, 60 Haw. 301, 306 n.1, 588
P.2d 447, 451 n.1 (1979). Cf. People v. Kalchik, 160 Mich. App. 40, 54-55, 407 N.W.2d
627, 634 (1987)(noting that the police observed and videotaped innocent users of a
public restroom)(Shepherd, J., concurring). A recentjudicial comment in a compulsory
drug testing case explains the basis of the special protection:
There are few activities in our society more personal than the passing of urine.
Most people describe it by euphemisms if they talk about it at all. It is a function
traditionally performed without public observation; indeed, its performance in pub-
lic is generally prohibited by law as well as social custom.
National Treasury Employees Union v. Von Raab, 816 F.2d 170, 175 (5th Cir. 1987),
aff'd, 109 S. Ct. 1384 (1989). The word "restroom" is itself a euphemism. See also Wes-
tin, supra note 1, at 1026 ("American society has strong codes requiring privacy for evac-
uation, dressing the body, and arranging the body in public, and privacy for sexual
relations is deeply rooted in our culture.").
These statements are obviously based on the actions likely to be observed rather
than on anything about the room itself. This is supported by cases using similar analysis
with respect to fitting rooms in clothing stores. In People v. Diaz, 85 Misc. 2d 41, 376
N.Y.S.2d 849 (N.Y. Grim. Ct. 1975), the court stated that:
The court does not discern much distinction between the privacy which people have
a right to expect in public restrooms from that which they hope to find in fitting
rooms.... What is crucial here is the nature of the activity involved and whether an
individual engaged in that activity may reasonably believe that he may perform it in
private.
Id. at 44-48, 376 N.Y.S.2d at 854-55.
279 See, e.g., United States v. Billings, 858 F.2d 617, 618 (10th Cir. 1988)(no protection
in public restroom from observation by officer "at a place where patrons are normally
found"); State v. Daniel, 319 So. 2d 582, 583 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1975)(permissible to
follow suspect into public restroom and make observations); Brown v. State, 3 Md. App.
90, 94, 238 A.2d 147, 149 (1968)(privacy turns on design of facility); People v.
Heydenberk, 171 Mich. App. 494, 495-98, 430 N.W.2d 760, 761-62 (1988)(upholding
use of video cameras with same field of vision as restroom patrons); State v. Bryant, 287
Minn. 205, 211, 177 N.W.2d 800, 804 (1970)(no protection if there is no door on stall);
State v. Holt, 291 Or. 343, 345-50, 630 P.2d 854, 856-58 (198 1)(analyzing three sepa-
rate stages of observation, emphasizing actual expectations of privacy and limitations on
privacy resulting from physical layout of restroom and its fixtures); Buchanan v. State,
471 S.W.2d 401, 404 (Tex. Grim. App. 1971), cert. denied, 405 U.S. 930 (1972)(existence
of protection turns on whether stalls have doors). Cf In re Deborah C., 30 Cal. 3d 125,
137-39, 635 P.2d 446, 450-53, 177 Cal. Rptr. 852, 857-59 (1981)(no REOP in store
fitting room because doors provided little protection from observation by persons in
common corridor). See also Note, Private Places, supra note 2, at 984 (noting that public
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constitutional privacy in a restroom is often described in the amor-
phous phrase "the modicum of privacy its design affords." 280
The house and restroom cases exemplify the tension between
the societal norm and likelihood approaches to analyzing the
REOP. 281 The societal norm approach recognizes protection for a
variety of actions that are both exclusive in nature and intrinsically
deserving of privacy from outsiders. The house is not the only place
where such private actions occur. A conversation at a secluded table
in a restaurant or a private walk in a park, for example, may seem
entitled to privacy under general societal privacy norms.282 The
restroom cases imply, however, that constitutional privacy is limited
by the realities of public behavior. Just as one's privacy in a public
restroom does not extend to observations made by other persons in
the restroom and one's privacy in a telephone booth does not ex-
tend to observations through its glass sides,2 3 there are few realistic
protections from observations in public. Walls and barriers such as
restrooms are only somewhat "public," because although accessible to public, individual
stalls are designed for exclusive use of one person at a time and are physically enclosed
in order to insure that person's privacy). Cf. Note, Aerial Surveillance, supra note 44, at
282-83 (relying on this analysis to argue that there should be no need to take all precau-
tions in order to preserve privacy, the target need only "close the door," as in restroom
cases, to demand privacy from aerial observation).
280 Smayda v. United States, 352 F.2d 251, 257 (9th Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 382 U.S.
981 (1966).
281 See supra notes 43-46 and accompanying text and note 109.
282 See United States v. Lace, 669 F.2d 46, 57 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 854
(1982)(Newman, J., concurring)(argument that police violated fourth amendment by
trespassing on defendant's property and observing intrinsically private behavior that
often occurs in secluded areas); Note, Private Places, supra note 2, at 984 (setting up hier-
archy of "public" private areas: toilet stall, restaurant table, theater box, and park
bench, with the latter containing neither the exclusivity nor the intimacy associated, in
ascending degree, with the others). See also Kitch, supra note 18, at 137 (suggesting that
weighing privacy interests is difficult due to the requirement of evaluating the relation-
ship between target and location). Perhaps the ultimate problem preventing the identifi-
cation of more than these two categories of places where observations are subject to the
warrant requirement is that there seems to be little true agreement on the hierarchy of
private relationships. Compare Note, Private Places, supra note 2, at 984 (hierarchy of
"public" private areas) with Kitch, supra note 18, at 140 ("[L]ong walks in parks are far
more likely actually to involve significant communication of private thoughts and feel-
ings" than are telephone conversations.).
Here the problems of a graduated fourth amendment are most severe. Gradations
are difficult enough to define and apply when everyone agrees on the order of priority.
Where agreement is lacking, gradations are inevitably incoherent. The virtue of recog-
nizing special protection for houses and restrooms is that those places represent privacy
values that are shared throughout our society.
283 Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 352 (1967). The "naked hearing" cases also
suggest a limit in this area. See supra notes 146, 148. Even though society generally
respects the privacy of conversations, it protects them only from artificial eavesdrop-
ping. As shown below, the same principle attends observations into houses and
restrooms. See infra notes 292-94 and accompanying text.
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commode doors are critical, for they "exhibit[] to the world a clear
demarcation between inside and outside, private and public, and, in
so doing, visibly assert[] the right to have this boundary
respected." 2
8 4
The apparently different protections afforded houses and pub-
lic restrooms provide guidance in developing meaningful judicial
standards for regulating observations. As suggested above, courts
that excoriate enhanced observations into houses do not similarly
condemn naked-eye observations. 28 5 The only protection against
such simple observations is the buffer zone of distance. The result
under most cases is that objects in homes are protected only to the
extent that they are invisible to the curious naked eyes of persons
outside the curtilage or other lawful locations.28 6 Restrooms, on the
other hand, are generally protected from naked-eye observations.
The usual setting in such cases is that an officer is hidden in an
observation post that provides visual access to the inside of a com-
mode stall.28 7 At least as long as the stall has a door that provides
the illusion of privacy, most courts prohibit observations even
though there is no trespass and naked-eye observation is
possible.28
8
284 Note, Private Places, supra note 2, at 984.
285 See supra note 141. Even United States v. Whaley, 779 F.2d 585 (11th Cir. 1986),
cert. denied, 479 U.S. 1055 (1987), pays lip service to this principle. Id. at 591-92 (disap-
proving use of enhancement devices to look into house but upholding observations in
that case through a version of the confirmation approach).
286 See supra notes 117-21 and accompanying text. Courts using the term "lawful loca-
tion" to describe the permissible location of the observer may enlarge protection be-
yond the curtilage in some circumstances. In United States v. Carriger, 541 F.2d 545
(6th Cir. 1976), the court held that an agent who slipped into a locked apartment build-
ing and made observations from common areas violated the fourth amendment. Id. at
550. For more on Carriger, see supra note 121. The court specifically relied on Michigan
laws forbidding unauthorized entry into such areas. Carriger, 541 F.2d at 550-51. In
essence, Michigan treats such common areas as part of the house. Although there is no
actual or reasonable expectation of privacy from people legitimately present in such
areas, such people are treated as guests rather than as interlopers. The fact that a target
has guests in his or her house, of course, does not mean that the target is subject to
enhanced observations into the home by others. See also People v. Triggs, 8 Cal. 3d 884,
893, 506 P.2d 232, 238, 106 Cal. Rptr. 408, 414 (1973)(relying on California statutory
prohibition of spying into bathrooms); State v. Havlat, 222 Neb. 554, 573, 385 N.W.2d
436, 447-48 (1986)(Shanahan, J., dissenting)(police intrusions onto open fields were
criminal trespasses and, as such, unlawful searches); Comment, Trespass and Fourth
Amendment Protection, supra note 49, at 729-32 (discussing Carriger and concluding that a
trespass violates a reasonable expectation of privacy).
287 See, e.g., Smayda.v. United States, 352 F.2d 251, 252 (9th Cir. 1965), cert. denied,
382 U.S. 981 (1966); Triggs, 8 Cal. 3d at 888, 506 P.2d at 234-35, 106 Cal. Rptr. at 410-
11; State v. Bryant, 287 Minn. 205, 206, 177 N.W.2d 800, 801 (1970); State v. Holt, 291
Or. 343, 345, 630 P.2d 854, 856-57 (1981); Buchanan v. State, 471 S.W.2d 401, 404
(Tex. Crim. App. 1971), cert. denied, 405 U.S. 930 (1972).
288 There is a facial distinction between the house and restroom cases. The house
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The house and restroom protections are less different than this
description suggests. They are similar in concept but diverge in ap-
plication because different possibilities for observation exist in the
two settings. Observations into a house are normally possible only
through windows or open doors. The often unstated premise of the
house cases is that when a target places an item where it can be seen
by a naked eye from beyond the curtilage through a window or
door, the target knowingly exposes the object to public view.28 9
This is rarely the situation in restroom cases; where it is, however,
such simple observations appear to be uncontroversial. 290 The se-
cret observation post, on the other hand, constitutes an unforesee-
able vantage point. If an observer similarly peeped through a small
hole in someone's bedroom wall, even from a lawful location, there
is every reason to believe that the courts would condemn
unenhanced as well as enhanced observations.291
cases represent an attempt to limit the "successful" REOP approach by denying observ-
ers the ability to cross the curtilage constructively through the use of enhancement de-
vices. The restroom cases, on the other hand, flatly repudiate the premise of the
"successful" REOP approach.
289 See, e.g., United States v. Minton, 488 F.2d 37, 38 (4th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 416
U.S. 936 (1974)(no search to look into open door); Cooper v. Superior Court, 118 Cal.
App. 3d 499, 509-10, 173 Cal. Rptr. 520, 525-26 (1981)(no search to look into apart-
ment window); Turner v. State, 499 S.W.2d 182, 183-85 (Tex. Crim. App. 1973)(police
officers may look into house windows); State v. Manly, 85 Wash. 2d 120, 124-25, 530
P.2d 306, 309, cert. denied, 423 U.S. 855 (1975) (majority and concurrence both stressing
that observations could be made by naked eye). Cf. United States v. Head, 783 F.2d
1422, 1426-28 (9th Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 476 U.S. 1171 (1986)(no search to look into
car window, collecting cases).
290 See, e.g., United States v. Billings, 858 F.2d 617, 618 (10th Cir. 1988)(no search
because officer could see suspicious conduct from public area of restroom); Ponce v.
Craven, 409 F.2d 621, 625 (9th Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 1012 (1970)(officers may
look through window into motel room bathroom because target has no REOP from ob-
servations through a window); In re Deborah C., 30 Cal. 3d 125, 137-39, 635 P.2d 446,
450-51, 177 Cal. Rptr. 852, 857 (1981)(no visual search where observation into store
fitting room was made from normal position in common corridor); Triggs, 8 Cal. 3d at
894 n.7, 506 P.2d at 238 n.7, 106 Cal. Rptr. at 414 n.7 (law officers are free to enter
public restrooms and make plain view observations free of fourth amendment concerns);
State v. Holt, 291 Or. 343, 346-47, 630 P.2d 854, 856-57 (1981)(officer's observations
from public area of restroom creates no fourth amendment issue).
291 Cf. State v. Tarantino, 83 N.C. App. 473, 478-80, 350 S.E.2d 864, 866-68
(1986)(officer violated fourth amendment by looking through wall cracks in building).
Judge Pope's concurring opinion in Smayda v. United States, 352 F.2d 251, 257 (9th
Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 981 (1966), discusses analogous issues. The court up-
held the use of an observation post in a men's restroom at Yosemite National Park. Id.
at 252, 256-57. Judge Pope argued that it was analogous to a landlord surreptitiously
adjusting the blinds in a tenant's room so that police officers could see into the room
from outside. Id. at 258 (Pope, J., concurring). There are at least two problems with this
analogy. First, the blinds are adjusted by a person with the "right" to do so, something
that is not always true with respect to the public restroom cases. Second, the landlord's
action is different from that of the officer who cuts a hole or hides in a secret area adja-
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Still, enhancement is the key to the prevailing analysis in both
settings. The house cases typically involve enhancement by magnifi-
cation; the restroom cases typically involve enhancement by vantage
point, a form of mechanical assistance. This suggests that aerial ob-
servations into houses would also run afoul of the fourth amend-
ment.29 2 The only remaining question concerns whether all vantage
points are equally troubling. The answer seems to lie in the fact that
secret observation posts are artificial in the sense that patrons can-
not reasonably anticipate their use. The same is not true for hills or
nearby buildings that aid observations into house or restroom win-
dows 29 3 or even for unusually tall officers able to see at a better an-
cent to a restroom. The landlord is instead acting like an officer who leaves a restroom
window open hoping that he or she can then see into the restroom from outside. In that
situation, unlike the usual vantage point observation, the target should be aware that
there is visual access into the room and can correct the matter, much as an observant
tenant could readjust the blinds. Judge Pope's theory about the scope of fourth amend-
ment protection may simply be wrong, at least if looking through an adjusted blind is
analogous to seeing through a curtained window by standing on a box. See State v.
Kaaheena, 59 Haw. 23, 30, 575 P.2d 462, 467 (1978); supra text accompanying notes
105-06, 110-11. It is also significant that Judge Pope refers to adjusting a blind rather
than cutting a hole in the wall. Kaaheena might be a close case, but it would not be close
if the officer had done what is common in the restroom cases and cut a hole in the wall
or ceiling or modified the building's structure to allow observations from above or be-
hind the room.
292 See e.g., National Org. for Reform of Marijuana Laws (NORML) v. Mullen, 608 F.
Supp. 945, 957 (N.D. Cal. 1985)(helicopter observations into houses violate the fourth
amendment); People v. Mayoff, 42 Cal. 3d 1302, 1312, 1313, 729 P.2d 166, 171-72, 233
Cal. Rptr. 2, 7-8 (1986)(no aerial examination of curtilage is permitted). But see State v.
Vogel, 428 N.W.2d 272, 273-75 (S.D. 1988)(upholding observation into residence).
NORML underscores the connection between the protection of deeply personal actions
and the protection of the house and curtilage. The court emphasized that helicopters
had hovered outside house windows and buzzed people in outdoor showers and out-
houses. NORML, 608 F. Supp. at 955-57. The former action was offensive because peo-
ple are entitled to privacy in their homes; the latter actions were offensive because
people are entitled to privacy for nudity and evacuation as long as they avoid public
areas.
293 See, e.g., United States v. Minton, 488 F.2d 37, 38(4th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 416
U.S. 936 (1974)(observations from hill upheld); United States v. Bassford, 601 F. Supp.
1324, 1333-35 (D. Me. 1985), aff'd, 812 F.2d 16 (Ist Cir.), cert. denied, 481 U.S. 1022
(1987)(observation from hill upheld); Cooper v. Superior Court, 118 Cal. App. 3d 499,
509-10, 173 Cal. Rptr. 520, 525-26 (1981)(observations from apartment across street
upheld); State v. Holbron, 65 Haw. 152, 153-55, 648 P.2d 194, 196 (1982)(approving
observations from public tennis court and hill 300 meters away). People v. Arno, 90 Cal.
App. 3d 505, 153 Cal. Rptr. 624 (1979), presents this issue in a stark fashion. The ma-
jority relied on the fact that the observer could not find a vantage point to look into
Arno's office without going to a hilltop at least 200 yards from the office building. Id. at
509, 153 Cal. Rptr. at 626. There is no suggestion that the court would have similarly
disallowed a naked-eye observation. The dissent suggested that binocular-aided obser-
vations were permissible, emphasizing that the surveillance "was conducted from a natu-
ral hill mass." Id. at 524, 153 Cal. Rptr. at 635 (Hanson, J., dissenting). See also supra
note 11 (cases upholding observations from vantage points).
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gle than are most of their colleagues. The enhancement that
breaches the privacy of private objects, therefore, is mechanical or
technological enhancement that crosses the line between normal
and supernormal observation.
29 4
There is one respect in which the overriding reasonableness in-
quiry suggests a possible distinction between houses and restrooms.
Professor Amsterdam's hypothetical of a recurring public an-
nouncement that we are all subject to video surveillance may de-
stroy the underpinning of any blanket requirement of an actual
expectation of privacy before fourth amendment protections at-
tach,29 5 but in certain circumstances notice may make reasonable
what would otherwise be unduly intrusive observations. While soci-
ety generally recognizes the privacy of activities in a public rest-
room, society may deem notice of observation in some
circumstances to constitute an adequate protection of personal pri-
vacy. Unlike a home, a public restroom is not the target's property
and the owner, whether governmental or private, has the' right to set
reasonable conditions on its use. Where a restroom is used as a
location for criminal conduct or is vandalized, or where some users
present health or sanitation problems or endanger other users, the
owner and legitimate users might reasonably prefer observation to
privacy. As long as adequate warnings are posted, the public may
well consider observation to be preferable to the owner's closing the
facility. 29 6 The analogy to airport and public building searches is
294 There are some borderline examples, such as State v. Kaaheena, 59 Haw. 23, 575
P.2d 462 (1978). For discussion of Kaaheena, see supra text accompanying notes 103-05
and 110-11. The court purported to rely on the location of the gap in the blinds but
really seemed to address the fact that the officer used the assistance of a crate in gaining
visual access of the room. See id. at 29, 575 P.2d at 467. A crate may not constitute an
"artificial" aid, however, at least where crates are normally in the vicinity of the window
and the target is aware of that fact. In such cases crates seem more like hills, something
the target must take account of in order to maintain privacy. Ladders are less problem-
atic, if only because the observer must normally transport them to the place from which
he or she makes the observation. See Commonwealth v. Hernley, 216 Pa. Super. 177,
180, 263 A.2d 904, 908 (1970), cert. denied, 401 U.S. 914 (1971)(Montgomery,J., dissent-
ing) (emphasizing use of ladder rather than use of binoculars).
295 Amsterdam, supra note 2, at 384. See also Note, A Reconsideration of Katz, supra note
49, at 158 (suggesting similarly offensive manipulation of actual expectations of privacy
by publicly announcing that extensive searches will take place at toll booths).
296 See In re Deborah C., 30 Cal. 3d 125, 138-39, 635 P.2d 446, 453, 177 Cal. Rptr.
852, 859 (1981) (recognizing interest of retailers in discouraging shoplifting and result-
ing justification for providing little privacy in fitting rooms); State v. Bryant, 287 Minn.
205, 211, 177 N.W.2d 800, 804 (1970)(recognizing store's interest in protecting
restrooms and suggesting that signs warning of surveillance would eliminate fourth
amendment concerns); People v. Diaz, 85 Misc. 2d 41, 47, 376 N.Y.S.2d 849, 855 (N.Y.
Crim. Ct. 1975)(acknowledging interests in decreasing shoplifting but requiring that
stores use methods other than surveillance of fitting rooms). Cf. Lucas v. United States,
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clear even if the usual problems in restrooms are more mundane
than terrorism. It is not the seriousness of particular crimes that
upsets the balance and justifies observation in this setting, however,
it is the combination of collateral effects of crime or unsanitary con-
ditions, the existence of prior notice, and the potential alternatives
that together make announced observations reasonable. 29 7
The resulting principles are clear if limited in effect. Widely
shared societal attitudes concerning the intrinsic privacy of actions
in homes and restrooms simply demand more protection for such
objects than is provided by the general visual search norms. All
fourth amendment protections should apply to unnatural or en-
hanced observations into houses and public restrooms, much as
physical searches of such areas normally require warrants based on
probable cause. 298 Judicial screening should prevent routine use of
such extremely intrusive practices early and perhaps unnecessarily
411 A.2d 360, 364 (D.C. 1980) (upholding use of sensoramatic tags and readers, relying
in part on public and private interest in protecting stores from theft). Some public
restrooms have been closed because of such problems and some stores have discontin-
ued the use of fitting rooms because they facilitate thieves as well as shoppers. Permit-
ting observations subject to adequate warnings allows individuals to make the choice
between privacy and comfort. See United States v. Henry, 615 F.2d 1223, 1227-28 (9th
Cir. 1980); United States v. Edwards, 498 F.2d 496, 499-501 (2d Cir. 1974); United
States v. Davis, 482 F.2d 893, 914-15 (9th Cir. 1973)(al1 three relying on some form of
notice of airplane security searches as supporting reasonableness of limited fourth
amendment intrusions); Lucas, 411 A.2d at 365-66 (MackJ., concurring)(proposing that
stores post signs warning customers that they are subject to sensoramatic search).
297 Most cases considering restroom observations are prosecutions for homosexual
conduct, apparently between consenting adults. While homosexual conduct may be
driven to such locations by erroneous and outdated perceptions of permissible sexual
behavior, society should not condone such conduct in public locations. Heterosexual
conduct, although protected from enhanced observation when it occurs in the home, see
Commonwealth v. Williams, 494 Pa. 496, 500, 431 A.2d 964, 966 (1981), is not pro-
tected in public. Moreover, not all offensive conduct that occurs in such locations is
sexual in nature. See, e.g., State v. Daniel, 319 So. 2d 582, 583 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
1975)(narcotics offenses); Brown v. State, 3 Md. App. 90, 92-93, 238 A.2d 147, 148-49
(1968)(narcotics offenses). Cf. People v. Diaz, 85 Misc. 2d 41, 42-44, 376 N.Y.S.2d 849,
850-51 (N.Y. Crim. Ct. 1975)(fitting room observations conducted to reduce theft);
Deborah C., 30 Cal. 3d at 130, 635 P.2d at 447-48, 177 Cal. Rptr. at 854 (theft observed
in fitting room). See also People v. Young, 214 Cal. App. 2d 131, 135, 29 Cal. Rptr. 492,
494 (1963)(asserting that public restroums are "often the locale of vice of many kinds
such as sexual perversion, sale of narcotics, petty thefts, robbery and assaults").
298 Most standard warrant exceptions would not apply. While there are various differ-
ent formulations of the warrant exceptions, three general categories exist: search inci-
dent to arrest, consent, and exigent circumstances. See W. LAFAVE &J. ISRAEL, supra note
17, at 126. While search incident to arrest and consent would appear inapplicable, there
is no reason that exigent circumstances should excuse the failure to obtain a warrant for
a physical invasion but not excuse the failure where only a visual observation is at issue.
Cf. People v. Agee, 200 Cal. Rptr. 827, 837 (Cal. Ct. App. 1984)(suggesting use of heli-
copters to pursue fleeing felons). Courts would still require probable cause in such cir-
cumstances. See United States v. Rubin, 474 F.2d 262, 265-70 (3d Cir. 1973), for a
19891
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even in legitimate investigations. The only categorical exception
would be where the owner of a public restroom reasonably acts to
protect persons or property by placing the facilities under surveil-
lance, and then only after clearly warning all users of the scope of
the observations. In general, then, the warrant requirement at-
taches as a result of the nature of the object in these limited situa-
tions.299 In other settings warrants are required because of the
government's technology.
2. Highly Sophisticated Technology
The problem of technologically-based limits on visual searches
differs from that pertaining to particularly private objects in that
courts only need draw one line to separate observations requiring
warrants from all others. Nevertheless, that line wavers and is ex-
ceptionally blurred. In theory, courts could avoid the problem by
either approving warrantless use of all enhancement devices or for-
bidding all such use without a warrant.300 Practical considerations
prevent such an approach, for some available technologies cut too
deeply into personal autonomy for routine use to be permitted,
30 1
description of various types of exigent circumstances justifying a search without a
warrant.
299 As suggested above, it would not be wise to extend this principle to even very
private actions conducted in public. There may nonetheless be additional indoor loca-
tions deserving of heightened protection from visual searches. In order to meet the
standard, however, they would have to be both exclusive in fact and the sort of place at
which society expects private conduct to occur. The only areas likely to meet these re-
quirements on a categorical basis are hotel rooms and private business offices. Existing
case law seems to recognize that hotel rooms are within this category; in reality they are
simply temporary houses, as recognized in the pre-Katz case law. See, e.g., Hoffa v.
United States, 385 U.S. 293, 301 (1966)(hotel room, like home or office, receives fourth
amendment protection); Stoner v. California, 376 U.S. 483, 489-90 (1964)(fourth
amendment protects occupants of hotel rooms). Inclusion of offices within this category
causes problems. Although many offices have attributes of privacy, a business office, as a
general matter, is neither as private as a house nor as obviously private to outsiders.
300 Several commentators come close to concluding that the fourth amendment bars
video electronic surveillance even when authorized by court order. See, e.g., Note, Lets
Go to the Videotape: The Second Circuit Sanctions Covert Video Surveillance of Domestic Criminals,
United States v. Biasucci, 53 BROOKLYN L. REV. 469, 484 (1987)(use of video electronic
surveillance may be constitutionally unreasonable in all settings); Note, Electronic Visual
Surveillance, supra note 1, at 288-93 (availability of other techniques renders video elec-
tronic surveillance unreasonable); Note, Visual Surveillance, supra note 84, at 1050 (such
surveillance can only be reasonable if it is clearly necessary). Another commentator sug-
gests strict limitations on aerial surveillance, arguing that courts should "reason that the
flight technology allowing aerial surveillance should be analyzed in the same way as
other intrusive technologies, such as electronic monitoring and sophisticated optical de-
vices, which the fourth amendment prohibits from being used against the home without
a warrant." Note, supra note 57, at 748.
301 This is most obvious with respect to devices such as the polygraph, which purports
to ascertain whether the speaker is telling the truth. The accuracy of the polygraph is
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while subjecting certain other technologies to the warrant clause
would be unimaginable. 30 2 Unfortunately, despite the general rec-
ognition that there is some point at which technological sophistica-
tion mandates full fourth amendment protection, there are very few
established guidelines in this area.
303
In order to begin to formulate general principles, it is necessary
to catalog the various technological devices available for law en-
open to question, but even assuming accuracy, there would still be general opposition to
the involuntary use of such techniques on privacy grounds. Moreover, a polygraph can-
not be administered surreptitiously and requires physical control of the subject, thereby
raising additional fourth amendment problems.
The Supreme Court suggested in Dow Chem. Co. v. United States, 476 U.S. 227
(1986), that it would draw the line of permissible aerial surveillance when the govern-
ment uses satellites for this purpose. Id. at 238. We are close to that time already, given
the apparent use of high-altitude U-2 airplanes to seek out marijuana crops. National
Org. for Reform of Marijuana Laws (NORML) v. Mullen, 608 F. Supp. 945, 949 (N.D.
Cal. 1985). In any event, satellite technology is certainly in use in foreign intelligence.
Unless the courts follow the Supreme Court's suggestion in Dow, nothing would stop the
government from using satelites to spy on this country except the cost and the good
sense of our political leadership, or, in the alternative, its fear of the public response.
Justice Brandeis's dissent in Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 471 (1928),
focused on problems of technological progress. He suggested that "[w]ays may some
day be developed by which the Government, without removing papers from secret draw-
ers, can reproduce them in court, and by which it will be enabled to expose to ajury the
most intimate occurrences of the home." Id. at 474 (Brandeis, J., dissenting). Such de-
vices may not yet be available, but this is only 1989. His vision is uncomfortably close to
what is already possible with computer technology. It is now quite possible to obtain
remote access to computer records through a telephone line and then rummage through
and extract particular information without the owner ever becoming aware. See Fisher,
On the Front Lines in Battling Electronic Invader, N.Y. Times, Nov. 5, 1988, at A7, col. 1-4
(noting that computer hackers can inject "viruses" into computer networks that can
copy and transmit data while remaining undetected); Markoff, Computer Hacker in Britain
Said to Enter U.S. Systems, N.Y. Times, Oct. 24, 1988, at D1, col. 1-2, D3, col. 4-5 (individ-
ual suspected of using computer and modem to break into hundreds of military, corpo-
rate and university computer systems over public telephone lines).
302 See United States v. Taborda, 635 F.2d 131, 138 n.8 (2d Cir. 1980)(excluding ob-
servations through eyeglasses and contact lenses from enhanced observations). No
cases or commentators appear to take the opposite view or suggest that the use of a
hearing aid is unlawful electronic surveillance.
303 See 1 W. LAFAvE, supra note 17, at 345-47 (noting that the level of sophistication at
which enhancement becomes a search is undefined); Comment, supra note 29, at 166
(suggesting that there is a "void in the law" concerning "highly sophisticated visual
equipment"). Many opinions suggest the existence of limits but do not purport to de-
fine them because there is no need to do so in the particular case. See, e.g., United States
v. Torres, 751 F.2d 875, 882-83 (7th Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 470 U.S. 1087 (1985)(recog-
nizing that video electronic surveillance is so intrusive that special protections may be
necessary, but finding such observations of terrorist bomb factory to be appropriate);
United States v. Bassford, 601 F. Supp. 1324, 1335 (D. Me. 1985), aff'd, 812 F.2d 16 (1st
Cir.), cert. denied, 481 U.S. 1022 (1987)(approving aerial observation but suggesting that
use of "sophisticated technological devices" might be restricted in other circumstances);
State v. Stachler, 58 Haw. 412, 419, 570 P.2d 1323, 1328 (1977)(upholding aerial sur-
veillance but implying that more intrusive forms might be disapproved).
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forcement observations. Most of the cases previously discussed in-
volved binoculars, telescopes, flashlights, airplanes, helicopters,
cameras, or simpler mechanical aids, such as ladders or crates. Per-
haps the two most sophisticated devices commonly used in law en-
forcement are video cameras8 0 4 and nightscopes. 30 5 Other highly
advanced devices used in law enforcement enhance vision construc-
tively, such as beepers, ultra-violet scanners, sensoramatic devices,
x-rays, and fluoroscopes .30 6 Police officers often use these and
other devices in combination to further enhance their ability to con-
duct surveillance
0 7
Drawing analogies between devices may be of some assistance
in evaluating their intrusiveness. After all, if one can agree that na-
ked-eye and eyeglass observations are permissible and that elec-
304 Cameras can be in the open, e.g., State v. Abislaiman, 437 So. 2d 181, 182-83 (Fla.
Dist. Ct. App. 1983), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 833 (1984), or hidden, e.g., United States v.
Cuevas-Sanchez, 821 F.2d 248, 250 (5th Cir. 1987); Torres, 751 F.2d at 877; People v.
Dezek, 107 Mich. App. 78, 84, 308 N.W.2d 652, 653 (1981). See also infra note 331 (cases
on open and surreptitious use of video cameras).
305 Cases addressing nightscopes include: United States v. Ward, 546 F. Supp. 300,
308-10 (W.D. Ark. 1982), rev'd in part on other grounds, 703 F.2d 1058 (8th Cir. 1983);
United States v. Hensel, 509 F. Supp. 1376, 1384 n.9 (D. Me. 1981), aff'd, 699 F.2d 18
(1st Cir.), cert. denied, 461 U.S. 958 (1983); Newberry v. State, 421 So. 2d 546, 547 (Fla.
Dist. Ct. App. 1982); State v. Denton, 387 So. 2d 578, 581-82 (La. 1980).
306 Cases addressing such techniques include:
(1) Beepers: United States v. Curtis, 562 F.2d 1153, 1155 (9th Cir. 1977), cert. de-
nied, 439 U.S. 910 (1978); United States v. Moore, 562 F.2d 106, 108 (1st Cir. 1977), cert.
denied, 435 U.S. 926 (1978). See also Karo v. United States, 468 U.S. 705, 708
(1984)(beeper placed in can of ether) and Knotts v. United States, 460 U.S. 276, 277
(1983)(beeper placed in drum of chloroform).
(2) Ultra-violet scans: United States v. Kenaan, 496 F.2d 181, 182 (1st Cir. 1974);
Commonwealth v. DeWitt, 226 Pa. Super. 372, 374, 314 A.2d 27, 28 (1973).
(3) Sensoramatic devices: Lucas v. United States, 411 A.2d 360 (D.C. 1980).
(4) X-rays and fluoroscopes: United States v. Sullivan, 711 F.2d 1, 2 (1st Cir. 1983);
United States v. Head, 546 F.2d 6, 8 (2d Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 430 U.S. 931 (1977).
(5) Narcotics-sniffing dogs are also "enhancement devices," see United States v.
Place, 462 U.S. 696 (1983). See supra notes 63-65 and accompanying text. Cases involv-
ing dogs trained to identify narcotics include United States v. Thomas, 757 F.2d 1359,
1366 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 819 (1985) and United States v. Solis, 536 F.2d 880,
881 (9th Cir. 1976).
307 Nightscopes are essentially a combination of artificial lighting and magnification.
Video electronic surveillance is often used in connection with aural electronic surveil-
lance. See, e.g., Torres, 751 F.2d at 876, 883; In re Order Authorizing Interception, 513 F.
Supp. 421, 422 (D. Mass. 1980); People v. Dezek, 107 Mich. App. 78, 81, 308 N.W.2d
652, 653 (1981).
United States v. Lace, 502 F. Supp. 1021 (D. Vt. 1980), aff'd, 669 F.2d 46 (2d Cir.),
cert. denied, 459 U.S. 854 (1982), reveals the wide variety of surveillance equipment that
law enforcement officials use in long-term surveillance. The officers in Lace used binoc-
ulars, a spotting scope, a nightscope, a device called an "Owl's Eye," a Questar lens,
various cameras, and infrared night goggles; many items came with zoom extenders or
other attachments. Id. at 1028-29.
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tronic eavesdropping is permissible only with a warrant, perhaps
analogies can sort out the rules concerning various devices. The
problem is that the analogies drawn in the cases are hopelessly in-
consistent. One analogy, between electronic surveillance and
"aided vision,"3 08 would suggest that all devices, perhaps excepting
mechanical aids, are subject to the strict regulations imposed on
wiretapping and bugging. Electronic eavesdropping is more com-
monly equated with more sophisticated visual aids, such as beepers,
nightscopes, and video cameras.30 9 If this implies that those devices
that do more than magnify the field of vision are necessarily subject
to the warrant clause, the suggestion is rebutted by numerous analo-
gies that suggest the opposite conclusion. For example, courts
sometimes analogize between nightscopes and binoculars to suggest
that both are permitted,310 or confuse matters even further by
describing a device such as a sensoramatic tag reader, which "sees"
something that a person cannot, as less intrusive than simple visual
surveillance.311 Beepers cause particular trouble in this regard, as
courts characterize them in different cases as comparable to elec-
308 People v. Arno, 90 Cal. App. 3d 505, 511, 153 Cal. Rptr. 624, 627 (1979). See also
People v. Ciochon, 23 Ill. App. 3d 363, 366, 319 N.E.2d 332, 335 (1974)(finding no
distinction between electronic eavesdropping and use of binoculars). Cf. United States
v. Kim, 415 F. Supp. 1252, 1254-56 (D. Haw. 1976)(begging the question by limiting
analogy to use of sophisticated aids); Note, supra note 82, at 391 (telescopes and binocu-
lars are "potentially more intrusive" than wiretapping). It is also possible to compare
unaided observations to electronic surveillance. Note, Private Places, supra note 2, at 974
(finding constitutional analogy between visual observation and electronic
eavesdropping).
309 See, e.g., United States v. Holmes, 521 F.2d 859, 865 (5th Cir. 1975)(beeper), aff'd
en banc, 537 F.2d 227 (5th Cir. 1976); State v. Denton, 387 So. 2d 578, 584 (La.
1980)(Watson,J., concurring)(nightscope); Comnmonwealth v. Hernley, 216 Pa. Super.
177, 183, 263 A.2d 904, 908 (1970)(Montgomery, J., dissenting), cert. denied, 401 U.S.
914 (1971)(video camera).
310 See, e.g., People v. Vermouth, 42 Cal. App. 3d 353, 362, 116 Cal. Rptr. 675, 680
(1974); Newberry v. State, 421 So. 2d 546, 549 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1982)(also analogiz-
ing to flashlights). Analogies to flashlights are particularly common, even though the
two devices operate totally differently. See, e.g., Bernstiel v. State, 416 So. 2d 827, 827
(Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1982). See also supra note 155 (various analogies of lights to binocu-
lars). Cf. People v. Beavers, 393 Mich. 554, 580, 227 N.W.2d 511, 522, cert. denied, 423
U.S. 878 (1975)(Coleman,J., dissenting), and State v. Glass, 583 P.2d 872, 885 (Alaska
1978)(Burke, J., dissenting) (both would uphold consent monitoring, drawing analogy to
use of binoculars).
311 See, e.g., Lucas v. United States, 411 A.2d 360, 364 (D.C. 1980); 1 W. LAFAvE, supra
note 17, at 349. Probably the closest analogy to such devices is the dog sniff, which also
reveals only whether a particular item is present. See United States v. Place, 462 U.S. 696
(1983), and supra notes 63-65 and accompanying text. Analogies are still treacherous, as
a dog sniff may be relatively non-intrusive compared to most enhanced observations, see
supra note 116, but it is still more intrusive than the use of eyeglasses. Thomas, 757 F.2d




tronic surveillance, less intrusive than binoculars, helicopters, and
radar, and identical to night-vision binoculars. 3 12 The overriding
problem may be that enhancement devices are used in too many
different settings for simple analogies to apply in all cases. Beepers
that facilitate mobile surveillance are much like airplanes or very ef-
ficient naked-eye surveillance; beepers that identify the location of
an item within a house, on the other hand, can be as informative and
arguably as intrusive as wiretapping or video electronic surveil-
lance. 3 13 All in all, analogies are of little assistance. 3 14
The logical alternative is to evaluate the nature and effect of
individual technological devices in light of the policies underlying
the fourth amendment. 315 This requires reconsidering Katz in some
respects, for the opinions and result, if not the amorphous method-
ology, provide sound policy guidance. At bottom the decision holds
that our society expects freedom from warrantless electronic sur-
veillance, but tolerates its use pursuant to judicial authorization. It
is thus necessary to examine other technological aids in terms of
312 See United States v. Dubrofsky, 581 F.2d 208, 212 (9th Cir. 1978)(night binocu-
lars); United States v. Moore, 562 F.2d 106, 112 (1st Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 926
(1978)(less intrusive); United States v. Holmes, 521 F.2d 859, 865 (5th Cir. 1975)(elec-
tronic surveillance), aft'den banc, 537 F.2d 227 (5th Cir. 1976). Dubrofsky combines anal-
ogies by suggesting that the appropriate comparison is to the use of night-vision
binoculars from the roof of a building with the owner's permission, that is, from a good
vantage point at a lawful location. Dubrofsky, 581 F.2d at 211-12.
313 The Supreme Court's decisions in United States v. Knotts, 460 U.S. 276 (1983),
and United States v. Karo, 468 U.S. 705 (1984), see supra notes 66-67 and accompanying
text, recognize that each analogy is accurate in its separate context, which results in
sharply different requirements in different settings. Karo relied on the fact that the
beeper was being monitored while it was in a residence, Karo, 468 U.S. at 714-18,
thereby following the principles set forth in section IV.B.1. It may be that many at-
tempts to draw lines based on technology largely collapse into reliance on such other
tests. Still, one aspect of beepers that makes their technology a pertinent factor is that
they are not in general public use. See infra note 347.
314 See, e.g., Fishman, supra note 2, at 325 n.203 (noting the difficulty of drawing analo-
gies concerning various forms of surveillance aids). This is also suggested in Justice
Douglas' dissent in United States v. White, 401 U.S. 745, 756 (1971)(Douglas, J., dis-
senting). He noted that equating simple eavesdropping and electronic surveillance is
much like equating gun powder and nuclear weapons. Id. at 756 (Douglas, J.,
dissenting).
315 "Innovative encroachments on privacy require a return to first principles." People
v. Agee, 200 Cal. Rptr. 827, 829 (Cal. Ct. App. 1984). See also On Lee v. United States,
343 U.S. 747, 759 (1952)(Frankfurter, J., dissenting)(raising concerns about "rapid ad-
vances of science"); United States v. Kim, 415 F. Supp. 1252, 1257 (D. Haw. 1976)("as
the technological capability of law enforcement agencies increases, the Fourth Amend-
ment must likewise grow in response"); Note, Aerial Surveillance, supra note 44, at 280
(courts need to measure impact of new investigative techniques on privacy protections);
Note, Electronic Visual Surveillance, supra note 1, at 298 ("The present conditions of rapid
technological development demand that the impact of new technology upon individual
privacy be evaluated and controlled before its use becomes widespread .... ").
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these concepts. Further complicating the matter, each device must
be examined in context, for attitudes toward a single device may
vary over time and concerning different uses. 316 Thus, one year's
precedent about nightscopes in a rural area may have little rele-
vance to later use in an urban area.
Judicial rhetoric provides substantial evidence of these societal
attitudes. Courts emphasize that the fourth amendment's primary
role with respect to technology is to respond to "the use of sophisti-
cated modern mechanical or electronic devices and the frightening
implications of their possible development. "1'3 17 Sophistication is a
recurring concern, as courts explicitly or implicitly assert that pri-
vacy is at greater risk from new, complex and ever-more advanced
technology than from yesterday's simpler aids. 318 Changing circum-
stances yield changing expectations. In 1951, Judge Frank de-
scribed the use of a hidden radio microphone as "a method
seemingly fantastic and smacking rather of lurid gangster movies or
the comic strips than of American realities,"31 9 a comment that
316 In 1973, the Third District Court of Appeal for California cogently made this point
in evaluating aerial surveillance:
At a recent but relatively primitive time, an X-2 plane could spy on ground activities
from a height of 50,000 feet. Today's sophisticated technology permits overflights
by vehicles orbiting at an altitude of several hundred miles. Tomorrow's sophisti-
cated technology will supply optic and photographic devices for minute observa-
tions from extended heights. Judicial implementations of the Fourth Amendment
need constant accommodation to the ever-intensifying technology of surveillance.
Dean v. Superior Court, 35 Cal. App. 3d 112, 116, 110 Cal. Rptr. 585, 588 (1973).
317 United States v. Solis, 536 F.2d 880, 882 (9th Cir. 1976).
318 See, e.g., United States v. Curtis, 562 F.2d 1153, 1156 (9th Cir. 1977), cert. denied,
439 U.S. 910 (1978)("The threejudges here concerned wish to make it clear that in this
age of ever-advancing sophistication in the development of electronic eavesdropping
devices, they are not insensitive to unjustifiable intrusions on the right of privacy, a right
that is deemed to be most precious to the American people."); People v. Cook, 41 Cal.
3d 373, 382, 710 P.2d 299, 305, 221 Cal. Rptr. 499, 505 (1985)("We reject the Orwel-
lian notion that precious liberties . . . simply shrink as the government acquires new
means of infringing upon them."); People v. Arno, 90 Cal. App. 3d 505, 511, 153 Cal.
Rptr. 624, 627 (1979)(referring to "sophisticated optical systems, infrared process, and
computer image enhancement"); Wheeler v. State, 659 S.W.2d 381, 388 (Tex. Crim.
App. 1982)(referring to "exotic, sophisticated devices and techniques"). Cf. Lopez v.
United States, 373 U.S. 427, 465-66 (1963)(Brennan, J., dissenting) (arguing that elec-
tronic recording renders use of even an overt agent an unconstitutional invasion of
privacy).
319 United States v. On Lee, 193 F.2d 306, 311 (2d Cir. 1951), aft'd, 343 U.S. 747
(1952)(Frank, J., dissenting). Lurid gangster movies and American realities have both
changed since 1951. Today's standard fare in entertainment often couples graphic vio-
lence and technology that did not even make the comic strips in 1951. Consent moni-
toring, Judge Frank's subject matter, remains controversial but is now an everyday
police practice in many jurisdictions and the Supreme Court's recurring battles over its
constitutionality have stilled since 1971. See supra note 76. The relationship between
real law enforcement activities and fictional portrayals may still be significant as an indi-
cator of what the public perceives as standard law enforcement procedure.
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would be naive if made today. Present concerns are more likely to
center on the possibility of constant satellite observation or the abil-
ity of police officers to observe miniscule details at enormous dis-
tances even at night.3 20 Such concerns are often raised in dissent,
perhaps out of the judge's frustration that the majority has failed to
recognize that the challenged use of technology heralds the arrival
of the police state.
32 1
Once the use of a particular technological device is upheld,
time takes its toll on the device's sophistication:
[T]he more use of such exotic, sophisticated devices and techniques is
condoned, the more will society become conditioned to take as reason-
able that which an earlier generation rejected. When the invasion ap-
proved today is extended in the next case and then the next, all
reasonable expectations are doomed if the peace officer can but find
the technology that enables him steadily to intrude.
322
This presents sad but accurate logic. No matter how doggedly
courts try to design a timeless formula for fourth amendment analy-
sis,323 time changes society's expectations and understandings con-
320 See, e.g., Note, supra note 57, at 759 (proposing analytical structure that encom-
passes "satellite remote sensing" to eliminate fears of "secret, minute, constant, and
even automatic surveillance by an 'eye in the sky' "). See also Dow Chem. Co. v. United
States, 476 U.S. 227, 238 (1986)(satellite observations may be fourth amendment
searches); United States v. Kim, 415 F. Supp. 1252, 1254 (D. Haw. 1976)(detailed obser-
vation from a quarter of a mile away); People v. Agee, 200 Cal. Rptr. 827, 838 (Cal. Ct.
App. 1984)(Evans, PJ., dissenting)(noting that law enforcement aerial surveillance is
primitive compared to existing military technologies).
321 Judge Frank's opinion in On Lee was in dissent. On Lee, 193 F.2d at 311 (Frank, J.,
dissenting). The opinion in Curtis was the functional equivalent of a dissent, as the panel
expressed its own serious concerns about the warrantless installation of a beeper but
upheld it because of a binding precedent within the circuit. Curtis, 562 F.2d at 1156 &
n.2. See also Florida v. Riley, 109 S. Ct. 693, 702-03, 704-05 (1989)(Brennan, J., dissent-
ing) (noting police state overtones of helicopter surveillance); Dow, 476 U.S. at 240 (Pow-
ell, J., dissenting)(arguing that majority's analysis will result in "gradual decay" of fourth
amendment protections due to technology); People v. Mayoff, 42 Cal. 3d 1302, 1331
n.8, 729 P.2d 166, 185 n.8, 233 Cal. Rptr. 2, 21 n.8 (1986)(Bird, C.J., dissent-
ing)("Today, the sound of English messengers at the doorstep has been replaced by the
drone of the police surveillance plane."). The quotation accompanying the following
note is one of those rare judicial items, a dissent in a decision later reversed on rehear-
ing. Wheeler v. State, 659 S.W.2d 388 (Tex. Crim. App. 1983), rev' 659 S.W.2d 381
(Tex. Crim. App. 1982).
322 Wheeler, 659 S.W.2d at 388. See also Dow, 476 U.S. at 251 (Powell, J., dissent-
ing) (effect of court's holding will be reduction of personal privacy "as technological ad-
vances become generally disseminated and available in our society"); Note, Electronic
Visual Surveillance, supra note 1, at 298 (technology must be regulated "before its use
becomes widespread").
323 Katz, at least as restated by Justice Harlan and interpreted over the years, tried to
create a general formula capable of resolving the scope of the fourth amendment in all
cases. The dissent in Dow noted this aspect: "The reasonable expectation of privacy
standard was designed to ensure that the Fourth Amendment continues to protect pri-
vacy in an era when official surveillance can be accomplished without any physical pene-
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cerning police practices. If the driving force behind fourth
amendment protection is society's general sense of security from in-
trusion, that sense is inevitably affected by the extent to which the
law fails to prevent widespread use of particular technological
devices.
Looking first to the sophistication of surveillance devices, there
is little agreement or explanation concerning permissible levels of
technological assistance. A telescope may constitute "powerful
technology," 324 and the use of binoculars may not constitute a "so-
phisticated electronic surveillance technique," 325 but courts expend
little effort and have less success in defining the parameters of the
inquiry. One attempt to provide a workable guideline suggests that
impermissibly sophisticated techniques are those that replace rather
than simply improve human senses.326 It fails as a defining charac-
teristic because it takes no account of either the level of intrusion or
the difficulty of separating enhancement from replacement. Other
attempts emphasize the level of intrusion, but do so in a fashion that
suggests that the problem is more the unreasonable behavior of the
observer than the device itself.3
27
tration of or proximity to the area under inspection." Dow, 476 U.S. at 247 (Powell, J.,
dissenting). Yet even the dissent inevitably focused to some extent on technological
rather than privacy issues. Id. at 249-50 & n.12 (Powell, J., dissenting).
324 Kim, 415 F. Supp. at 1256.
325 State v. Stachler, 58 Haw. 412, 421, 570 P.2d 1323, 1329 (1977).
326 See, e.g., United States v. Thomas, 757 F.2d 1359, 1367 (2d Cir. 1985), cert. denied,
474 U.S. 819 (1985)("[T]he officers' use of a dog is not a mere improvement of their
sense of smell, as ordinary eyeglasses improve vision, but is a significant enhancement
accomplished by a different, and far superior, sensory instrument."). This is trouble-
some in two respects. First, the use of narcotics-sniffing dogs is generally seen as consti-
tuting a very limited intrusion, despite its conceptual distinction from magnification.
See, e.g., United States v. Place, 462 U.S. 696, 707 (1983)(dog sniff does not constitute
search where no seizure is involved); United States v. Solis, 536 F.2d 880, 882 (9th Cir.
1976) (recognizing that dogs have "keen olfactory sense" but that their use only presents
limited intrusion). Cf. United States v. Alborado, 495 F.2d 799,- 803, 806 (2d Cir.
1974)(magnetometer is relatively unintrusive but reveals presence of metal otherwise
hidden from all human senses); Lucas v. United States, 411 A.2d 360, 363-64 (D.C.
1980)(similar analysis for sensoramatic device). Second, the line between enhancement
and replacement sounds more meaningful than it really is. A dog's sense of smell may
be many times that of the average person, but many enhancement devices are similar in
effect. The difference between replacement and enhancement devices is that the infer-
ence from a "positive reading" is circumstantial in the former and direct in the latter.
Since the underlying premise of using trained dogs and other replacement devices is
that their circumstantial evidence is as reliable as direct evidence, it elevates form over
substance to rely on the scientific theory of the "device" rather than on the extent to
which it improves what humans can do. Still, the fact that some replacement devices are
not widely used by the public supports requiring warrants and probable cause for law
enforcement use. See infra note 347.
327 See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Williams, 494 Pa. 496, 500, 431 A.2d 964, 966
(1981)(focus on duration of surveillance and observation of sexual conduct rather than
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One technique, video camera surveillance, provides a good sub-
ject for analyzing the undue sophistication issue. While the
Supreme Court has never addressed the problem of video electronic
surveillance, a number of lower courts have considered the issue in
recent years.328 Most have engaged in interest balancing to con-
clude that video camera surveillance is permissible when it is con-
ducted under the rigorous requirements established for audio
electronic surveillance in Title III of the Omnibus Crime Control
and Safe Streets Act of 1968.329 Analogy seems appropriate in this
limited instance, largely because both techniques are highly intru-
sive and rely on electronic means. 330 One issue that courts have
nature of startron technology); Commonwealth v. Lemanski, 365 Pa. Super. 332, 349-
50, 529 A.2d 1085, 1092-93 (1987)(emphasizing actions of observing officers rather
than the degree of enhancement afforded by binoculars). Cf. Riley v. State, 511 So. 2d
282, 287 (Fla. 1987), rev'd, 109 S. Ct. 693 (1989)(distinguishing helicopter observations
from surveillance by fixed-wing aircraft by emphasizing the intrusiveness of the particu-
lar observations in the case). See generally supra Part IV.A.2 (the reasonable implementa-
tion norm).
328 See, e.g., United States v. Cuevas-Sanchez, 821 F.2d 248, 251-52 (5th Cir. 1987);
United States v. Biasucci, 786 F.2d 504 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 827 (1986); United
States v. Torres, 751 F.2d 875 (7th Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 470 U.S. 1087 (1985); In re
Application for Order Authorizing Interception, 513 F. Supp. 421 (D. Mass. 1980);
Ricks v. State, 312 Md. 11, 537 A.2d 612, cert. denied, 109 S. Ct. 90 (1988).
329 Pub. L. No. 95-351, 82 Stat. 211-225 (1968), codified at 18 U.S.C. §§ 2510-2520
(1982). Torres concluded that video surveillance under limitations analogous to wiretap-
ping requirements meets fourth amendment restrictions, at least where it is not used in a
person's residence. Torres, 751 F.2d at 882-83. Torres reached this result by balancing
law enforcement and privacy interests. Noting that the camera was secreted in a bomb
factory, the court held that such surveillance was appropriate because "[t]he benefits to
the public safety are great and the costs to personal privacy are modest. A safe house is
not a home." Id. at 883. See also Cuevas-Sanchez, 821 F.2d at 252 (5th Cir. 1987)(applying
most Title III requirements to video electronic surveillance); Biasucci, 786 F.2d at 510
(following Torres and characterizing Title III as providing constitutional standards); Ap-
plicationfor Order Authorizing Interception, 513 F. Supp. at 423 (applying Title III's provi-
sions as a matter of "judicial deference" to congressional policy). Cf. Ricks, 312 Md. at
13-16, 20-24, 27-31, 537 A.2d at 613-14, 616-18, 620-21 (following Torres and Teicher);
People v. Teicher, 52 N.Y.2d 638, 651-56, 422 N.E.2d 506, 512-15, 439 N.Y.S.2d 846,
852-55 (1981)(relying on general warrant authority and fashioning standards from Katz
and Berger). But see Sponick v. City of Detroit Police Dept., 49 Mich App. 162, 198-99,
211 N.W.2d 674, 689-90 (1973)(refusing to apply Title III to video surveillance). Com-
mentators have noted various difficulties in developing a law of video electronic surveil-
lance that meets constitutional standards. See, e.g., Note, supra note 300, at 486-97
(concluding that courts have not yet found ways to implement the Berger and Katz stan-
dards for such surveillance); Note, Electronic Visual Surveillance, supra note 1, at 281-89
(concluding that reasonableness depends on resolving serious problems of particularity,
duration, minimization, and necessity).
330 "We think it also unarguable that television surveillance is exceedingly intrusive,
especially in combination (as here) with audio surveillance, and inherently indiscrimi-
nate, and that it could be grossly abused-to eliminate personal privacy as understood
in modem Western nations." Torres, 751 F.2d at 882. See generally Biasucci, 786 F.2d at
510 (noting "obvious similarities between aural and video electronic surveillance");
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rarely addressed is whether the non-surreptitious use of video cam-
eras in public places is permissible in the absence of a warrant.
33'
Here the issues concerning societal attitudes are starkly presented.
On the one hand, in many cases use of this technique may represent
a reasonable response to high crime rates in particular areas where
the permanent assignment of a police patrol is impracticable. On
the other hand, it was this form of an open and permanent techno-
logical observation post that symbolized governmental oppression
in Orwell's 1984.332
As suggested above, one cannot fully evaluate the use of sophis-
ticated surveillance devices without taking account of their history
and contemporary use. The history of wiretapping suggests that
our society has long abhored the practice, even prohibiting it and
related practices by legislation notwithstanding the Supreme
Court's refusal to place it under constitutional control until 1967.
3
33
Aerial surveillance, on the other hand, carries little of the stigma
Teicher, 52 N.Y.2d at 653, 422 N.E.2d at 513, 439 N.Y.S.2d at 853 (recognizing that
video electronic surveillance is highly intrusive). Where distinctions are drawn, they
tend to treat video surveillance as more intrusive. See, e.g., Application for Order Authorizing
Interception, 513 F. Supp. at 423 (characterizing this as the view of "[m]ost observers");
Ricks, 312 Md. at 20, 537 A.2d at 616 ("[V]ideo surveillance is more intrusive than audio
surveillance."); Note, Electronic Visual Surveillance, supra note 1, at 294 (stressing that
video surveillance cannot be escaped, involves exposure of a person's body, and violates
absolute expectations of privacy, all unlike audio surveillance); Comment, supra note 84,
at 1043 & n.6 (noting several respects in which this is true).
331 See, e.g, State v. Abislaiman, 437 So. 2d 181, 182-83 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1983), cert.
denied, 469 U.S. 833 (1984)(remote camera in hospital parking lot). Cases upholding
surreptitious use in public, e.g., Sponick, 49 Mich. App. at 198, 211 N.W.2d at 690, and at
private places with consent of building managers, e.g., People v. Winograd, 125 Misc. 2d
754, 755, 757, 480 N.Y.S.2d 419, 421, 422 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1984), support the notion that
open use in public is permissible. See also United States v. Karo, 468 U.S. 705, 709
(1984)(surreptitous video camera used in commercial storage facility with consent of
business-no analysis of issue); State v. Okubo, 3 Haw. App. 396, 410, 651 P.2d 494,
504 (1982), aff'd on other grounds, 67 Haw. 197, 682 P.2d 79 (1984)(videotaping of mat-
ters occurring in public raise no fourth amendment issues).
332 Orwell, supra note 192, at 6-9. It is unlikely that courts or legislatures would
strictly prohibit the practice. Banks and many other private entities have a substantial
justification for overt video surveillance. Thus, courts would have to fashion some ex-
ceptions for justifiable uses of open video surveillance. This may be analogous to
warned observations in public restrooms. See supra note 296 and accompanying text. If
open observation may sometimes be reasonable in restrooms despite the intrinsic pri-
vacy of actions associated with such places, it is difficult to state categorically that open
observation in public is inappropriate merely because electronic means are used.
333 See, e.g., Johnson v. State, 2 Md. App. 300, 302-05, 234 A.2d 464, 465-67
(1967)(discussing history of aural surveillance from simple eavesdropping through in-
terception of telegraph and telephone communications, noting federal and state laws
prohibiting certain forms of electronic surveillance). See also Berger v. New York, 388
U.S. 41, 45-50 (1967)(discussing technology and public attitudes); S. Rep. No. 1097,
90th Cong., 2d Sess. 67, reprinted in 1968 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 2112, 2154
(describing the harmful effects of widespread electronic surveillance). See generally
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attached to electronic surveillance. Law enforcement officials have
used airplanes since the 1920s and the many non-law enforcement
uses of aerial patrols render them a routine and generally approved
police practice.3 34 The history of visual electronic surveillance is
much shorter. Congress did not regulate it in the 1968 Act because
technology was not yet sufficiently advanced for law enforcement to
use surreptitious video surveillance with any degree of success-not
because of any affirmative policy decision to permit discretionary
use of the technique.335 If the courts continue to regulate video sur-
veillance through analogies to aural electronic surveillance law, they
may succeed in repeating the history of wiretapping. In that event,
the public will become conditioned to expect privacy rather than in-
trusion in this regard and warrants will always be required.3 36
Fisher, supra note 200 at 127-32 (describing early legislation to prohibit electronic
surveillance).
334 For a good general treatment of the history of aerial partrols, see Comment, supra
note 29. In California, which still produces the bulk of decisions in this area, airplanes
were first used in 1929, a full-time aerial detail was formed in the 1930s, with substantial
increases in use in each succeeding decade. Id. at 146-47. A 1960's study showed heli-
copters to be exceptionally useful for both law enforcement and various other public
safety purposes, such as water and mountain rescues. Id. at 147. This seems to be at
least part of the court's message in People v. Superior Court (Stroud), 37 Cal. App. 3d
836, 112 Cal. Rptr. 764 (1974), when it pointed out that helicopters are a "routine"
aspect of police protection in Los Angeles. Id. at 839, 112 Cal. Rptr. at 765. See also
Florida v. Riley, 109 S. Ct. 693, 696 n.2 (1989)(tracing history and describing use of
helicopters in police work).
335 Torres, 751 F.2d 875, 880-81 (noting that "television cameras in 1968 were too
bulky and noisy to be installed and operated surreptitiously"). Cf.Johnson, 2 Md. App. at
303, 234 A.2d at 465 ("Up to this time, the problem of violation of privacy by visual
means has not become as acute [as audio electronic surveillance], since visual sensory
aids apparently have not reached the advanced state of development of audio sensory
aids."). Times have changed. See Note, supra note 300, at 471 (noting increased use of
video electronic surveillance); Feder, Devices Gain in Range and Sophistication, N.Y. Times,
Nov. 26, 1986, at D5, col. 4 (noting that microchip technology now allows "astonishingly
concealable" video cameras).
In 1977 Congress passed the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act, Pub. L. No. 95-
511, 92 Stat. 1783 (1977), which defines electronic surveillance to include television
surveillance and submits aural and video electronic surveillance to the same procedural
requirements. See generally 50 U.S.C. §§ 1801-1806 (1982). The courts have generally
held that this Act does not regulate domestic law enforcement use of video technology.
See United States v. Biasucci, 786 F.2d 504 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 827 (1986);
Torres, 751 F.2d at 881-82.
336 See Wheeler v. State, 659 S.W.2d 381, 388 (Tex. Crim. App. 1983). See supra text
accompanying note 322. The converse of judicial abdication and the resulting loss of
privacy is that judicial enforcement of limitations on the use of technology allows indi-
viduals to expect privacy with confidence. Thus, the history of a particular technology is
not simply a matter of how long it has been available, but an understanding of the ways
in which people have become accustomed to its use.
United States v. Taborda, 635 F.2d 131 (2d Cir. 1980), provides an example. The
government argued that telescopes had been in use since the 1600's, but the court was
suitably unimpressed. Id. at 138 n.7. A long history of general use was not relevant to
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Conditioning through general use has brought quite a few tech-
nological devices into the realm of acceptance and it would serve no
purpose to limit their use at this time. Binoculars and flashlights are
such common tools that it is unreasonable to limit their use in public
areas solely because they are scientifically sophisticated and enhance
the sense of sight.3 37 There may, however, be a valid distinction
between binoculars and telescopes, if only because binoculars are
far more commonly used.3 38 Still, the overall point is that "[i]t is
unreasonable to expect law enforcement officials not to take advan-
tage of modem technology, and tools that are in common usage, in
the ordinary course of the performance of their duties."3 3 9
the validity of telescopic observations into private homes. The general use of telescopes
out of doors for many years, on the other hand, is relevant to the legitimacy of outdoor
law enforcement use of binoculars and telescopes. Everyone from bird watchers to boy
scouts has used them for so many years in that setting that society no longer has any
realistic sense of privacy from such observation in outdoor areas.
337 See generally State v. Stachler, 58 Haw. 412, 421 n.6, 570 P.2d 1323, 1329 n.6
(1977)(refusing to regulate binocular use under state constitution because binoculars
were "commonly used in police work" at the time that a prohibition of invasions of
privacy was added to constitution); People v. Smith, 42 N.Y.2d 961, 963, 367 N.E.2d
648, 649, 398 N.Y.S.2d 142, 143 (1977)(Jasen, J., dissenting)("It is a well-recognized,
fundamental, and traditional police practice to shine lights into dark places ..." ); 1 W.
LAFAVE, supra note 17, at 330 (noting that the lack of a justifiable expectation of privacy
from flashlight observations is mainly due to the fact that the flashlight is a common
device); Note, Electronic Visual Surveillance, supra note 1, at 279 (contrasting beepers to
"traditional methods" such as binoculars).
338 Florida courts seem to draw this distinction. In State v. Barnes, 390 So. 2d 1243
(Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1980), the court disallowed the use of a high-powered telescope,
essentially because the observation was "accomplished by special equipment not in gen-
eral use." Id. at 1244. In Bernstiel v. State, 416 So. 2d 827 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1982), a
different appeals court concluded that Barnes implicitly authorized the use of "ordinary"
binoculars. Bernstiel, 416 So. 2d at 829. See also United States v. Taborda, 491 F. Supp.
50, 53 (E.D.N.Y.), vacated, 635 F.2d 131 (2d Cir. 1980)(suggesting that telescopes are
"powerful and sophisticated devices" not ordinarily used by general public); United
States v. Kim, 415 F. Supp. 1252, 1256 (D. Haw. 1976)(warrantless observations by tele-
scope disallowed, reliance on telescope being "special equipment not in general use").
This distinction between binoculars and telescopes is not universally recognized. See
Note, supra note 82, at 393 ("Because the use of telescopes and binoculars is not wide-
spread in our society, citizens maintain a reasonable expectation of privacy for activity
and objects not readily observable by the naked eye.").
339 Newberry v. State, 421 So. 2d 546, 549 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1982)(upholding use of
nightscope). See also Note, Sense-Enhancing Devices, supra note 41, at 1179 (suggesting that
use of a technological aid constitutes a violation of a REOP if it is "a sophisticated opti-
cal instrument not generally available"). One reason for the Supreme Court's close divi-
sion in the aerial search cases is that aerial surveillance is probably somewhere between
binoculars and electronic surveillance in terms of common use. See Florida v. Riley, 109
S. Ct. 693, 696-97, 699, 701, 704, 705 (1989)(each opinion suggesting a somewhat dif-
ferent understanding of the prevalence of helicopter use). Authorities calling for close
regulation stress that aerial surveillance is an unusual investigative means, e.g., Note,
Aerial Surveillance, supra note 44, at 287, or a "rather novel form of police investigation,"
People v. Cook, 41 Cal. 3d 373, 376, 221 Cal. Rptr. 499, 501, 710 P.2d 299, 301 (1985).
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One attempt at fashioning a standard in this area compares law
enforcement observations to those of a "reasonable private citi-
zen." 340 The underlying premise is that police officers should be
permitted to make observations using methods that are used by
members of the general public. This is in one sense a version of the
likelihood REOP approach; an expectation of privacy from a partic-
ular device is reasonable only if a private observer is unlikely to in-
trude in this manner.341 In any event, the message is the same in
each form: law enforcement officers are entitled to use those devices
that private persons routinely use.
34 2
This is not the usual principle in fourth amendment analysis.
Courts and commentators commonly note that the fourth amend-
ment imposes burdens on law enforcement officers that are not im-
posed on private citizens. 343 It is nevertheless a valid principle with
Other authorities may recognize that aerial observation results from recent technology,
but stress that at least fixed-wing aircraft are commonly used by the public and are not
the sort of sophisticated technology that people fear. See, e.g., United States v.
Broadhurst, 805 F.2d 849, 853, 856 (9th Cir. 1986).
340 Various versions of this analysis use slightly different terminology. See United
States v. Vilhotti, 323 F. Supp. 425, 431 (S.D.N.Y.), aff'd in part, rev'd in part, 452 F.2d
1186 (2d Cir. 197 1)("reasonably respectful citizen"); Note, Aerial Surveillance, supra note
44, at 284-85 ("natural curiosity"); Note, supra note 57, at 746 ("reasonable passerby").
341 See, e.g., 1 W. LAFAVE, supra note 17, at 419-21 (discussing aerial surveillance and
noting the difference between normal observations and those made only after careful
scrutiny); Note, supra note 57, at 752 (noting that people behave in accordance with what
strangers can be expected to see); Note, Tracking Katz, supra note 41, at 1482 (this ap-
proach serves Katz policies).
In Vilhotti the court relied on this concept to uphold an officer's flashlight examina-
tion of the interior of a garage from outside. Vilhotti, 323 F. Supp. at 431-32. It con-
cluded that a reasonably respectful citizen might have made the observation,
emphasizing the "extent of social inhibition on natural curiosity and ... the degree of
care required to insure privacy." Id. at 431.
342 See Note, supra note 57, at 755-56 ("It is no longer reasonable to expect that peo-
pIe in the air will not observe the ground; indeed many members of the public ascend
solely in order to look down."). Under this theory, law enforcement officers are permit-
ted to make aerial observations that are consistent with those that private citizens would
make in routine overflights. Id. at 756. This is distinctly more limited than the theory
used by the Supreme Court in the aerial search cases, which seemed to set the bench-
mark at "possible observation." See supra text accompanying notes 68-74. One problem
that results from this approach is that it revisits all of the complications of defining the
appropriate level of likelihood that now confounds REOP analysis. See supra notes 109-
112 and accompanying text.
343 See Burdeau v. McDowell, 256 U.S. 465, 475 (1921)(fourth amendment applies
only to government action). See generally United States v. Kim, 415 F. Supp. 1252, 1256
(D. Haw. 1976)("lack of concern about intrusions from private sources has little to do
with an expectation of freedom from systematic governmental surveillance"); People v.
Agee, 200 Cal. Rptr. 827, 836 (Cal. Ct. App. 1984)(scrutiny from private overflights
does not subject people to scrutiny from law enforcement overflights); Commonwealth
v. Lemanski, 365 Pa. Super. 332, 348, 529 A.2d 1085, 1092 (1987)(that various persons
could view contraband is irrelevant, as the fourth amendment is directed to governmen-
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respect to observations. Coverage of "actors" and coverage of "ac-
tions" are two separate issues. The fact that only official actors are
subject to the fourth amendment does not mean that the prevalance
and acceptance of certain private "actions" is irrelevant to defining
that outer boundaries of the fourth amendment. Application of the
fourth amendment to the use of technological devices requires an
evaluation of societal values, and there is no better evidence of such
values than non-constitutional law and practices concerning private
use of a particular device.344 Thus, it is simply myopic to deny law
enforcement officers access to those tools that are permitted in pri-
vate surveillance and are commonly used by criminals.3 45 It is in-
structive that traditional fourth amendment limitations on physical
invasions are usually paralleled by laws against private trespasses
and that Katz was promptly followed by a federal statute that prohib-
ited private electronic surveillance and limited private access to
eavesdropping devices.3 46 If society had been unwilling to regulate
tal intrusion); State v. Ludvik, 40 Wash. App. 257, 262, 698 P.2d 1064, 1067 (1985)
(fourth amendment does not apply to private persons acting without official involve-
ment). See also I W. LAFAvE, supra note 17, at 421-22 (noting that casual observation
from private aircraft is different from intentional observation from police airplanes);
Note, Katz and the Fourth Amendment, supra note 44, at 81 (fact that private citizens can
make observation is not dispositive, people rarely eavesdrop or peep in windows, and
law enforcement restrictions are not measured against private behavior).
344 Controversy concerning the increasing use of technology by reporters suggests
that there are few established principles concerning the ethics of private use of sophisti-
cated devices. See Zuckerman, Sticky Issues in Gumshoe Journalism, TIME, Aug. 8, 1988, at
72 (discussing use of miniature cameras and microphones, hidden video cameras, and
nightscopes). See also Wills, Did Gary Get Screwed?, Village Voice, May 19, 1987, at 17
("[I]f God didn't mean for reporters to stake out candidates' houses, he wouldn't have
invented the telephoto lens.").
345 See State v. Spica, 389 S.W.2d 35, 45-46 (Mo. 1965), cert. denied, 383 U.S. 972
(1966) (upholding consent monitoring, noting that criminals use new devices and police
should have similar right). Cf. Comment, supra note 43, at 210 (arguing for reliance on
private norms in this area and defending holding government to same standards). See
also United States v. Knotts, 460 U.S. 276, 284 (1983)(police efficiency is a virtue and has
no role in and of itself in constitutional analysis); United States v. Agapito, 620 F.2d 324,
332 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 834 (1980)(emphasizing a second theme, that the
fourth amendment does not require "gentlemanly" behavior); United States v. Jackson,
588 F.2d 1046, 1052 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 442 U.S. 941 (1979)(relying on "the preva-
lence of uninvited listeners in human society" as supporting law enforcement eaves-
dropping); Vilhotti, 323 F. Supp. at 431 (adopting the "reasonably respectful citizen"
standard as properly reflecting contemporary norms underlying Katz standard); New-
berry v. State, 421 So. 2d 546, 549 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1982)("It is unreasonable to
expect law enforcement officials not to take advantage of modern technology, and tools
that are in common usage, in the ordinary course of the performance of their duties.").
346 See, e.g., United States v. Carriger, 541 F.2d 545, 551 n.1 (6th Cir. 1976); People v.
Triggs, 8 Cal. 3d 884, 893, 506 P.2d 232, 238, 106 Cal. Rptr. 408, 414 (1973)(both
relying on statutes prohibiting private invasions as establishing an enforceable public
policy against governmental intrusions). With respect to private electronic surveillance,
see: 18 U.S.C. § 2511 (1984)(unauthorized electronic surveillance constitutes a crime);
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such private electronic surveillance, it would be difficult to conclude
that society demands freedom from the same intrusions by law en-
forcement officers. On a more subtle level, common privacy inva-
sions define general privacy expectations. Unless society demands
privacy from use of a particular technology, it cannot reasonably ex-
pect privacy from such use. If it tolerates widespread discretionary
use of a specific device, law enforcement use of that device should
not be limited by the warrant and probable cause requirements.
The result is that there are few limitations based solely on the
nature of particular technological devices. Aural electronic surveil-
lance fits into this category, largely because Title III has successfully
prevented it from becoming a generally available technology. The
same is true of video electronic surveillance, but it is imperative that
the law regulate private use or else video surveillance may eventu-
ally be thought of as nothing more exotic than remote control bin-
oculars. The public rarely uses beepers and some other
"replacement" technologies, and these should therefore be gov-
erned by the warrant clause.3 47 Most photographic techniques, on
the other hand, are no longer so unusual as to constitute highly so-
18 U.S.C. § 2512 (1984) (manufacture, distribution, possession, and advertizing of inter-
ception devices constitutes a crime); 18 U.S.C. § 2513 (1984)(such devices may be con-
fiscated).
If anything, society tolerates more intrusive conduct from law enforcement officers
than from private citizens. See, e.g., Note, Private Places, supra note 2, at 979 (footnote
omitted)("To strip law enforcement of all furtive fact-finding techniques that would be
offensive coming from a private citizen would be a radical step .... ). Perhaps one
reason for this is the unarticulated requirement of a legitimate purpose. Private activi-
ties are obviously not limited to legitimate purposes, as binoculars and similar devices
can be used for "tom peeping" as well as for nature study. Of course, where private
persons use binoculars for a legitimate purpose, the use is not offensive. To some ex-
tent, this was the court's point in Kim when it characterized the prevalence of "tom
peeping" as irrelevant to the government's telescopic observations of Kim's apartment.
Kim, 415 F. Supp. at 1256. Some improper use of technology does not make all use of
technology unreasonable. On the other hand, Kim is limited by location. See supra note
137. If the agents had observed Kim outdoors, the prevalence of legitimate enhanced
observations by members of the public would support the government's use of a
telescope.
347 See Note, Tracking Katz, supra note 41, at 1488 (suggesting that people will look in
windows but will not use beepers). This goes beyond the Supreme Court's holding in
Knotts, but may be the inevitable result of the holding in United States v. Karo, 468 U.S.
705 (1984). For discussion of Karo, see supra note 67.
Other technological devices raise issues that cannot be fully resolved here. Private
citizens rarely use magnetometers, but the same is not true of the somewhat similar
sensoramatic devices. The common judicial treatment of the use of such devices as a
search not requiring a warrant or probable cause may simply be an example of a correct
result for the wrong reason. Nevertheless, such devices and other sophisticated but rela-
tively non-intrusive devices such as narcotics-sniffing dogs suggest that sophistication is
not the end of the analysis.
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phisticated technology.3 48 Magnification devices present a more dif-
ficult problem, as indicated by the somewhat artificial line
occasionally drawn between binoculars and telescopes. Still, the
fact that telescopes are disapproved primarily in home observation
cases suggests that courts should not subject the outdoor use of
such devices to the warrant clause.349 Similarly, aerial observation is
simply too common for courts to subject it to such regulation simply
because of its technological nature.350 At present, therefore, only
electronic surveillance and "replacement" technologies used pri-
marily by the government are sufficiently sophisticated to mandate
judicial supervision in all cases. Other technologies, if used to make
observations into areas other than houses or restrooms, are subject
only to the general norms.
V. CONCLUSION
Courts and legislatures have done relatively little to place visual
searches under legal control. The formalistic attitude of the entry
paradigm concerning property restrained regulation for most of the
nation's history, and the well intentioned but ultimately empty tau-
tology of the expectations paradigm changed the rules without solv-
ing the problem. Technological progress and increasing
aggressiveness by law enforcement agencies mandate that the legal
system develop a new approach capable of addressing the propriety
of governmental observations.
Too many courts in the past have assumed that the fourth
amendment imposes few, if any, restrictions on law enforcement ob-
servations. The trend may be changing, as some courts are now
seeking to identify principles in this area. This development proba-
348 See, e.g., United States v. Allen, 675 F.2d 1373, 1380 (9th Cir. 1980), cert. denied,
454 U.S. 833 (1981)(use of special lens upheld because "[s]uch equipment is widely
available commercially and is not more sophisticated than lenses generally available to
the public"); 1 W. LAFAvE, supra note 17, at 345 (concluding that enhanced photography
is permissible). But see Saltzburg, supra note 58, at 25 (describing cameras used in aerial
surveillance as "modem sophisticated equipment").
349 See supra notes 136-41. It is also difficult to draw straight lines in this regard. A
strong set of binoculars or a telephoto lens may be far more intrusive than a simple
telescope.
350 See supra notes 108, 334. The Supreme Court stated in California v. Ciraolo, 476
U.S. 207 (1986):
One can reasonably doubt that in 1967Justice Harlan considered an aircraft within
the category of future "electronic" developments that could stealthily intrude upon
an individual's privacy. In an age where private and commercial flight in the public
airways is routine, it is unreasonable for respondent to expect that his marijuana
plants were constitutionally protected from being observed with the naked eye from




bly results from the enormous recent advances in technology, which
have forced a sufficient number of people to recognize the privacy
implications and to raise concerns in this area. Nevertheless, the
development of legal doctrine has been halting and inconsistent,
largely because courts and legislatures have too often focused on
isolated devices and practices without taking cognizance of the more
general problems raised by law enforcement observations.
The first step toward regulating this activity on a general basis
is to admit that observations are searches. Too often courts deny
that looking is searching, even though the rationale of Katz and the
reality of modem technology compel the conclusion that many con-
structive invasions are extremely intrusive. Characterizing law en-
forcement observations as visual searches brings them under
constitutional control and permits effective judicial protection of
privacy and security. This simple step-adoption of the intrusion
paradigm-provides a theory of fourth amendment analysis that is
both inclusive and coherent.
The four norms proposed in this Article together constitute a
workable framework for implementing the intrusion paradigm.
Every visual search must have a legitimate purpose and be con-
ducted in a reasonable manner. These two general norms, which
would apply to all observations and all other searches, should serve
to prevent arbitrary conduct and minimize intrusions. More offen-
sive observations would be subject to the warrant and probable
cause requirements. One specific norm would require judicial au-
thorization for enhanced or otherwise unnatural observations into
houses or restrooms; the second would require judicial authoriza-
tion for observations using sophisticated technology not widely
used by members of the public. Adoption of these norms would
protect society from many intrusive surveillance practices without
depriving the government of the reasonable use of modern technol-
ogy for legitimate law enforcement purposes. 351
351 Many people may want greater protection from observations. Moreover, consis-
tent application of these four norms may identify gaps or additional problems that re-
quire creative applications of the fourth amendment. This is consistent with the
paradigm concept, a theory that consolidates and explains existing approaches, but
which leaves room for developing exceptions and additional principles. More stringent
restrictions can be imposed through state constitutions or legislation.
Also consistent with the paradigm concept, the four norms may serve as a model for
regulating other uses of technology that affect privacy. This Article has adhered to the
traditional view of the fourth amendment as applicable only to information gathering,
but there may be other vehicles for regulating other forms of governmental privacy inva-
sions. Computer data collection would seem to be an obvious target for regulation.
Privacy would be enhanced if governmental agencies were subject to restrictions on
computer use analogous to those proposed for observations. The general norms could
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The intrusion paradigm and the four norms_ proposed in this
Article provide one solution to the seemingly intractable problem of
the increasingly technological society. At a minimum they would
limit the adverse effects of sophisticated technology used in police
surveillance. They respond to the worst present abuses and provide
a means for effective control of the worst future abuses. In a doctri-
nal field mined with awkward, inconsistent, and incoherent deci-
sions, they provide four guideposts for the preservation of privacy
from unreasonable searches and seizures.
consist of requirements that records be maintained only for legitimate purposes and that
records be accessed and used reasonably. The specific norms could include a prohibi-
tion of maintaining any records of exceptionally private information and a prohibition of
domestic use of sophisticated computer technology not available to the public.
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